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CHAPTER I
POWER AND AUTHORITY IN COLLEGE ATHLETICS
Introduction.
Who controls "big time" college athletics? How is that 
control executed? Has control changed over time? Why do various 
interest groups participate in intercollegiate athletics? These 
questions are not simple, but they can be approached through an 
analysis of the exercise of power and authority in the governance 
of intercollegiate athletics.
Media reports, from newspaper sports pages to extensive 
television coverage, respond to an intense public interest in 
intercollegiate athletics and often reveal substantial problems 
in the conduct of college athletics. The problems include 
unethical practices by some parties involved in the athletic 
governance process who compromise academic integrity for 
commercial interests. "The observer is confronted, on the one 
hand, with lofty ideals and, on the other, by rumors and even 
well-authenticated statements of questionable practices, 
deception, and hypocrisy which ... multiply." (Savage et al.,
1929, p. 32) Savage's early observation is echoed today by the 
Knight Commission on Intercollegiate Athletics (1993, p. I) in 
its concern "that athletics abuses threaten the very integrity of 
higher education." Lucas and Smith (1978) noted turn-of-the- 
•century unethical practices that included recruiting, 
compensating, and playing ineligible athletes, such as post­
graduates, in collegiate athletic contests. Recent documented
unethical practices demonstrate that athletic constituents have 
continued these practices by supplying illegal inducements to 
prospective athletes, providing improper benefits to athletes, 
and using ineligible athletes. (33 Institutions. 1994, p. A43)
From recruiting scandals, to eligibility questions, to over- 
commercialization, the accounts of the persistent abuses that 
accompany the reports on intercollegiate athletics demonstrate 
that these "myriad problems" have been going on for a long time. 
(ACE, 1979) By the mid-1980s, 92% of college presidents felt 
there were major problems in the governance of college athletics. 
(Gilley et al., 1986) A 1989 Harris Poll indicated that 80% of 
the general public surveyed thought college athletics were out of 
control and corrupted by big money; yet contest attendance, media 
attention, and advertising dollars have all steadily increased 
since public interest has continued to grow. (Knight Commission, 
1993, p. II) A significant component of American society, 
athletics has become a $100 billion industry annually. (Andre & 
James, 1991) Due to their importance in our society, the 
perpetual problems in the operation of intercollegiate athletics 
merit attention. In investigating intercollegiate athletics, an 
examination of the roles and actions of the constituents 
participating in this enterprise is an initial step to 
understanding the use of power and authority in athletic 
governance.
Who are the constituents involved in the governance of 
intercollegiate athletics? Constituents, both on campus and off,
3include governing boards, presidents, athletic directors, 
coaches, faculty, students, conferences, alumni, boosters, 
business leaders, the National Collegiate Athletic Association, 
the media, and the general public. How do each of these 
constituents participate in, influence, or even control the 
governance of athletics to varying degrees at different 
institutions?
The control of intercollegiate athletics can be executed 
through regular channels of authority in the governance 
structure. However, the presence of continual problems in 
intercollegiate athletics suggests that constituents outside the 
hierarchy of authority utilize power in the governance process. 
The execution of specific constituent control is revealed through 
examining their use of power and authority in the athletic 
governance process.
Examining the methods of the constituents' use of power and 
authority can suggest possible motives for their participation in 
the governance of intercollegiate athletics. What motivates 
constituent participation? An examination of the needs leading to 
the decision-making process employed by constituents in the 
governance of intercollegiate athletics will provide insights 
into the continued systemic dysfunctioning of athletic 
governance.
What has led to the consistent problems over time? An 
explanation of the systemic dysfunction begins with an 
examination of the constituents participating in the governance
of athletics. An analysis of constituents' methods of 
participation, their execution of control through their role in 
the authority hierarchy and in the use of power that leads to the 
persistent problems, provides further insights into the breakdown 
in governance. Finally, an explanation of the apparent needs of 
the various constituent groups that motivate their decision­
making and lead them to participation, or even positions of 
control within intercollegiate athletics governance will reveal 
the basis for the systemic dysfunctions in the governance of 
intercollegiate athletics.
Problem Statement
The intent of this study is to explore constituent 
utilization of power and authority over time that led to systemic 
dysfunctions in the governance of big time intercollegiate 
athletics, and to develop a model to examine the needs motivating 
the interested constituents, thus suggesting alternatives for 
reform.
Persistent problems in the operation of intercollegiate 
athletics support the need for continued examination of this 
controversial area of American higher education. In this study, I 
will analyze constituents' use of legitimate authority in the 
structure of intercollegiate athletic governance, and their use 
of power, both legitimate and illegitimate, in the process of 
governance in intercollegiate athletics. I will explain the needs 
motivating, and decision-making process employed by, constituents 
in intercollegiate athletic governance. I will describe the
systemic dysfunctions over time and recommend specific avenues 
for reform in the governance of intercollegiate athletics. 
Research Questions
1. Who are the constituents using authority and power in the 
governance of intercollegiate athletics:
a. in 1929?
b. currently?
2. How do the constituents employ power and authority in the 
governance of intercollegiate athletics:
a. in 1929?
b. currently?
3. What are the needs that appear to motivate the 
constituent's involvement in the governance of 
intercollegiate athletics:
a. in 1929?
b. currently?
4. How is the current governance of intercollegiate 
athletics similar to, or different from, that of 1929?
5. What recommendations emerge from this analysis that would 
reform the intensifying breakdown in the governance of 
intercollegiate athletics?
Purpose of Study
Why is this study necessary? Through an examination of the 
use of power and authority by various constituents in the 
governance of athletics, athletic reformers can recognize the 
vulnerable elements that exist in the current system and can
identify the areas in the structure and process of 
intercollegiate athletic governance that need reform. By viewing 
the systemic breakdown in governance, administrators seeking 
substantive reforms can identify significant areas in which to 
formulate policies and implement practices that will intensify 
effectual reform efforts. Constituents can examine their needs 
and clarify their roles in the governance of intercollegiate 
athletics. The participation of a variety of athletic governance 
constituents in reform efforts is critical to success, yet can 
only be clearly defined if their needs and roles are mutually 
understood.
Reformers must ultimately understand the needs and roles of 
the constituents and their use of power and authority in the 
governance of intercollegiate athletics in order to devise 
feasible governance alternatives. Only through understanding the 
players, problems, and process of athletic governance, can 
reformers have a genuine and lasting impact upon changes in the 
operation of intercollegiate athletics.
Definitions of Terms
In this study, specific definitions for certain terms must 
be delineated in order to maintain accuracy. Intercollegiate 
athletics involve not only the competition between athletes 
representing individual university athletic programs, but also 
the complex governance relationships of those individual athletic 
programs. Athletics are an on-campus activity as well as an 
inter-institutional system of competitive sports, and a social
institution including people, practices, policies, and events in 
complex relationships. (Sage, 1990) Big time athletic programs 
are generally housed within elite major research "multiversities" 
where, according to Kerr (1982), a series of related communities 
are held together. These elite big time institutions boast 
celebrated athletic programs competing in many sports, but 
emphasizing revenue-producing sports like football and 
basketball, which are operated in a conspicuous business-like 
manner and display prominent commercial values. (Savage, 1929; 
Gilley et al. , 1986)
All big time athletic programs are members of the National 
Collegiate Athletic Association Division I-A. The National 
Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) is the major national 
inter-institutional regulatory body that governs intercollegiate 
athletics. It is comprised of presidential delegates representing 
member schools, and administered by its own extensive executive 
and administrative staff. In general, the institutional members 
of the NCAA often recommend rules and regulations through a small 
group of presidents elected to the Presidents' Commission and 
then enact the proposed rules legislation through the votes of 
institutional delegates, the faculty athletic representatives. 
(Yaeger, 1991)
Rule compliance is the responsibility of the individual 
institutions, although an enforcement system has been implemented 
by the NCAA executive staff. The NCAA promotes the collective 
political and economic interests of intercollegiate athletics,
8above the interests of individual member institutions. While all 
big time athletic programs are members of Division I-A--the 
highest level of intercollegiate athletic competition as 
designated by the NCAA--not all Division I-A universities have 
elite big time athletic programs. The focus of this study is the 
operation of these elite athletic programs. Over 100 Division I-A 
programs are included in the category of big time. The NCAA also 
includes other levels of competition. The majority of its 850- 
plus member institutions are less commercially-driven and more 
educationally-oriented. (Knight Commission, 1993)
At the core of this study of elite athletic institutions is 
the governance of intercollegiate athletics. Governance occurs 
when operating policies are established or changed, whereas 
administration involves making decisions on the basis of 
policies. (Westmeyer, 1990) In this study, governance in 
intercollegiate athletics includes the formation of policy and 
its administration both on-campus and inter-institutionally. 
Governance is executed through a variety of structures and 
processes. The governance structures of intercollegiate athletics 
include the hierarchy of constituent authority and prescribed 
procedures for policy formation and execution.
The governance of athletics involves the complex 
relationship of a variety of constituencies both within and 
outside of the university structure. Therefore, intercollegiate 
athletic governance structure is not wholly housed within the 
campus boundaries. For example, the NCAA and conferences are
9component constituents of the inter-institutional governance 
structure. In addition, the process of intercollegiate athletic 
governance involves a complex network of constituents and special 
interest groups outside the university. Conflicting interests 
between these groups--both within and outside of the formal 
governance hierarchy--results in the struggle for control of big 
time intercollegiate athletics. For purposes of this study, 
control is the direct involvement of constituents in the 
operation of intercollegiate athletics, wherein they direct 
actions in both governance and administration. (Chu et al., 1985)
Certain constituents control athletics through the use of 
legitimate power and accepted lines of authority within the 
university governance structure. Other constituents use 
illegitimate power, outside the lines of institutional authority, 
in the process of governance, in order to gain control. The 
constituents involved in athletic governance on-campus include 
the governing board, the president, the athletic director, the 
coach, and, to a lesser degree, the faculty and students. The 
constituents involved in inter-institutional athletic governance 
include the NCAA, conferences, and the government. Additional 
external constituents involved in the governance process include 
the alumni, boosters, business leaders, and the media.
A hierarchy of authority is inherent in the governance 
structure and should be clearly delineated. Constituent authority 
is supported by the use of legitimate power within the hierarchy. 
If the authority hierarchy is not adhered to, gaps are created,
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and illegitimate power is used by constituents to fill in the 
gaps in the hierarchy. The use of power and authority, whether 
legitimate or illegitimate, is reciprocal in relationships 
between constituents. (Burbules, 1986) According to Wolf (1990), 
constituents can use three types of power: interpersonal, 
tactical, and structural, which will be explained in detail 
later.
What needs motivate constituents to use power and authority 
in the governance of intercollegiate athletics? Needs are drives 
that motivate behavior. They can be tangible or intangible 
factors. According to Maslow (1970), needs are hierarchical, 
where basic needs such as security and safety serve as the 
foundation upon which higher level needs such as autonomy are 
built. Self-preservation will be presented in this study as an 
underlying deficiency need of individual constituents, that is, 
it takes precedence over other needs. (Maslow, 1970) For purposes 
of this study, self-preservation is the drive by individuals or 
groups in athletic governance to preserve their current status. 
The needs of various constituents, which result in their use of 
power and authority, will be determined by an analysis of the 
policies, practices, and circumstances of those constituents in 
the governance of intercollegiate athletics.
Constituent needs that spur the exercise of power and 
authority ultimately initiate dysfunction in the governance of 
intercollegiate athletics. In this study, a systemic dysfunction 
exists when the process of athletic governance is incongruent
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with the prescribed structure of governance in intercollegiate 
athletics. These systemic dysfunctions are created when, within 
the governance structure, breaches in authority are generated by 
constituents who either exceed or neglect their prescribed role, 
which results in constituent use of power to fill these authority 
gaps in the process of athletic governance.
Limitations
This study examines, over time, the needs of constituents 
and their use of power and authority in order to analyze a 
systemic dysfunction in the governance of intercollegiate 
athletics, thus suggesting alternatives for reform. Limitations 
of this study include the individual and collective limitations 
of previous research that are employed in this analysis. Details 
of the methods used in the previous works used for the data in 
this study are available only to the degree that they are 
revealed within the original sources. Therefore, the data are 
limited in this study. For example, the case studies and survey 
research conducted as an integral part of some of the reports are 
limited in scope and by the reliability and validity of their 
methods.
Defining and using social concepts have inherent biases in 
perspectives. This study is reliant upon the work of a variety of 
other researchers, each having provided an essential component, 
concept, or theory that may in itself be biased, thus limiting 
this current application. However, many of the most accepted and 
respected authorities in their fields have provided the
foundation for this study. The impact of the work of the vast 
array of prominent researchers--from Maslow to Wolf, Baldridge, 
Savage, Kerr, Frey, Sage, and many others--upon this study are 
discussed in Chapter II.
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CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE
Introduction.
"We have managed, in the United States, to hide the 
structures of power relations beneath more layers of subtlety and 
complexity, in schools and throughout society." (Burbules, 1986, 
p. ill) In this study, I intend to remove the shroud confounding 
the governance of intercollegiate athletics. Constituents use 
power and authority to pursue their aims in the governance of 
intercollegiate athletics. These power and authority 
relationships are shaped by the needs of various constituents. 
Within the system of governance in higher education, athletics is 
the arena in which power and authority relationships are studied. 
Therefore, an examination of each of these components is 
essential. The works of researchers from a variety of disciplines 
are indispensable ingredients in the current study. As Wolf 
(1990, p. 588) stated, "We can use the work of our predecessors 
to raise new questions." This review of related literature is 
organized as follows to present the essential components upon 
which this study was constructed: power and authority, needs, 
governance, and athletics.
Power and Authority
Power is a social concept presented through a variety of 
biases by those attempting to explain it. (Burbules, 1986) 
Theorists in social psychology, sociology, political science, and
philosophy each bring unique perspective to the study of power 
and authority, a subject of concern to "... social study in all 
its fields and forms." (Crespi, 1992, p. vii) Traditional views 
of power concerned themselves with the forms it takes and the 
definitions of the associated terms rather than with defining 
power itself. (Burbules, 1986) Some of these terms surrounding 
power include rights, force, violence, coercive circumstance, 
obligations, constraints, commands, exploitation, liberty, 
manipulation, autonomy, sanction, incentive, enticement, freedom, 
control, influence, reward, expertise, and authority.
(Airaksinen, 1988; Henderson, 1981; Shaver, 1981; Pennock & 
Chapman, 1972; Oppenheim, 1961) While each of these terms is an 
important concept, Henderson (1981, p. 11, 12) noted that the 
"diverse terminology used in attempts to explicate ... power" can 
create problems in the organization and structure of 
conceptualizations regarding power. Many theorists have also 
presented typologies of concepts related to power. Examples noted 
by Burbules (1986) were: Nyberg's Force, Finance, Fiction, and 
Fealty; Galbraith's Condign (punishment), Compensatory (reward), 
and Conditioned (persuasive or manipulative); and Wrong's Force, 
Manipulation, Persuasion, and Authority. The concentration on 
defining the concepts and nature of power through typologies have 
been restrictive. (Burbules, 1986)
Burbules (1986, p. 96) stated that "...traditional theories 
of power have assumed that power is a property of individual 
persons, wielded instrumentally as a means to particular intended
outcomes." Rather, he argued that power is reciprocal in social 
relations, that the "efficacy of power as a conservative system" 
can either direct outcomes or preserve the status quo, and that 
power is inherent in some relationships. (Burbules, 1986, p. 96) 
Power occurs in social relations and as such is a reciprocal, 
"dynamic and interactive" relationship. (Oppenhiem, 1961; 
Henderson, 1981, p. 33) Burbules (1986, p. 96, 97) illustrated 
the concept of reciprocity: "X has power over Y and ... Y 
empowers X." Giddens (1979, p. 93) stated that power is "always 
two-way, even if the power of one actor or party in a social 
relationship is minimal compared to another." He described power 
interactions as relations of autonomy and dependence. (Giddens, 
1979) Power is also "conflict oriented", that is it begins with 
and is the consequence of underlying conflicts of interest. 
(Airaksinen, 1988, p. 8; Burbules, 1986; Henderson, 1981) Actors 
in power relationships "suppress, disguise, preserve, or deny" 
these conflicts of interest in order to obtain a desired outcome 
or preserve the current state. (Burbules, 1986, p. 98) Burbules 
(1986, p. Ill) stated that "power endures because underlying 
conflicts of interest endure." Hence, an examination of power 
requires a knowledge of where each actor's interests reside. 
Burbules (1986) concluded that if no conflict of interest exists, 
no exercise of power exists. Therefore, a power vacuum occurs 
where congruent objectives reign.
While conflicts of interest generate reciprocal power 
relations, different degrees of compliance and domination exist
in those relationships. (Nyberg, 1981; Burbules, 1986)
Interactive power relations usually exhibit tension between 
compliance and defiance, or consent and resistance. Burbules 
(1986) presented a continuum that placed power relations between 
domination and consent. Power relies on compliance, not consent, 
and uses domination in the extreme. (Burbules, 1986) Domination 
occurs when one actor uses superior power over a resistant 
inferior-powered actor. At the opposite end of the spectrum, 
consent occurs when the inferior-powered actor approves the use 
of power by the superior-powered actor. Compliance implies that 
the inferior-powered actor yields to the superior-powered actor. 
(Burbules, 1986) Similarly, Bailey (1969) categorized power 
relationships by degree from consensual to command. In command 
relationships, domination by the actor with superior power 
limits, or eliminates, the autonomy of the actor with inferior 
power. (Bailey, 1969; Burbules, 1986) While the inferior-powered 
actor's autonomy is a "threat" to the superior-powered actor's 
authority and control, consensual power relationships at the 
other end of the spectrum are "an expression of informed and 
autonomous judgement" in a reciprocal power relationship. (Szasz, 
in Rosenbaum, 1983, p. 199; Burbules, 1986, p. 100) The continuum 
of power is perceived differently by actors with superior power 
and those with inferior power. However, power is "like a machine 
in which everyone is caught, those who exercise power just as 
much as those over whom it is exercised." (Foucault, in Burbules, 
1986)
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Power relations are "not merely synchronic, but diachronic", 
not momentary but relative to previous relations and affective in 
future relations. (Burbules, 1986, p. 98) Power relations are 
perpetual; their past history influences predispositions that 
establish propensities that "shape and constrain the relation and 
which are in turn reinforced by it." (Burbules, 1986, p. 98)
Power is a means of prevention as well as direction and 
control. (Burbules, 1986) Therefore, the intent of outcomes is 
central to the concept of control. (Bailey, 1969; Henderson,
1981) To obtain desired ends in power relations, or control those 
situations, a power actor employs a variety of methods; from 
obligation and permission, to incentives and inducements, to 
persuasion and manipulation, to constraints and sanctions, to 
coercion and commands, to force and violence. The continuum of 
methods employed by the superior-powered actor in power relations 
reveals the degree of acceptance of the superior's outcomes by 
the inferior-powered actor. Crespi (1992) described alternative 
methods employed by power actors to achieve their objectives: 
negotiation, consensus, and coercion. According to Airaksinen 
(1988), actors with superior power also use coercion, force, 
violence, exploitation, obligation, commands, permission, and 
constraints in order to attain control. Bailey (1969) added the 
use of collusion. Henderson (1981) noted the role of dependence 
by the inferior-powered actor upon the superior-powered actor, 
and the use of constraints, inducements, and persuasion. 
Manipulation, sanction, coercion, incentive, and enticements are
18
methods employed by power actors in pursuit of control. (Pennock 
& Chapman, 1972)
Burbules (1986, p. 105) stated that we "use" power in a 
variety of ways in attempts to gain control, without recognizing 
that the power relation also "uses" us. Foucault (1977) argued 
that power struggles are the core of many power theories and that 
they involve not only an attempt by the inferior-powered actor to 
escape the power relation but also to wrestle power away from the 
superior-powered actor. Burbules (1986, p. 109) noted that power 
struggles are "... attempts to supplant one group in power with 
another without rejecting the basic power relation or conflicts 
of interest that have given rise to it." In this examination of 
interactive, reciprocal power struggles between actors in 
intercollegiate athletic governance, I will employ Wolf's (1990) 
delineation of modes of power.
Wolf (1990) argued that the study of modes of power would 
produce greater clarity in describing power relationships and, 
therefore, in applying the concept of power in future research.
He identified four distinct modes of power. The first is a 
personal attribute of "potency or capability, the basic 
Nietzschean idea of power." (Wolf, 1990, p. 586) This mode does 
not describe the "form and direction" of interactive power play; 
therefore, for purposes of this study, it will not be employed in 
examining the relationships and actions of power actors in 
intercollegiate athletics. (Wolf, 1990, p. 586) The second mode 
of power is used in interpersonal relations. This way of using
power concentrates on the "sequences of interactions and 
transactions" among the actors involved in the power 
relationship, such as one actor's ability to impose will on 
another actor. (Wolf, 1990, p. 586) However, interpersonal power 
does not involve the "arena" in which the interactions occur. The 
third mode of power does examine the "arena" of play as a 
component in power relations in which actors operate within 
determinate settings. Wolf (1990, p. 586) identified this mode as 
tactical or organizational power, wherein power is used to 
control the settings in which interactive power play occurs. For 
example, one actor can use power over the environment of another 
actor. The fourth mode of power identified by Wolf (1990, p. 586) 
is structural power "... that not only operates within settings 
or domains but that also organizes and orchestrates the settings 
themselves." Structural power shapes the field of play, 
establishing the social structure surrounding the arenas in which 
power relations occur. Structural power determines the possible 
actions of actors engaged in interactive power play, making some 
power relations possible and others impossible. However, 
structure is itself a social concept that has eluded an agreed- 
upon definition. (Giddens, 1979; Sewell, 1992)
Other theorists have identified concepts that support Wolf's 
(1990) description of structural power as a social force that 
determines possibilities for power play. Airaksinen (1988, p. 93- 
170) described the "coercive institution" that parallels 
Burbules' (1986, p. 96) description of the "inherence of power in
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certain institutions, regardless of anyone's actively choosing or 
directing them." Such power in "coercive circumstance" is made 
necessary by surrounding situations and institutions, and is 
neither chosen nor avoided. (Airaksinen, 1988, p. 97) This 
reflects Wolf's (1990) delineation of "how the forces of the 
world impinge upon the people" through structural power.
Power is latent in structures of ideology, authority, and 
organization; however, "... ideology, authority, and organization 
each can take forms, and arise in contexts, in which they are 
relatively free from power." (Burbules, 1986, p. 95, 108)
Ideology is used as a framework of legitimation and rationale for 
power relations that can facilitate or restrict action in 
relations of power. (Pennock & Chapman, 1972; Burbules, 1986)
Burbules (1986, p. 107) suggested that many view authority 
as the "... legitimate cousin of power: where power coerces, 
authority persuades." Oppenheim (1961) described legitimacy as 
the right to exercise power thus resulting in authority. 
Airaksinen (1988, p.126) presumed that "... some aspects of 
authority have a rational core that makes them socially 
unavoidable and even morally viable forms of human cooperation."
According to Burbules (1986), authority, whether claimed or 
granted, is underwritten by institutional arrangements such as 
symbols, rituals, and physical configurations; expertise can 
enter in as well. Social factors allow these arrangements to be 
taken as authority when often they are intended to maintain 
advantage or privilege. (Burbules, 1986) Privilege is an
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expression of power and is associated with authority. (Burbules, 
1986)
Burbules (1986, p. 107) stated, "Organization as a framework 
of power relates closely to ideology and authority." Within that 
framework, Airaksinen (1988, p. 121) stated that we "... need a 
hierarchical institution supported by authority." Burbules (1986, 
p. 107) describe the hierarchical institution, noting that "... 
bureaucratic organization is characterized by hierarchy, 
specialization, and relegated responsibility." Hierarchy often 
preserves the status quo. Within the hierarchy, privileges go 
with positions and specialization allows autonomy by position. 
Bureaucracy also creates conflict of interest through relegated 
responsibilities. (Burbules, 1986)
Authority in bureaucratic organizations can be "bounded by 
relevant and sensible limits" and grounded in consensual 
qualifications, it can promote common interests, and it can be 
maintained through "respect and trust". (Burbules, 1986, p. 108) 
Conversely, authority can be unquestioned; it can presume 
privilege and exercise prerogative beyond justified limits. 
(Burbules, 1986) Authority can be used to undermine the exercise 
of autonomy. (Szasz, in Rosenbaum, 1983, p. 200) An organization 
can be participatory rather than hierarchical in its decision 
making processes by developing collective rather than specialized 
tasks, and decentralizing rather than focussing responsibilities. 
(Burbules, 1986) Whether in a participatory or hierarchical field 
of interactive power play, power is contextual. The field of
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play, the direction of play, the individual actors involved, and 
the interests of those actors, determine the use of power and 
authority.
Needs
Since power and authority are contextual, any study of power 
must identify where the actors' interests reside. (Burbules,
1986, p. 96) Interests and needs, whether individual or 
institutional, serve as motivation. Motivation is a complex 
series of desires and drives. (Owens, 1981) Motivation serves as 
an intervening variable between needs and outcomes (see figure 
1) . Without motivation, based upon needs, there would be no 
organized action directed toward outcomes. Thus, purposive 
behavior is motivated by needs and oriented toward a goal. 
(Schelling, 1978, p. 17)
MOTIVATIONNEEDS OUTCOME
Figure l:Motivation as an Intervening Variable
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Needs are drives that motivate behavior. They can be 
tangible or intangible factors. A pre-eminent need generating 
action, "self-preservation," as first described by James 
(1892/1977) was a category of action directed toward maintenance 
of the present state of self. For purposes of this study, self- 
preservation is the drive by individuals or groups in athletic 
governance to preserve their current status. Within this study, 
self-preservation is the objective of organisms and organizations 
alike, the need of individuals and institutions.
According to Maslow (1970), needs are hierarchical. Maslow 
(1970), in his Hierarchy of Needs, placed the basic needs of 
survival, security, and safety at the foundation. Maslow (1970) 
theorized that human needs build to a peek of autonomous self- 
actualization. In this regard, the basic need of self- 
preservation serves as the foundation upon which higher level 
needs such as autonomy are built. However, the basic needs are 
deficiency needs, meaning that, if they are not met, the person 
will seek to make up for the deficiency, and this takes 
precedence over all other needs. (Maslow, 1970) If lower-order 
deficiency needs are not satisfied, they maintain greater potency 
and higher-order needs cannot arise. (Maslow, 1970) In this 
study, self-preservation is an underlying deficiency need of 
individuals and constituent groups in the governance of 
intercollegiate athletics.
Maslow (1970), in his Hierarchy of Needs, suggested that the 
basic needs of survival, safety, and security as deficiency needs
serve as the pre-eminent motivation for behavior. While Maslow 
directed his work toward general human behavior and motivation, 
these theories can be applied to individuals in work settings and 
to institutions as well. (Owens, 1981) Owens (1981) applied 
Maslow's theories to educational organizations as well as 
individuals in those organizations. He drew four conclusions 
about the application of Maslow's Hierarchy in organizations: 1) 
unmet needs have prepotency, needs that have been met are not 
motivators; 2) the "web of needs" is complex; 3) there is general 
intention to satisfy motivating needs, beginning with lower-order 
needs; and 4) there are many ways to meet higher-order needs, but 
relatively few ways to meet lower-order needs, which are pre­
eminent. (Owens, 1981)
Herzberg (1966) described factors similar to general 
deficiency needs in organizational settings as hygiene or 
maintenance factors, upon which motivation factors could be 
built. His Two-Factor Theory of Motivation described the 
preventive quality of maintenance factors, that is, if they are 
not sufficiently present, they can prevent motivation. However, 
if maintenance factors are satisfied, motivation can occur. In 
this sense, Herzberg (1966) suggested that motivation arises from 
certain factors, and dissatisfaction arises from a separate set 
of factors and can stifle motivation.
Self-preservation, as an interest of individuals or 
organizations, is a deficiency need generating the motivation to 
use power and authority in interactive relationships. Authority
can be asserted in order to be maintained or extended; a variety 
of modes of power can be employed toward the same ends.
(Burbules, 1986; Wolf, 1990) In the governance of intercollegiate 
athletics, power and authority relationships are shaped by the 
needs of various constituents and the field of play upon which 
power interaction occurs. Therefore, an examination of the 
governance of higher education, as the field of play where 
constituents use power and authority in intercollegiate 
athletics, is a foundation upon which to build this study. 
Governance of Hicrher Education
Universities are complex organizations that vary from other 
organizations in a number of ways: they serve a variety clients; 
their employees have varying skills; they possess various 
technologies; they use diverse structures and methods of 
governance; and they have different relationships to external 
environments. (Baldridge, 1991) The organizational 
characteristics of universities include: institutional goals, 
hierarchical systems and structures, officials with specific 
responsibilities, policy-making processes, and "day-to-day" 
bureaucratic administration. (Baldridge, 1991, p. 39) In this 
section, I examine universities by looking at previous works on:
1) the pluralistic nature of the university and its mission and 
how that leads to a shared governance ideal; 2) the influence of 
external interests as universities pursue resources and the loose 
governance structures that ensue; 3) decision-making processes
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and models; and 4) leadership and authority in higher education 
governance.
"Goal ambiguity" is common in higher education organizations 
and universities that often "try to be all things to all people" 
and thus "rarely have a single mission." (Baldridge, 1991, p. 39) 
Cohen and March (1991) suggested that rhetoric and ineffective 
efforts by university administrators to produce cohesive goals 
have usually resulted in "meaningless" mission statements. Kerr 
(1982, p. 41, 136) noted that there is no more bold vision of a 
singular mission and described the modern "multiversity" as a 
"city of infinite variety", a "pluralistic institution", wherein 
several purposes, several power centers, and various clientele 
were the norm. Kerr (1982) also noted the existence of "student 
power", "faculty power", and "public power," which are evidence 
that higher education serves many "clients with disparate, 
complicated needs." (Baldridge, 1991, p. 31) In attempting to 
serve many masters, universities "do not know clearly what they 
are trying to do, they often do not know how to do it either." 
(Baldridge, 1991, p. 31)
Universities are "people-processing" institutions where 
various clients demand, and often obtain, influence in 
governance. (Baldridge, 1991, p. 40) These clients can be 
mutually-dependent internal constituents, such as students, 
faculty, administrators, or trustees, who seek to share 
governance authority. (Berdahl, 1991; Mortimer & McConnell, 1991) 
Shared governance, while infrequent in practice, is therefore an
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ideal wherein "... joint involvement is preferable to segmental 
decision making." (Mortimer & McConnell, 1991, p. 164) The 
concept of shared decision making "ignores conflict of interest", 
assuming that shared values give rise to consensus and 
"consultation and joint effort should be built on a high degree 
of trust." (Mortimer & McConnell, 1991, p. 166, 169) The shared 
governance model also "...takes little account of external 
forces." (Mortimer & McConnell, 1991, p. 166)
Institutional clientele include constituents in the external 
environment. Most "... of the threats to departmental, college, 
and campus autonomy and patterns of governance are generated by 
external forces and developments." (Mortimer & McConnell, 1991, 
p. 167) Universities, like any complex organizations, are 
"environmentally vulnerable" to outside influences. (Baldridge, 
1991 , p. 42) On a "continuum from 'independent' to 'captured'," 
Baldridge (1991, p. 42) placed universities in the middle. While 
they had enjoyed "substantial insulation" as a whole, they are 
now facing "powerful external forces." (Baldridge, 1991, p. 42) 
When applied, this strong external pressure seriously reduces the 
"operating" or "procedural autonomy." (Baldridge, 1991, p. 33; 
Berdahl, 1991, p. 218) Kerr (in Keller, 1983, p. 24, 25) stated 
that "autonomy--to the extent it ever existed--is dead".
Berdahl (1991, p. 218) noted the impact of external 
constituents, such as donors, courts, state governments, and 
federal bureaucratic offices, that "often have the power of 
control, not even to mention the murky terrain of influence" in
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higher education. He described the specific situation that may 
arise with:
... our good friends, the alumni, who, on the one hand, 
support alma mater with their money, their enthusiasm, and 
their volunteer efforts. But on occasion, their enthusiasm 
can go too far, particularly in such areas as 
intercollegiate athletics, where there have been instances 
of gross interference with campus decisions and priorities. 
... Not only do they give money and support, but sometimes 
they want to help control the academy's decisions. (Bardahl, 
1991, p. 219)
Furthermore, state governments are externally seeking control 
over institutional role, budget, and performance while the 
influence of "the flow of federal money" over the direction of 
the university is tied to policies designed to "broaden access" 
and assure "social justice and affirmative action." (Berdahl,
1991, pp. 221-222) Even the external forces involved in 
university governance have diverse interests and are not always 
cooperative, competing among themselves for influence. (Berdahl, 
1991)
In relation to external constituents, Hackman (1991) defined 
environmental power as the ability to acquire needed outside 
resources, while institutional power was influence within the 
institution. External resources are sought out because 
"peripheral units," such as athletics, must "bring in financial 
resources" and "'pay their own way ... or they will shrink.'"
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(Hackman, 1991, p. 275) This predicament creates institutional 
conflict and ambiguity. Kerr (in Keller, 1983) noted:
There is a 'kind of lawlessness' in any large university 
with separate sources of initiative and power; and the task 
is to keep this lawlessness within bounds ...
There are several 'nations', of students, of faculty, 
of alumni, of trustees, of public groups. Each has its 
territory, its jurisdiction, its form of government. Each 
can declare war on the others; some have the power of 
veto... It is a pluralistic society with multiple cultures, 
(p. 28)
The lawlessness of an "organized anarchy" implies 
"confusion, disarray, and conflict" in higher education 
organizations. (Cohen & March, 1991, p. 399; Baldridge, 1991, p. 
44) Four systemic ambiguities were identified as fundamental in 
"organized anarchies": ambiguity of purpose, ambiguity of power, 
ambiguity of experience, and ambiguity of success. (Cohen &
March, 1991, p. 399) Cohen & March (1991, p. 399 - 404) 
concluded: universities have no clear goals; formal authority is 
limited and often not accepted, while "the real power" is hard to 
find; outcomes are dependent upon factors outside presidential 
experience; and goals and outcomes are independent of each other, 
creating diverse criteria for success.
The concept of "organized anarchy" supports the 
organizational characteristics of higher education institutions 
identified by Baldridge's (1991 , p. 34): unclear goals, client
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service, unclear technologies, problematic professionalism, and 
vulnerable environment. "Organized anarchy" also suggested a 
"looser, more fluid kind of organization," described by Weick 
(1991, p. 103) as "loosely coupled systems." (Baldridge, 1991, p. 
34) Loose coupling refers to an independent, yet responsive 
connection between university elements with diverse interests, 
using task-induced technical or office-oriented authority 
coupling mechanisms. (Weick, 1991) Kerr (1982) described the 
looseness of university governance as:
... the multiversity with its strung-along type of unity, 
with its lack of devotion to any single faith and its lack 
of concentration on any single function, with a condition of 
cohesion at best or coexistence at next best or contiguity 
at least, (pp. 138-139)
Decision-making is problematic in a "loosely coupled, 
ambiguous organization." (Cohen & March, 1991, p. 404) In such 
organizations, decision making often results from* unplanned 
activities. (Baldridge, 1991) Keller (1983, p. 26) called for an 
end to the "era of laissez-faire" governance and suggested the 
need for planning an "academic strategy" in university decision­
making.
Organizational decision-making in higher education 
governance can be categorized in "bureaucratic", "collegial", or 
"political" models. (Baldridge, 1991, p. 38) However, Baldridge 
(1991, p. 45) stated that "... the search for an all-encompassing 
model is simplistic, for no one model can delineate the
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intricacies of decision processes in complex organizations."
While no model stands on its own, each has valid aspects to help 
examine higher education governance structures. Baldridge (1991, 
p. 35) suggested that these models be used "jointly to examine 
different aspects of the governance process."
Bureaucratic structures were described by Weber, in 
Baldridge, (1991, p. 46) as "networks of social groups dedicated 
to limited goals and organized for maximum efficiency." The 
elements of bureaucracy associated with university governance 
were summarized by Baldridge (1991): the state charter allows 
external state influence; the formal hierarchy specifies formal 
relationships; the communication channels are formalized; 
authority relations are definitive; rules and regulations 
formally govern the university; people processing and record­
keeping abound; and decision processes for routine decisions are 
delegated. The bureaucratic model has weaknesses when applied to 
higher education because it explains the "formal structure" of 
governance and "authority--legitimate, formalized power," but it 
fails to provide illumination about the "dynamic processes" or 
the use of informal power and influence in institutions of higher 
education. (Baldridge, 1991, p. 47) While bureaucracies explain 
the most efficient manner of executing policies, they do not 
examine changes over time, nor do they address how policies are 
developed. (Baldridge, 1991)
The collegial governance model examines the process of 
policy-making in higher education. The university has been viewed
by some as a "collegium," a "community of scholars," wherein 
there is full participation by all members in decision-making. 
(Baldridge, 1991, p. 48) Such a "roundtable" democracy suggests 
that academic institutions should process differently from 
bureaucratic hierarchies. (Baldridge,1991, p. 48) The academic 
community achieves "coordination" in decision-making through 
"dynamic consensus." (Millet, in Baldridge, 1991, p. 48) Ideally, 
within the collegial model, the faculty's professional authority 
is based upon expertise rather bureaucratic position. (Baldridge, 
1991) However, noting the "discontent and anxiety" of 
academicians with the governance structure of higher education, 
Baldridge (1991) suggests that the model of university governance 
ought to be a "utopian" collegium, not that it is one. The most 
obvious shortcoming of the collegial model in the governance of 
higher education is its incapacity to deal with conflicts of 
interest. (Baldridge, 1991)
Neither bureaucratic rule-making nor collegial consensus 
explains the "power plays, conflict, and the rough-and-tumble 
politics" of institutional governance. (Baldridge, 1991, p. 50) 
Within the "loosely coordinated, fragmented political system" of 
governance in higher education, the political model offers an 
explanation of the decision-making process that is less 
"systematic or formalistic" than the other models. (Baldridge, 
1991, p. 54) In the political model where complex organizations 
are viewed as "miniature political systems, with interest-group 
dynamics and conflicts," policy-making is the focus. (Baldridge,
1991, p. 50) The model is based upon the following assumptions 
about the political process: inactivity prevails and decisions 
are made by small groups; participation in the process is fluid 
by those interested; universities are divided into "interest 
groups with different goals and vales"; conflict is normal and 
healthy in complex organizations; formal authority is limited by 
competing interest groups; and external interest groups are 
influential in internal governance processes. (Baldridge, 1991, 
p. 51, 52) In this light, the political model is particularly 
applicable in examining aspects of constituents' use of power and 
authority in governing athletics in higher education.
The governance of higher education involves a complex 
political community that creates a variety of pressures and many 
sources of power and influence that impact decision-making in the 
university setting. In addition, within the political model, 
university decision-making includes a "legislative stage" that 
generates policy based upon these various influences, and a 
"policy execution phase" that provides feedback and possibly 
creates new conflict. (Baldridge, 1991, p. 55, 56) In the 
political decision-making process, interest groups or 
bureaucratic processes determine the decision which needs to be 
addressed, and then the right of decision-making is "subject to 
conflict, power manipulation, and struggles between interest 
groups." (Baldridge, 1991, p. 52, 53) Committees, councils, and 
advisory groups are part of a diffuse, "complex decision network" 
in higher education that "allows a cumulative buildup of
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expertise and advice." (Baldridge, 1991, pp. 53, 54) Baldridge 
(1991) described the process of decision-making in the political 
model:
First, powerful political forces--interest groups, 
bureaucratic officials, influential individuals, 
organizational subunits--cause a given issue to emerge from 
the limbo of ongoing problems and certain 'attention cues' 
force the political community to consider the problem. 
Second, there is a struggle over locating the decision with 
a particular person or group, for the location of the right 
to make the decision often determines the outcome. Third, 
decisions are usually 'performed' to a great extent by the 
time one person or group is given the legitimacy to make the 
decision; not all options are open and the choices have been 
severely limited by the previous conflicts, (p. 54) 
Leadership in the governance of higher education is viewed 
differently based upon the model of governance applied. In the 
bureaucratic model, the leader plays the role of "hero" presiding 
over a "complex pyramid of power." (Baldridge, 1991, p. 57) The 
collegial leader is a negotiator and facilitator in obtaining 
"consensus in a community of scholars." (Millet, in Baldridge, 
1991, p. 57) The political leader who "jockeys between power 
blocs", negotiating, facilitating, mediating, and networking to 
"fight for desired changes" is "... not at the peak of a pyramid 
but rather at the center of intersecting circles." (Berdahl,
1991; Baldridge, 1991, p. 58)
Whetten and Cameron (1991) identified the characteristics of 
successful leaders: they put equal emphasis on process and 
outcome; they are risk takers with a low fear of failure; they 
nurture support of strategic constituencies; they do not succumb 
to external demands; they leave a distinct imprint; they are 
excellent communicators; they respect the power of organizational 
cultures; and they highlight sources of opportunity that exist. 
For this study, effective leaders use power and authority in 
interactive relations either to maintain the status quo or to 
achieve intended outcomes. In order to achieve their ends, 
leaders can use two types of authority: administrative authority 
that is derived from a legitimate position within the power 
hierarchy; and professional authority that is derived from 
knowledge. (Etzioni, 1991) Leaders exercised authority as "line" 
authority that follows the chain of command or "staff" authority 
that occurs outside the "line" and contends with a degree of 
autonomy..(Etzioni, 1991)
Within the university hierarchy, the governing board and the 
president are responsible for providing leadership and direction. 
The president serves "at the pleasure of the board." (Kauffman, 
1980) Effective boards are responsible for policy formation.
(Chait et al., 1991) The formation of policy is an action of 
governance, while the application or execution of policy is an 
action of administration. (Westmeyer, 1990) Both are necessary 
for effective governance. The structure of governance remains 
similar to that described by Elliott (1935) wherein the board
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could act unilaterally or through delegation of authority in the 
university hierarchy, which included the president, faculty, and 
other administrators serving as leaders. However, the processes 
in governance involve power relationships outside the formal 
university hierarchy.
Pfeffer (1991) concluded that leaders are constrained in 
their actions by external factors and circumstances beyond their 
control. These constraints can be an application of Wolf's (1990) 
notion of structural power. For example, Barrow (1990) noted the 
impact of capitalism on the "reconstruction of American higher 
education" prior to 1928. While "environmental forces" go "beyond 
administrative control," effective administrators can have an 
impact upon organizational effectiveness and performance.
(Whetten & Cameron, 1991, p. 459) The impact of effective leaders 
in one arena of governance is described by Hackman (1991, p.
276): "Sports have increased because ... the president decided to 
emphasize it." While this is an over-simplified analysis, the 
arena of intercollegiate athletics merits the attention of 
research in the governance of higher education.
Intercollegiate Athletics
While reform efforts are abundant in college athletics 
today, current reform agendas take into account neither the 
possibility of long-term systemic breakdown of the higher 
education governance structure and processes relative to 
intercollegiate athletics, nor the power relationships of the 
constituencies involved. Lessons from history can be applied by
modern decision-makers addressing current problems. Thelin (1982, 
p. 1) noted the need to examine history because the complexities 
in structure and processes of universities are derived from "the 
fact that universities are historic institutions." Eitzen and 
Sage (1978, p. 25) stated: "Current social circumstances are 
related to events of the past, consequently sociologists use 
history to develop an understanding ..., making the current ... 
more meaningful."
Lucas and Smith (1978, p. vi) suggested that, in looking at 
history, finding "a continuous stream of ideas" is adequate, 
rather than attempting to observe a "single central theme"; 
however others have examined specified themes in relation to 
college athletics. Davenport (in Chu et al., 1985, p. 6) 
described a "paradox" in college athletics where the athletic 
pursuits of winning, commercialization, and money contradict the 
epitome of scholarship, academic integrity, and the positive 
qualities perceived in higher education. Lawrence (1987) 
concentrated on the development and pervasive role of the NCAA in 
college athletics. Hart-Nibbrig and Cottingham (1986, p. 1) 
traced the evolution of sport relative to the economic and 
political factors that created "corporate athleticism", and the 
problems associated with that evolution. Smith (1988) 
concentrated upon the conflict between collegial "paternalism" 
and student "freedom" in college athletics. Hardy and Berryman 
(in Frey, 1982) surveyed the development of intercollegiate 
athletics relative to institutional control and educational
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value. Chu (in Chu et al., 1985) examined the formal 
incorporation of athletics into the ambiguous concept of American 
higher education. Andre and James (1991, p. xix) presented the 
"conflict and controversy" that surrounded the development of the 
institution of college athletics.
Lucas and Smith (1978, p. v - vii) stated that the history 
of American sport reflects the "dominant social themes in 
American society", and provides a deeper knowledge of athletics 
relative to modern society. Eitzen and Sage (1978, p. 25) 
concluded that athletics are "a microcosm of American society" 
that reinforce and reflect societal values as a "mirror of 
American life." The relationship between athletics and American 
societal values was described as "reciprocal" in nature by Eitzen 
and Sage (1978, p. 59) and Nyquist (in Chu et al., 1985). Sports 
"properly conducted provide values of enduring human 
significance." (Simon, 1991, p. 200) The dominant American values 
associated with athletics were presented by Eitzen and Sage 
(1978): Success (Individual Achievement); Competition; Means to 
Achieve (Hard Work); Progress; Materialism; and External 
Conformity. Violence has emerged as the ultimate method of 
"survival of the fittest" in the theory of Social Darwinism as it 
exists in society and as it is expressed in sports. (Eitzen & 
Sage, 1978, p. 68) Marmion (1979) stated that American college 
athletics have "truly become a part of the social fabric of our 
society." McPherson (1989) and Sage (1980) noted that athletics 
are pervasive in our society. It is because of sports'
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pervasiveness that an examination of the "rise of sport in 
America" is important in providing "clues to understanding sport 
in its present form." {McPherson, 1989; Sage, 1980; Eitzen &
Sage, 1978, p. 54)
Smith (1988) viewed extracurricular activities, including 
sports, as an expression of student rebellion, or freedom, 
against the paternalism of early universities. Intramural class 
competitions were documented early on the American college 
campus, with students "playing at ball" as far back as 1761. 
(Lawrence, 1987, p. 1, 2; Smith, 1988) However, things changed 
when Harvard met Yale in a crew race on August 3, 1852: the 
Boston, Concord, and Montreal Railroad company, in a commercial 
venture to promote its line to Lake Winnipesaukee, New Hampshire 
as a vacation destination, sponsored the first inter-college 
athletic competition. (Lucas & Smith, 1978, p. 196, 197) This 
marked the "watershed of intercollegiate sports", followed, on 
July 1, 1859, by baseball between Amherst College and Williams 
College, and English soccer-style football between Rutgers and 
Princeton on November 6, 1869. (Hart-Nibbrig & Cottingham, 1986, 
p. 18; Smith, 1988, p. 219; Davenport, in Chu et al., 1985, p.7) 
However, it was the debut of American rugby-style football on May 
15, 1874 with a tie between Harvard University and McGill 
University of Canada, followed a year later on June 4, 1875 with 
Tuft University defeating Harvard, that prompted more widespread 
institutional and public interest in intercollegiate athletics. 
(Smith, 1988)
Football was received enthusiastically by students and 
spectators alike; however, it created controversy with respect to 
the "place of athletics in higher education." (Davenport, in Chu 
et al., 1985, p. 7) "King football" caught the attention not only 
of the public, but also of the college administrators of the day 
who recognized the publicity and revenue potential associated 
with a winning team. (Hart-Nibbrig & Cottingham, 1986, p. 18, 19) 
As communication and transportation technologies advanced, 
college athletics became more pervasive in American society. 
(Eitzen & Sage, 1978? Sage, 1980; McPherson, 1989) As successful 
sports teams received newspaper attention, business-like, "win- 
at-all-cost" athletic programs emerged. (Lawrence, 1987, p. 6, 7) 
Veysey (1965) implied that a bandwagon effect of successful 
athletic programs at leading institutions such as Harvard existed 
within higher education:
Trustees of existing institutions ... sometimes preferred 
to risk experimentation rather than continue in the 
unpromising ways of the past ... Once one respectable 
institution moved in a new direction, others found 
themselves under a powerful compulsion to follow suit. (p.
10, 11)
Systemic problems have existed in the relationship of 
athletics to higher education since the advent of intercollegiate 
competition on August 3, 1852. (Smith, 1988; Hardy & Berryman, in 
Frey, 1982) From early, unorganized student activities, student- 
run college athletic clubs "promoted and encouraged" inter-
college competitions. {Hardy & Berryman, in Frey, 1982, p. 17; 
Hart-Nibbrig & Cottingham, 1986, p. 18) But "students erected 
within the gates a monster" that needed to be controlled.
(Rudolph, 1962, p. 155) Kerr (1982, p. 16) concurred: "Once 
started, university spectator sports could not be killed even by 
the worst of teams or the best of de-emphasis; and few 
universities seriously sought after either." Athletics became a 
vehicle for campus unification, as Rudolph (1962, p. 381) 
suggested that "if every man did not take the same courses, at 
least he had an opportunity to cheer for the same team." College 
athletics had a variety of proponents, despite its uncomfortable 
fit in the academic environment.
Willing academicians, government leaders, and the American 
general public entertained the notion of new programs and 
objectives for higher education, and the colleges' business- 
minded presidents and trustees used athletics as a means of 
remedying financial and enrollment difficulties. Without a 
well-accepted understanding of the importance and 
responsibilities of the American college and university, 
leadership in higher education had to search creatively for 
funds and students, altering programs and educational 
philosophies in the process. (Chu, 1985, p. 36)
The control of college sports, whether shared or absolute, 
evolved among "students, alumni, presidents, faculty, and 
professional administrators", gradually shifting from its student 
origins to alumni and, later, college faculty and administrators.
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(Hardy & Berryman, in Frey, 1982, p. 17) Smith (1988, p. 212) 
concluded that students had lost control of athletics because 
they "lacked the responsibility to run them without conflicting 
with academic values." The faculty had quickly regulated student- 
run athletics; professional coaches then began to run individual 
sports; and the alumni and college authorities controlled the 
financial aspects. (Smith, 1988; Hardy & Berryman, in Frey, 1982) 
During the 1855 rematch of the Harvard-Yale crew regatta, 
the eligibility of an "already-graduated" Harvard competitor 
demonstrated the need for some collective regulation and 
governance for intercollegiate athletics. (Lucas & Smith, 1978, 
p. 198) Hardy and Berryman (in Frey, 1982) stated that:
By the turn of the century, ... both supporters and 
detractors had adopted the posture that proper governance 
and regulation were necessary to (depending on one's 
position) improve, reform, or salvage the athletic pastimes 
which, like a weed, could neither be left alone nor 
completely eradicated, (p. 16)
The formation of the NCAA finally addressed the issue of inter- 
institutional governance of college athletics. (Smith, 1988) In 
response to public outcries bemoaning the brutality in college 
football, which had resulted in 18 deaths and 143 serious 
injuries in 1905 alone, President Theodore Roosevelt charged 
representatives of Harvard, Yale, and Princeton with the task of 
reforming the sport or abandoning it. (Slaughter & Lapchick,
1989; Hart-Nibbrig & Cottingham, 1986; Lawrence, 1987) The
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purpose of the NCAA, to oversee college sports, was stated in its 
initial Constitution:
Its object shall be the regulation and supervision of 
college athletics throughout the United States, in order 
that the athletic activities in colleges and universities 
may be maintained on an ethical plane in keeping with the 
dignity and high purpose of education. (Hardy & Berryman, 
in Frey, 1982, p.22; Davenport, in Chu et al., 1985, p. 8} 
The NCAA adopted rules regarding eligibility and amateurism. 
(Slaughter & Lapchick, 1989) Lawrence (1987) presented the 
"Principles of Amateur Sports" in the NCAA's Amateur Code that 
discouraged:
...the offering of inducements to players to enter colleges 
or universities because of their athletic abilities and of 
supporting or maintaining players while students on account 
of their athletic abilities, either by athletics 
organizations, individual alumni, or otherwise, directly or 
indirectly, (p. 21-23)
As amateurism was promoted by the NCAA, commercialized athletic 
programs were for the first time being formally recognized as 
components of higher education. (Davenport, in Chu, 1985) In 
their efforts to field winning and financially successful teams, 
universities ignored NCAA amateur rules. The NCAA continued to 
resolve through unenforceable regulations the amateur ideal 
despite its members ignoring the rules on amateur eligibility to 
a significant degree. (Lawrence, 1987, p. 24, 25)
Lucas and Smith {1978, p. 145) and McPherson (1989) viewed 
amateur rules as elitist, yet the existence of athletics had a 
"democratizing" effect as they allowed everyone in the emerging 
nation to share in the common American values reflected in 
sports. The "social aristocrats" immigrants, and the new middle 
class working "rabble" all supported and encouraged the growth of 
college athletics. (Eitzen & Sage, 1978, p. 49) The rise of the 
industrialized society and the development of urbanization in 
America, combined with technological advances, spurred the growth 
of widespread interest in "corporate sport." (Eitzen & Sage,
1978, p. 20, 43) Hart-Nibbrig and Cottingham (1986, p. 17} 
suggested the historic links "between a growing, aggressive 
business system ... and the organization of intercollegiate 
athletics." By the 1920s, college athletics were part of "mass 
entertainment in a growing industrial society." (Hart-Nibbrig & 
Cottingham, 1986, p. 23) As the nation offered new freedoms and 
opportunities, athletics became "the one big national 
denominator" in the "Golden Age" of college sports in the 
twenties. (Davenport, in Chu, 1985, p. 8? Hart-Nibbrig & 
Cottingham, 1986, p. 22)
In 1929, Howard Savage, for The Carnegie Foundation for the 
Advancement of Teaching, conducted what " ... was, and probably 
remains, the most thorough look ever taken at U.S. college 
sport." (Lawrence, 1986, p. 8) The Savage Report condemned the 
"highly organized commercial activity" of college athletics, and 
placed the responsibility for corrective action with the
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"president and faculty." (Hart-Nibbrig & Cottingham, 1986, p. 23) 
The Savage Report outlined the abuses in college athletics and 
prescribed solutions; however it was not well received. (Hart- 
Nibbrig & Cottingham, 1986; Davenport, in Chu, 1985) The NCAA 
acknowledged the problems presented in the Savage Report, but did 
little to correct the situation. (Slaughter & Lapchick, 1989) 
Hanford (1979) noted that the Report had little effect on the 
direction that intercollegiate athletics took.
The Great Depression, following close on the heals of the 
Savage Report, affected "all facets of our society", including 
intercollegiate athletics. (Davenport, in Chu, 1985, p. 11) 
Financial constraints led university athletics to become more 
"influential and businesslike" in their pursuit of resources, 
thereby intensifying illegal recruiting and other violations. 
(Slaughter & Lapchick, 1989, p. 8; Lawrence, 1987; Davenport, in 
Chu et al., 1985; Hart-Nibbrig & Cottingham, 1986) World War II 
initiated a "hiatus in the growth of intercollegiate sports" and 
only one major change in NCAA regulation, freshman eligibility. 
(Davenport, in Chu, 1985, p. 11, 12; Lawrence, 1987)
After World War II, football, and "big time" newcomer 
basketball, emerged to solidify their importance in society. 
(Davenport, in Chu, 1985, p. 12) The 1950s were marred with 
point-shaving and recruiting scandals where football and 
basketball players had become little more than "commodities in a 
growing mass entertainment industry". (Slaughter & Lapchick,
1989, p. 10; Hart-Nibbrig & Cottingham, 1986, p. 25) Expanding
commercial interests and abundant abuses in college athletics 
pushed the NCAA to move from "an advisory body to a governing 
body with full power to police and penalize." (Davenport, in Chu, 
1985, p. 12, 13; Hart-Nibbrig & Cottingham, 1986, p. 24, 25) In 
1952, the NCAA devised an enforcement policy that was to control 
and punish member abuses. (Lawrence, 1987) Yet the advent of 
televised sports, with mass appeal and vast revenue, soon changed 
intercollegiate athletics as well as the role of the NCAA. 
(Davenport, in Chu, 1985; Lawrence, 1987)
Television enhanced the money-making prospects of 
commercialized intercollegiate athletics and led to the rise of 
"corporate athleticism". (Hart-Nibbrig & Cottingham, 1986, p. 25, 
26) College sport had become "a spectacle, big business, and an 
extension of power politics" wherein the "goal of pleasure" was 
"replaced by extrinsic rewards, especially money." (Eitzen &
Sage, 1978, p. 20) The "big time" commercial nature of athletics 
in the university has prompted great concern. (Atwell, 1979; 
Lopiano, 1979; Nyquist, 1979; Frey, in Chu et al., 1985;
McPherson, 1989; Bailey & Littleton, 1991) The finances 
associated with the control of televised sports reinforced the 
emergence of the NCAA as an economic cartel offering college 
athletics as its product. (Koch, in Frey, 1982; Sage, in Frey, 
1982; Hart-Nibbrig & Cottingham, 1986; Lawrence, 1987; Wilson, 
1994) As television money increased the commercialization of 
intercollegiate athletics, the civil rights movement and the 
campus unrest of the 1960s and 1970s increased the opportunity
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for participation, reflecting the societal concerns of the day. 
(Davenport, in Chu, 1985; Hart-Nibbrig & Cottingham, 1986; Hardy 
& Berryman, in Prey, 1982; Hanford, 1979}
The 1960s reflected the civil rights movement with expanded 
athletic opportunity for blacks; however, many academically 
unprepared black athletes matriculated solely for athletic 
purposes into commercial athletic programs where they served as 
cheap labor in the production of massive athletic profits. (Sage, 
1980; Hart-Nibbrig & Cottingham, 1986; Lawrence, 1987) Athletics 
themselves became a "commodity" in a "collusive intercollegiate 
athletic market." (Sage, 1990, p. 104; Koch, in Frey, 1982) 
Slaughter & Lapchick (1989, p. 11) viewed the 1960s and 1970s as 
a period of "ascendancy" for profitable commercialized 
intercollegiate athletics. Boyer (in Slaughter & Lapchick, 1991, 
p. xi) noted the increasing cultural importance of athletics: 
"Big-time sport, collegiate and professional, is becoming the new 
civil authority in our culture. It draws the pride and unifies 
the community the same way great cathedrals did in earlier 
times."
In the 1970s, the expanded women's movement prompted Title 
IX of the Higher Education Act, legislation that continues to 
have a significant impact upon intercollegiate athletics. (Hart- 
Nibbrig & Cottingham, 1986; Davenport, in Chu et al., 1985; 
McPherson, 1989) Women's sports have continued to receive less 
attention and less money than those of men; however, the NCAA, 
which took over women's championships from the Association for
48
Intercollegiate Athletics for Women only after its efforts to 
thwart Title IX regulations failed, has witnessed, if not 
stimulated, increased opportunities for women in athletics. 
(Hart-Nibbrig & Cottingham, 1986; Acosta & Carpenter, in Chu et 
al., 1985)
In the 1980s, reformers addressed their main concerns in 
athletics, institutional control, commercialization, and the 
academic integrity of the institutions involved, and often 
questioned the paradox of athletics in higher education. 
(Davenport, in Chu et al., 1985) While Hanford (1979) questioned 
whether institutions could maintain their autonomy while 
governing athletics, Sage (1990, p. 188) suggested that 
intercollegiate athletics have the typical problems of 
"conventional capitalistic entertainment enterprises." Serving in 
an entertainment role, athletics engage in intense competition 
for resources. Universities deviate from this role by avoiding 
payment to athletes for the product through invoking "the 
educational mission of the university" and using the "ideology of 
amateurism" in college athletics. (Sage, 1990, p. 188)
Many researchers (Chu, in Chu, et al., 1985; Frey, in Chu et 
al., 1985; Hart-Nibbrig & Cottingham, 1986; McPherson, 1989; 
Bailey & Littleton, 1991) have noted that commercial practices in 
"big-time" athletic programs and poorly defined university 
missions have allowed the influence of extramural constituents on 
college athletics. The need to match institutional goals with 
athletic governance structures is particularly difficult with
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"ambiguous and conflicting goals" in universities, yet it has 
been central to the discussion on intercollegiate athletics since 
their inception. (Hardy & Berryman, in Frey, 1982, p. 25; Chu, in 
Chu et al., 1985)
As the 1990s proceed, reform advocates continue to discuss 
the issues of control, commercialization, and academic integrity 
in college athletics. Hardy and Berryman (in Frey, 1982, p. 17) 
stated: "Students, coaches, faculty, presidents, alumni and 
boosters all had differing notions as to the athletic interests 
of their institutions." Frequently internal constituents such as 
coaches, faculty, and administrators have conflicting interests. 
(Scott, in Frey, 1982; Bailey & Littleton, 1991) Gilley et al. 
(1986, p. 3) noted that "lack of internal control (including 
confused and fractured lines of responsibility) is a critical 
factor contributing to problems in university athletic programs."
In addition to internal interest-group conflicts, athletics 
have formed connections with external constituencies; in part 
because regularly administered institutional budgets have been 
restricted in relation to athletic costs. (Chu et al., 1985) 
Athletics have been deemed unworthy of full incorporation into 
the educational curriculum and as such are not fully funded. 
(Scott, in Frey, 1982) They are left to forge their external 
connections in pursuit of resources. In turn, as external 
constituencies provide revenue to college athletics, external 
influence is attached to the purse strings, and the external 
special interest constituencies seek control of commercial
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collegiate athletics. {Frey, in Chu et al., 1985; Hart-Nibbrig & 
Cottingham, 1986; McPherson, 1989; Bailey & Littleton, 1991) 
According to Gilley et al.{1986, p.26), "Today, power is so 
widely diffused outside colleges and universities that an 
institution must strive to become a major shareholder of its own 
athletic material."
In a case study involving "...universities having major 
athletic problems" as well as "seven exemplary institutions", the 
problematic universities featured "an absence of adequate 
administrative supervision of the athletic program", while the 
comparison schools "were less administratively independent." 
(Gerber, in Gilley, 1986, p. 36-37). According to Frey (1982): 
"Ever since the first intercollegiate athletic event in 
the mid 1850's, the course of action of college athletic 
programs has been dictated by groups which, in fact, do 
not originate within the boundaries of the campus. That is, 
a great deal of what happens in intercollegiate athletics is 
the result of a response to the interests and demands of 
externally based constituencies." (p. 106)
Among the external interest groups are the alumni, the 
community, business interests, the general public, booster clubs, 
the government, and television. (Kjeldsen, in Frey, 1982; Frey, 
in Chu et al., 1985; Hart-Nibbrig & Cottingham, 1986; McPherson, 
1989; Sage, 1990; and Bailey & Littleton, 1991) College athletics 
serve the interests of the general public and the surrounding 
community by providing entertainment. (Michener, 1976)
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Commercialized college sport spectacles also provide benefits to 
business interests, as Kjeldsen (in Frey, 1982) noted the 
"beneficiaries of intercollegiate athletics" include:
... community business people who either directly provide 
services and/or supplies to the athletic department or who 
benefit from the infusion of money into the local economy, 
and ... the seeker of entertainment services who realizes a 
period of diversion from the normal routines of life. (p. 
201)
Bailey and Littleton (1991) noted that alumni interests are 
also served through personal satisfaction and ego-gratification 
derived from a connection to a highly visible, successful 
athletic program. Hart-Nibbrig and Cottingham (1986, p. 12, 13) 
contend that all successful college athletic teams have "strong 
booster groups" that influence college athletics through "a 
financial and economic infrastructure" without which a serious 
commercial college athletic program would be "unable to compete." 
Gilley et al. (1986, p. 7) concluded that the " ... lack of
control of boosters has caused more problems for ... universities 
than ... any other aspect of athletics." The university's loss 
of control over external constituencies was addressed by Bailey 
and Littleton (1991): "Fortunately for most university 
presidents, the control of fervent external groups is a matter of 
keeping the larger university purposes and their need for 
financial support in some perspective." (p. 43)
While " ... some would argue that because of their own
52
indigenous decentralized form of governance, ... " universities 
are not able to " ... refute the claim that they are at the mercy 
of a subculture with alien values, one that is closely linked to 
ominous forms of wealth, egocentricity, and political power." 
(Bailey & Littleton, 1991, p. SI) Boyer (in Slaughter & Lapchick, 
1989) argued that American universities must execute the 
responsibility of athletic control and that the regular 
governance structure of the institution should provide the means 
for control:
... of first importance, there must be firm leadership at 
the top from the board of trustees and the president of the 
college or university. Ethical direction for the coaches 
and athletic directors, for the faculty athletics 
committees, for student athletes, for the fans and 
especially the alumni, must come from the board and the 
president. The buck stops there, (p.xiv)
Presidents have the NCAA charge of "ultimate responsibility and 
final authority for the conduct of the intercollegiate athletics 
program." (Bailey & Littleton, 1991, p .67) Presidents are 
becoming more collectively active in the governance of 
intercollegiate athletics through the NCAA Presidents'
Commission, which was established " ... because there was a 
perception that presidents did not have the means to play a 
definitive role in intercollegiate athletics." (Bailey & 
Littleton, 1991, p .100)
The NCAA is a regulatory body acting in the interests of its
more than 850 voluntary member institutions {Tow, in Frey, 1982, 
p.108). It enacts and enforces rules governing intercollegiate 
athletics as approved by its member institutions, and yet it has 
significant authority over those same member institutions. Bailey 
and Littleton {1991, p. 128, 129) stated: "The structure of the 
NCAA membership and the policies for distribution of the 
association's revenues can influence significantly the ability of 
member institutions to control abuses in college sports." Noll 
(in Andre & James, 1991, p. 198) stated: "Judging from the 
popular literature, the moral high ground is occupied by the 
NCAA. ...depicted as fighting the good battle."
The NCAA's influence over its membership promotes the
perception of the role of the NCAA as that of a cartel, an
association designed to monopolize control over college 
athletics. (Sage, in Frey, 1982, p. 131-138) Noll (in Andre & 
James, 1991, p. 198) observed that "...the economic value of 
intercollegiate athletics have continued to grow, and the cartel 
practices of the NCAA have become more important. Lawrence (1987, 
p. xiii) viewed the NCAA as an "intercollegiate athletic cartel 
... colluding to restrict output in an effort to raise prices and
profits." The role of the NCAA as a cartel is supported also by
the fact that the NCAA has its own legal department, and also the 
Governmental Affairs and Joint Legislative Committee to lobby for 
its interests and self-protection; at times against its own 
members. (Lawrence, 1987, p. 152) Nevertheless, the NCAA is
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central to athletic reform movements, providing a structure for 
change at the national level.
The issue of control of intercollegiate athletics has gone 
beyond institutional walls and the NCAA. A variety of external 
constituents influence the governance of intercollegiate 
athletics. Government involvement, through legislation and the 
courts, has attempted to curtail the undesirable influences of 
some external constituents, but in the process has become an 
additional external influence on college athletics, a 
longstanding fear of higher education. (Bailey & Littleton, 1991) 
While externally situated booster organizations and individual 
boosters exert significant commercial influence on athletic 
departments, and government exerts regulatory influence, the 
television medium has been called the "most important external 
influence on college sports" (Hart-Nibbrig & Cottingham, 1986, p. 
11) .
The media, in particular television, has played a key role 
in the development of commercialized, ,rwin-at-all-cost",
"corporate athletics." (Hart-Nibbrig &. Cottingham, 1986, p. 11) 
Bailey and Littleton (1991) noted:
The media, including television, in its encompassing 
treatment of sports merely responds to what the public 
desires. And, partly as a result, the university itself 
remains in its purposes and modes of conduct the least 
understood of democratic institutions, its one visible and
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significant connection to the lives of most Americans being 
intercollegiate athletics, (p. 47)
Television creates, promotes, and organizes "highly 
lucrative sports markets", thus raising the "financial stakes 
associated with college sports." (Hart-Nibbrig & Cottingham,
1986, p. 11) Hart-Nibbrig and Cottingham (1986, p. 68) concurred: 
"Of all the revenue-generating sources for college athletics none 
has had the dramatic impact of television." Examples of the 
financial gains to be made include a recent billion dollar NCAA 
contract with the CBS television network, a forty million dollar 
NBC television football contract with the University of Notre 
Dame, the College Football Association's 210 million dollar 
contract with the ABC television network, and Penn State 
University's creation of its own satellite television network. 
(Lederman, 1990; Blum, 1995)
The NCAA, itself receiving much of its operating revenues 
from television contracts, is currently discussing options for 
"revenue sharing" in order to distribute the extensive revenue 
more equitably among its membership. (Lederman, 1990; Blum, 1994) 
The revenue generated from the mass media's promotion of college 
athletics is tantalizing to university athletic programs, some 
with budgets up to 15 million dollars and deficits over one 
million dollars (Thelin & Wiseman, 1990). Padwe (in Slaughter & 
Lapchick, 1989, p. 123-135) described the role of the media in 
creating "the moral and ethical wasteland intercollegiate 
athletics have become." The media continues to influence
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intercollegiate athletics as Bailey and Littleton (1991) 
explained:
Much has already been said about the importance of 
consensus development, and the roles of individual CEOs, the 
NCAA Presidents' Commission, athletics conferences, and 
educational organizations in achieving that consensus. At 
this point in the reform movement, the media can be the 
strongest force in helping these entities in that effort by 
creating an awareness on the part of the public of the 
pressing need to control abuses in college sports and of the 
changes that must be made to accomplish this. (p. 108)
The commercial entertainment business of college athletics 
is at the same time influenced by the media and propelled by 
those it entertains, thus demanding media attention as noted by 
Andre and James (1991):
Americans spend almost $100 billion a year on sports. Only 
defense, education, and health get more of our gross 
national product. Most of that money is spent on spectator 
sport, and a sizable fraction of it on college sport. As a 
result, sport is always in the news, (p.ix)
The commercial practices in the business of college athletics 
have enhanced professionalism in college athletics through 
employing athletes for compensation, as Sage (in Chu et al.,
1985) stated:
Big-time intercollegiate sport is a business enterprise... 
Not only are big-time intercollegiate athletic programs a
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commercial enterprise functioning as a part of a cartel 
and employing athletes, but the programs are operated with 
employees (athletes) who are being paid slave wages, (p.
211)
Hart-Nibbrig and Cottingham (1986, p. 10) proclaimed "...the 
reign of the amateur in intercollegiate athletics has ended. The 
present system of intercollegiate sport is highly 
professionalized.1 Receipt of any form of compensation 
constitutes a degree of professionalism:
... any difference between a student-athlete in a big-time 
sports program and a professional athlete lies only in the 
amount of the compensation, not in any special quality the 
amateur enjoys and the professional lacks. (Lawrence, 1987, 
p. 145)
Noll noted that, due to strict NCAA rules, a "strong college 
player ... is paid approximately 3 to 10 percent of his actual 
economic value to a university." (in Andre & James, 1991, p. 206) 
Bailey and Littleton (1991, p. 64) argued that the current NCAA 
regulations in intercollegiate athletics that foster the image of 
amateurism are "... keeping student-athletes in a kind of 
economic bondage even though their athletic efforts annually 
produce untold millions of dollars in revenue." The major sources 
of revenue in today's commercialized athletic system include "... 
gate receipts, television, and postseason play." (Noll, in Andre 
& James, 1991, p. 200)
Noll (in Andre & James, 1991, p. 197) concluded that
"American universities have an uneasy relationship with their 
commercial activities." Financial necessity can cause conflict 
with the intellectual mission of an institution. Financial 
pressures have at times led unscrupulous practitioners to obtain 
academically "substandard" student-athletes who are expected to 
remain eligible for play, if not for graduation. (Gilley et al., 
1986, p. 25; Nyquist, in Chu et al., 1985) As reform movements 
attempt to bring athletics and academics "... into a reciprocal 
relationship, the issue of use of public funds for athletics will 
have to be addressed more precisely." (Bailey & Littleton, 1991, 
p. 125-126) Currently, public policy against using state funds 
for athletics serves as evidence of the fissure between athletics 
and academics, and as a stumbling block for incorporating 
athletics into the university mainstream; therefore, "...the 
overt translation of intercollegiate athletics into a commercial 
enterprise" occurs. (Frey, in Chu et al., 1985; Bailey & 
Littleton, 1991, p. 64)
A variety of interests in higher education, as well as 
athletics, have identified both abuses and benefits in college 
athletics. The search for blame has been directed in numerous 
arenas, including: The NCAA, the university, the board, the 
president, the faculty, the coaches, the players, the media, and 
extramural concerns. For example Boyer (in Slaughter & Lapchick, 
1991, p. xiii) noted: "Faculty are especially crucial to the 
cause of ethics in athletics. ... Their records ... are 
embarrassingly weak." Lawrence (1987) concluded:
The NCAA has turned college sports into big business, with 
pressure to cheat on recruiting rules, to keep academically 
unfit students eligible, and to retain coaches who win but 
who sometimes do not exemplify the values generally believed 
to come from athletics, {p. xv)
The university itself has been charged with "hypocrisy" for 
housing athletic programs. (Bailey & Littleton, 1991, p. 61) 
Bailey and Littleton (1991) observed:
...college sports are essentially a culture not 
sufficiently responsive to the educational and ethical 
rhythms of their environment and, left to their own 
dynamic, tend to seek constantly a life of their own outside 
that setting. Yet they must live there, within the 
university... (p. 30)
Identifying contributors to the problems facing college athletics 
demonstrates the scope of intercollegiate athletics and the need 
for a comprehensive, unified strategy in addressing these complex 
problems. The concern for the role of athletics in higher 
education is not a new one. Lapchick (in Slaughter &. Lapchick, 
1991) stated:
There is a great deal of debate over whether college 
athletics has changed significantly since its first 
appearance. ... In reviewing the history of sport at those 
schools, we would do well to be cautious in assigning 
sainthood to ancestors and damnation to contemporaries. 
Conflict and controversy have followed the development of
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sport in America just as surely they have followed the 
development of any social institution. Nostalgia often 
blurs our vision ... Today's problems in sport are not new, 
nor have they just recently bloomed. In unearthing the 
precursors to today's problems, we must be careful to
realize that, in reconstructing their contexts and
environments, we tend to ignore the clouds for the sunshine
and the hardships for the joys. (p. xix)
According to Lapchick {in Slaughter & Lapchick, 1991, p. xx) , 
current observers of intercollegiate athletics "...are simply 
deluding themselves when they wax nostalgic for a time when 
things were better." Boyer (in Slaughter & Lapchick, 1991, p. ix, 
x) argued that while "ethical issues in sport predate our own 
time," they have changed, becoming "... more serious than before. 
Changes in degree have become changes in kind. Now, sport 
programs involve staggering amounts of money, television 
contracts, and mass audiences." Giamatti (1988, p. 191) 
concluded: "To reform intercollegiate athletics is to begin to 
approach, again, a true examination of American higher 
education's nature and purpose."
Conclusion
A variety of reform recommendations have been made. Some 
suggest that athletics be moved off college campuses. (Simon, in 
Andre & James, 1991; Nyquist, in Chu et al., 1985) Lawrence 
(1987) demonstrated the inevitability of the connection:
"One obvious solution would be to abolish commercial
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football at all universities. ... The history of 
intercollegiate sports shows, however, that this solution 
would be short lived. With the loss of big-time football, 
fans would turn to the next level of collegiate competition 
to satisfy their appetite for the game. Fraternities, for 
example, might start an interuniversity league. They would 
quickly find enough outside interest to play in stadiums and 
charge admission. Driven by the public recognition and 
potential television appearances, these teams would begin 
recruiting actively, and suddenly the cycle would start 
again. Thus, while it may be interesting to imagine what 
education would be like without big-time athletics, 
practically speaking,it would be difficult to abolish 
sports." (p. 144)
Noll (in Andre & James, 1987) and Bailey and Littleton (1991) 
noted a need for revenue sharing within the NCAA in conjunction 
with an increase in academic standards for participants. Hanford 
(in Chu et al., 1985) recommended that freshman should be deemed 
ineligible for competition. Atwell (in Chu et al., 1985) 
emphasized the need to begin reform at the scholastic level and 
to maintain high academic standards. Boyer (in Chu et al., 1985) 
deemed it critical to reduce commercialism and maintain academic 
integrity. Sperber (1990, p. 345) called on all interests 
involved in college athletics to "stop pretending" that they "are 
connected to the educational mission of American colleges and 
universities."
Uehling (in Chu et al., 1985)/ Davis (1979), Hanford (in 
Frey, 1982) recognized the need for increased presidential 
leadership. According to Gilley (1986, p. 9), "It is clear that 
strong presidential leadership, clear lines of authority and 
responsibility, and tighter internal university control are 
required. 1 Boyer (in Chu et al., 1985) noted the need for Board 
support. Scott (in Frey, 1982, p. 35) echoed the presidents' need 
for the "steadfast support" of the board of trustees; and 
suggested "strengthening the head of the professional personnel 
in charge of athletics." Marmion (1979, p. 344) noted the need 
for administrators to get involved and warned of "governmental 
involvement." Atwell (1983) and Frey (in Chu et al., 1985, p.
187) also described the alternatives for increased government 
involvement in college sports. They warned that the government 
might install a "tsar" for intercollegiate athletics, as it has 
in the war on drugs, or that it might increase legislation 
specifically addressing athletic issues, or that it might 
increase its involvement as "a result of court actions."
Sage (1990, p. 184) called for the NCAA to stop "blaming the 
victim", to take responsibility and to address "the inherent 
structural problems." Slaughter and Lapchick (1989) called on the 
NCAA to establish a comprehensive policy for reform including 
prescribed responsibilities for presidents, coaches, and athletic 
administrators in dealing with academic and athletic achievement.
McPherson (1989, p. 81) suggested that neither a "total 
professional entertainment model" nor a "total amateur model"
would work for intercollegiate athletics in our society. Athletic 
and academic programs need to be "intimately integrated" in 
higher education. (McPherson, 1989, p. 81) Toward this end, Hart- 
Nibbrig and Cottingham (1986, p. 107-117) presented three reform 
options: a "commercially viable semiprofessional college sports 
system" that would function as a feeder system for professional 
athletics and be tangential to the university; a residual amateur 
system with university control and academic emphasis being the 
cornerstones; and a "corporate athleticism" model with commercial 
interests competing for influence over university athletics and 
the inherent conflicts with academic interests that would occur. 
However, each of the three models would extend the struggle 
between academic and commercial interests.
Since athletics reside within the university and are 
nourished by external sources, there appears to be no single 
formula for success in controlling intercollegiate athletics, as 
Bailey and Littleton (1991) noted:
There are many reasons for the lack of effective control of 
abuses in college sports. Perhaps the two most important 
are the failure of the leadership of higher education to 
recognize the seriousness of the problem and the fact that 
over the past century control has often been directed more 
toward the treatment of the symptoms than to the fundamental 
causes of the malady.... As a result, the complex matrix of 
causes has not been adequately clarified, and, therefore, no 
foundation has been developed for a holistic approach to the
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control of abuses in college sports with emphasis on the 
fundamental causes, (p.ix)
Cooperative reform efforts involving 1 ...leaders from higher 
education, business, the Congress, sports, and boards of 
trustees", in the form of the Knight Commission, have set out to 
jointly recommend reform in intercollegiate athletics." (Atwell 
et al., in Lederman, 1990, p.38) Boyer described the stakes at 
hand in the reform of college athletics:
I am confident we could meet the challenge of ethics in 
college sport. Indeed, we must, for if the institution of 
higher education allows unscrupulous practices and athletic 
scandals to undermine the integrity of the enterprise, that 
college or university loses its authority in society. ...
It should be remembered that what is at stake is nothing 
less than the basic definition of the institution of higher 
education, (in Slaughter & Lapchick, 1991, p. xiv)
Through examining the persistent dysfunctions in the governance 
of intercollegiate athletics, practical reforms can be 
determined. This study pursues feasible reform alternatives based 
upon an examination of the needs motivating constituents to 
exercise authority and power in the governance of intercollegiate 
athletics.
CHAPTER III
DESIGN OF THE STUDY
Introduction
This study determines avenues for reform in big time 
intercollegiate athletics by looking at the systemic dysfunctions 
of governance over time as revealed by an analysis of the needs 
that have prompted constituents to exercise power and authority 
at two points in the development of intercollegiate athletics. 
First, an examination of the policies, practices, and 
circumstances of intercollegiate athletics in 1929 based upon the 
data provided in the Savage Report (1929) reveals the use of 
power and authority by various constituents at that time. Next, 
the current policies, practices, and circumstances of 
intercollegiate athletics are examined to determine constituent 
use of power and authority using recent data from a variety of 
reports and other sources. These examinations of constituent use 
of power and authority illustrate the systemic dysfunction in 
governance over time wherein constituents can either fulfill or 
relinquish their authority roles, which results in gaps in 
authority that are filled in by other constituents' use of power. 
Finally, the needs that drive these constituents to either use or 
not use authority and power in intercollegiate athletic 
governance emerge from the examination of their actions.
In order to effectively accomplish these ends, the design of 
this study must be grounded within a sound conceptual framework, 
founded upon the application of relevant source materials, and
conducted using viable methodological procedures. That is, in 
describing the design of this study, I must first establish the 
conceptual framework within which the study has been conducted.
In so doing, I examine university governance and its component 
constituencies, the utilization of authority and power by these 
constituents, and the needs that prompt their exercise of 
authority and power. Based upon this conceptual framework, I then 
provide a description of the sources utilized in the study. I 
conclude with an explanation of the methodological procedures 
employed in this study.
Conceptual Framework
Although Westmeyer {1990} identified athletics as a major 
area for policy setting, many organizational theories and 
governance models in higher education have overlooked the 
complex, if not confused, relationship of intercollegiate 
athletics to institutional governance. Westmeyer {1990} defined 
governance as policy-making, distinct from administration, which 
is the execution of policy through decision-making, and 
management, which may not involve decision-making at all.
Governance occurs within a structure. A variety of 
institutional governance models are recognized in higher 
education research, including the collegial model, the political 
model, and the bureaucratic model. {Baldridge, 1991) No single 
theory is sufficient in explaining the governance of 
universities. The collegial model presents decision-making as a 
consensus-building process relying on professional, or expert,
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authority rather than bureaucratic authority. The political model 
emphasizes the application of power, to resolve conflicting 
interests, in setting and administering policy. The bureaucratic 
model highlights in particular the structural hierarchy within 
the institution, the organizational chain of command, and the 
lines of authority. Each of these models illustrates certain 
aspects of institutional governance within which a variety of 
constituents operate.
Who are the constituents within the institutional hierarchy 
who are involved in governance and administration? Westmeyer
(1990) identified participants within the governance structure of 
institutions of higher education: the state legislature, the 
state coordinating boards, governing boards, the president, other 
administrators, and the faculty. The state confers a charter upon 
the governing board of an institution, which then becomes the 
supreme legal authority responsible for university policy. 
(Kauffman, 1980) Presidents provide leadership in the operation 
of the university, serving at the will of the board. (Kauffman, 
1980) Both boards and presidents are charged with the protection 
and fulfillment of the institutional mission. (Chait et al.,
1993) Within the bureaucratic hierarchy of intercollegiate 
athletics governance, other administrators would include the 
athletic director and his/her assistants and the coaches.
Athletic administrators and coaches are chiefly responsible for 
the daily operation of athletic departments. Conferences and the 
NCAA are also part of the bureaucratic structure of governance in
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that, while they are housed off campus, they are involved in 
policy making for intercollegiate athletics.
The institutional governance structure operates through the 
processes of governance. The processes of governance occur within 
the interactions among the constituents. However, governance, 
which involves the processes, procedures, and practices of 
setting policy and administering policy through decision-making, 
can be influenced subtlety from the outside. (Westmeyer, 1990) 
These "subtle influences" are actors outside the governance 
structure who have the potential to influence the processes of 
institutional governance.
These external constituents include the alumni, the federal 
government, the state governments, funding agencies, accrediting 
agencies, and the public. The alumni provide "the greatest source 
of support for sports programs." (Westmeyer, 1990, p. 126) The 
federal government utilizes finances, most with restrictions and 
regulations attached, and federal court decisions. State 
governments use funding, direct legislation, and board influence. 
Funding agencies, with regard to intercollegiate athletics, 
include individual donors, private companies, the media, 
foundations, and governmental agencies. They influence governance 
processes through their distribution of resources. The public, 
with regard to intercollegiate athletics, includes students, 
parents, fans, the college community, and the general public. The 
public influence is through their financial support as consumers 
of intercollegiate athletics.
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For the purpose of this study, the constituents who are 
legitimately involved in the governance process of 
intercollegiate athletics consist of the state government, the 
board, the president, the faculty, the athletic administration, 
the coach, the conferences, and the NCAA. (Knight Commission, 
1993; Bailey & Littleton, 1991; Yaeger, 1991; Gilley et al.,
1986; Hart-Nibbrig & Cottingham, 1986; Chu et al., 1985; Frey, 
1982; Savage et al., 1929) On the other hand, constituents who 
influence the governance process from a position external to the 
formal governance structure include the alumni, local businesses 
and corporate sponsors, boosters, the local community, the 
general public, state governments, the federal government, the 
media, and in some circumstances the NCAA. (Knight Commission, 
1993; Andre & James, 1991; Lawrence, 1987; Gilley et al., 1986; 
Hart-Nibbrig & Cottingham, 1986; Chu et al., 1985; Frey, 1982; 
Savage et al., 1929)
Constituents, both within and external to the formal 
governance structure, may or may not influence the governance 
process through policy-setting and decision-making, regardless of 
their location on or off campus. For example, the NCAA, which is 
located off-campus, is part of the formal intercollegiate 
governance structure and has influence in athletic policy. While 
students reside on-campus, but are not part of the formal 
governance structure and have little or no influence in athletic 
policy. Yet the alumni, who are neither part of the formal 
governance structure nor on-campus, also have influence in
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intercollegiate athletic policy. These apparent contradictions 
are clarified by an examination of constituents' use of authority 
and power.
Burbules (1986) defined authority as a legitimate right to 
govern, which in the case of higher education is granted by the 
state to governing boards. Legitimate authority is a function of 
position and includes components such as positional privilege and 
expertise. Bureaucratic hierarchy supports authority 
relationships through designating the roles and responsibilities 
of authorized actors. Constituents gain control by exercising 
legitimate authority through the formal governance structure. For 
purposes of this study, the legitimate authority of constituents 
in athletic governance is indicated by their prescribed roles and 
responsibilities, by official institutional policy and policy- 
setting structures, by the formal structure of the bureaucratic 
hierarchy, by the official channels of communication, and by the 
chain of command.
While authority is exercised legitimately through the 
governance hierarchy, power is exercised through both the formal 
and informal processes of intercollegiate athletic governance. 
Constituents can utilize power legitimately to support authority 
or illegitimately to circumvent authority. In examining the use 
of power by constituents, the distinct modes of power identified 
by Wolf (1990) are employed: interpersonal power centers on the 
capacity of an individual or group to impose its will upon 
another individual or group through interactive relationships;
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tactical power involves the methods and strategies employed to 
obtain desired outcomes by controlling a specified environment; 
and structural power organizes and shapes the domains of power 
play, thereby determining the form and direction of possible 
interaction. These modes of power are applied in the examination 
of the arenas, circumstances, and constituent practices involved 
in policy setting and decision-making that reveal the use of 
power in the governance of intercollegiate athletics.
For the purpose of this study, power is evident through 
certain assumptions: a conflict of interest must exist in power 
relationships; power relationships are reciprocal in nature; and 
power relations exist within an environment which can be 
influenced by its constituents. (Burbules, 1986) The exercise of 
power by constituents includes obtaining control or influence 
through the use of coercion, exploitation, incentive, sanction, 
negotiation, or command, among others. (Crespi, 1992; Airaksinen, 
1988; Burbules, 1986; Henderson, 1981; Pennock & Chapman, 1972; 
Bailey, 1969; Oppenheim, 1961)
When an actor relinquishes authority by not fulfilling 
his/her prescribed role and responsibilities, gaps in authority 
develop. Other actors then exercise various modes of power to 
fill these gaps in authority. An examination of the needs that 
motivate these actors to either exercise authority, relinquish 
authority, or utilize power can help clarify the systemic 
dysfunctions in the governance of intercollegiate athletics. 
(Owens, 1981; Maslow, 1970)
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Sources
Since this study analyzes two time periods to determine the 
degree of consistent failure in authority, I must ground the 
analysis of governance structure and processes within its own 
time frame. Standard university governance procedures are 
delineated for both the 1929 period and the present. Elliott and 
his colleagues (1935) in The Government of Higher Education 
described the structure and procedures of governance in the 
American system of higher education. The authors delineated the 
roles and responsibilities of university constituents both within 
and outside of the campus authority hierarchy. (Elliott et al., 
1935) The ultimate authority in university governance was 
bestowed by the state upon the governing board. The board 
typically retained authority in policy matters, particularly as 
they pertained to the mission. As capitalistic interest in higher 
education increased, universities began redefining and refining 
their missions in the 1920s. (Barrow, 1990) The general principle 
stood that "boards should legislate and presidents should 
execute." (Elliott et al., 1935, p. 187) The board delegated to 
the president the authority to execute policy, except in areas of 
"legal responsibilities, and investments." (Elliott et al., 1935, 
p. 187) The emerging capitalistic interests of the university 
resulted ultimately in "little else than businessmen" serving in 
the role of president. (Kauffman, 1980; Veysey, 1965, p. 346) 
Administrative officers carried out responsibilities with various 
degrees of authority in the hierarchy. In some institutions,
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"dual organization" resulted in "several administrative officers 
who are not subordinate to the president." (Elliott et al., 1935, 
p. 187)
Kerr (1982), Westmeyer (1990), and Baldridge (1991) are 
among the many scholars whose combined works reveal the current 
structure and procedures in university governance. Today's 
"multiversity" continues to lack clarity in its purpose. (Kerr, 
1982) "Goal ambiguity" has led to such complexities in today's 
universities that their governance process cannot be explained 
using one prototype, but requires at least three models: the 
bureaucratic, the collegial, and the political. (Baldridge, 1991) 
The typical current governance structure remains similar to its 
1929 counterpart, with the governing board at its pinnacle, and 
the president serving at the will of the board. (Westmeyer, 1990) 
Governing boards continue to be granted the ultimate authority in 
policy-making on individual campuses. (Chait et al., 1993) And 
presidents continue to have major responsibilities in policy 
execution. (Kauffman, 1980)
In order to analyze the governance issues earlier in the 
century, I used data from the 1929 Carnegie Foundation for the 
Advancement of Teaching (CFAT) Report entitled American College 
Athletics (commonly referred to as the Savage Report). Lawrence 
(1987, p. 8) described the Savage Report as "... the most 
thorough look ever taken at U.S. college sport." Introducing the 
Report, Savage (1929) stated its purpose:
The present enquiry has for its object to ascertain the
74
significant facts concerning college athletics in the United 
States ... , to analyze these facts in relation to American 
college and university life, ... and to present a summary of 
American college athletics, their merits and their defects, 
together with such suggestions looking toward their 
improvement as may grow out of the materials at hand. (p. 3) 
The Savage Report (1929) documented the policy and practices of 
the institution and the constituents involved in the governance 
of intercollegiate athletics. Scholars agree that the 
recommendations presented in the Savage Report (1929) were 
neither well received nor effective in changing the direction of 
American college athletics, yet, accurately reflected the 
condition of athletics in American colleges as they had developed 
in 1929. (Hart-Nibbrig & Cottingham, 1986; Davenport, in Chu et 
al., 1985; Slaughter & Lapchick, 1989; Hanford, 1979) Savage 
(1929) addressed the inefficacy of previous reform:
The present situation in American college athletics could be 
described and efficacious remedies proposed merely by 
setting forth a series of quotations from materials 
published before 1900. The complaints that have been voiced 
since 1900 have been in the main echoes or amplifications of 
the adverse criticisms of previous years. Some of the 
reasons these cries have gone unheeded are to be found in 
their general nature and lack of specific modern instances, 
but especially in the fact that the interests of individuals 
and the special pleadings which have been used to buttress
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and justify their complaints have obscured the truth of 
their utterances, {p. 11, 12)
According to its authors, the Savage Report (1929, p. 12) was 
"not the final word" on intercollegiate athletics, nor did it 
propose "a formula for remedying" all of the problems in college 
athletics because college athletics were "so complex and so 
overlaid with the interests of individuals." Smith's (1988) 
historical analysis of the athletic governance and constituent 
roles is used in the current study to coordinate with the 1929 
Savage Report.
With no single current report providing sufficient evidence 
for an analysis of contemporary athletic governance, a variety of 
national reports are employed to examine constituent use of power 
and authority. The Reports of the Knight Foundation's Commission 
on Intercollegiate Athletics (Knight Commission, 1993) resulted 
from a three year, three million dollar investigation of athletic 
abuses in higher education. The Knight Commission (1993) 
documented the roles of selected constituents in the governance 
of intercollegiate athletics. Its ultimate purpose was the 
proposal of a reform agenda, based upon redefining constituent 
roles and clarifying intercollegiate athletic goals.
Published in 1983, the NCAA Report of the Select Committee 
on Athletic Problems and Concerns in Higher Education (NCAA 
Report) was convened by the NCAA Council in order to:
... bring together a group of esteemed individuals, 
combining the highest standing in higher education with
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extensive knowledge of intercollegiate athletics, to examine 
in detail the serious problems affecting college athletics 
today, (p. 23)
The NCAA Report (1983) first identified problem areas in 
intercollegiate athletics. It then generated "conclusions and 
recommendations" concerning academic issues, athletic governance 
issues, athletic finance issues, recruiting issues, and NCAA 
enforcement issues.
The American Council on Education (ACE) and George Mason 
University cooperatively issued the Special Report on 
Administration of University Athletic Programs: Internal Control 
and Excellence. (Gilley et al., 1986) This study presented data 
from a survey of 138 Division I-A university presidents, and 
included an historical examination of athletic problems, and 
comparisons of case studies from eight institutions. Four of the 
institutions exhibited problems in athletics and four were 
trouble-free. Gilley and his colleagues (1986) focused on 
leadership and control in intercollegiate athletics.
The NCAA Presidents' Commission Third National Forum (1988) 
offers perspectives and insights from a federal representative, 
the NCAA administration, and the NCAA presidential membership. 
Commission Chair John Slaughter noted that the NCAA Forum 
provided the "opportunity to discuss and to debate the 
substantive policy issues in college athletics." (NCAA Forum,
1988) The ultimate purpose was to enable Forum participants to 
recognize and define the problems and abuses in college athletics
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and to treat these problems through recommended reform 
legislation to be sponsored by the NCAA Presidents' Commission.
Additional sources used in interpreting modern college 
athletics include books and journal articles by contemporary 
social scientists who examine intercollegiate athletics. For 
example, many prominent researchers contributed to the ACE Report 
(1979), who after three years of investigation devoted an entire 
issue of its Educational Record to college athletics. A variety 
of scholars examining legal, financial, and governance issues in 
intercollegiate athletics are presented by Frey (1982) in 
Governance of Intercollegiate Athletics and in Government and 
Sport. (Johnson & Frey, 1985) In Sport and Higher Education. Chu 
and his colleagues (1985) compiled descriptive and analytical 
studies by contributing authors that focused on historical, 
financial, governance, and academic issues in intercollegiate 
athletics.
Comprehensive general studies that describe commercial and 
athletic interests, analyze problems in governance, and prescribe 
various reform recommendations include Bailey and Littleton
(1991), Andre and James (1991), Slaughter and Lapchick (1989) , 
Lawrence (1987), and Chu (1989). Commercial interests and the 
role of the NCAA are examined by Yaeger (1991) and Funk (1991) . 
Hart-Nibbrig and Cottingham (1986), Sperber (1990), Thelin 
(1994), and Lapchick (1986) examine the commercialization of 
intercollegiate athletics and describe interests impacting the 
governance of college athletics. Sage (1990; 1980), Eitzen and
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Sage (1978), McPherson (1989), Wilson (1994), and Baker (1981) 
offer sociological analyses of the significance and operation of 
intercollegiate athletics in American society.
Methodological Procedure
The research questions delineated in Chapter I dictate the 
methods and procedures employed in this study. First of all, the 
constituents who use authority and power in the governance of 
intercollegiate athletics must be identified from within the 
source materials from both 1929 and the present. Using the 
explanation of legitimate governance structure presented by 
Elliott (1935) and Savage (1929), I isolated the actors who were 
designed to be in authority positions from those who were located 
outside the bona fide structures. I identified constituents using 
power by their actions in intercollegiate athletics through 
interpreting and generalizing examples presented in the source 
materials.
Second, the manner by which constituents utilize power and 
authority in the governance of intercollegiate athletics had to 
be discovered. I determined the use of power and authority by 
interpreting constituent actions, practices, policies, 
structures, and circumstances in the governance of 
intercollegiate athletics. Sources from both time periods are 
presented to demonstrate examples of the use of power and 
authority. If those in authority roles demonstrated that they had 
relinquished their proper roles, further examination sought to 
document the exercise of power to fill in the gaps in authority.
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My interpretation of constituent uses of power through actions, 
practices, policies, structures, and circumstances is based upon 
the modes of power identified by Wolf (1990).
Third, the analysis proceeded to the needs that motivate the 
constituent to exercise power and authority in the governance of 
intercollegiate athletics. Maslow's (1970) Hierarchy of Needs and 
his concept of deficiency needs are applied to the use of 
authority and power by constituents. Common factors that affect 
the concept of self-preservation in constituent use of power and 
authority were sought.
When, over time, authority roles are not executed properly 
and the resulting gaps are filled by the use of power, an 
incongruence between the governance structure and the processes 
employed by constituents in the governance of intercollegiate 
athletics occurs. This incongruence indicates a systemic 
dysfunction in the governance of intercollegiate athletics. An 
interpretation of source materials that determines who uses power 
and authority, how they use power and authority, and why they use 
power and authority are instruments of analysis that lead to the 
development of recommendations for systemic change in athletic 
governance. Reform alternatives are generated from this study 
based upon the answers to the research questions.
This study employs a variety of research methods in order to 
address the questions posed above. Each method has its strengths 
and shortcomings, as does the collective use of a number of
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methodological techniques. All research methods and results, 
therefore, are subject to argument:
Methodological diversity is a phenomenon endlessly familiar 
to academic researchers, and they know its basis is partly 
technical and partly a matter of what researchers feel it is 
most important to explain. (Cohen & Garet, 1983, p. 304)
As Kaestle (1988, p. 67) noted, "not all questions are 
linked to quantitative research"; therefore, this study employs 
elements of such qualitative research techniques as Content 
Analysis, Historical Interpretation, Descriptive Study, and Case 
and Field Study. The methodologies employed are qualitative 
designs in social research, employed to define and use social 
concepts such as power and authority, and as such are subject to 
inherent biases. (Burbules, 1986) While this study does not 
employ an empirical, quantitative analysis of data, some of the 
source materials utilized quantitative research methods.
Some elements of the Content Analysis methodology are used 
to identify and extract information from past and present 
sources. The analysis is systematic and sequential in nature, the 
material is examined in the context of its time and source, and 
inferences are made from the data collected. (Krippendorff, 198 0) 
The content of the source documents identified are examined for 
specific examples indicating the use of power and authority by 
constituents in the governance of intercollegiate athletics. One 
example of a specific breach in authority cited in a national 
report indicates a systemic occurrence if the context in which it
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is referenced indicates that it is representative of similar 
occurrences. Such indicators are generalized to demonstrate the 
authority structure as well as the power relationships among 
constituents in the process of governance. For example, the 
Savage Report (1929, p. 90) specifically cited the University of 
Wisconsin's illegitimate use of a "slush fund" to emphasize the 
common existence of such funds at universities of the day.
Historical Interpretation is used to examine the distant and 
recent past. It requires "challenging and creative interaction" 
with source materials by historical "scavengers." (Kaestle, 1988, 
pp. 61, 71) Historical analysis is based on the sources at hand, 
but it is also based upon the historian's temperament, 
convictions, hunches, and explicit and implicit theoretical 
beliefs:
The rules of investigation and analysis help us less and 
less as we attempt to make broader generalizations about the 
past, or make judgments about its relation to the present, 
and this is part of what we mean when we say that history is 
also art. (Kaestle, 1988, p. 61)
Historical interpretation remains largely subjective, as Kaestle 
(1988, p.68) noted that history "... is selective and 
interpretive, it is necessarily guided by the individual 
historian's sense of what is important, where to find meaning, 
and how social change and human motivation work. 1
Kaestle (1988, p. 67) noted the methodological problems 
associated with historical interpretation: "There is no single,
definable method of inquiry, and important historical 
generalizations are rarely beyond dispute." Kaestle (1988) 
presented four key problems to watch for: confusing correlations 
with causal relationships; avoiding vagueness and presentism when 
defining key terms; differentiating between evidence of ideas 
about how people should behave and evidence of ideas about how 
people in fact behave; and distinguishing between intent and 
consequences. While no researcher can "completely transcend or 
resolve the four problems," it is essential that researcher and 
reader alike be aware of the problems and of the "associated 
methodological challenges" in attempting to make meaningful 
generalizations resultant to interpretive analyses. (Kaestle,
1988, p. 70)
Because this period of exploration and revision has resulted 
in diverse eclectic methodologies, because no new 
methodological or ideological consensus has emerged--in 
short, because there is no successful paradigm in 
educational history today--it is all the more important that 
each reader of educational history be critically alert and 
independent. (Kaestle, 1988, p. 71)
This study also employs elements of both Descriptive and 
Case and Field Study methods. In its broadest sense, the term 
Descriptive can include many types of studies designed to 
describe situations or events. (Isaac & Michael, 1981) The 
current study is Descriptive only in that it systematically 
describes the facts and characteristics of a given population or
area of interest. (Isaac & Michael, 1981) The data described is 
generated from an analysis of other source materials. Many of the 
sources examined in this study utilized the Case and Field Study 
techniques, in that they intensively analyzed the background, 
current status, and environmental interactions of intercollegiate 
athletics governance. (Isaac & Michael, 1981) While the Case and 
Field Study method is vulnerable to subjective biases, it can 
provide useful anecdotes and examples from which to generalize. 
(Isaac fie Michael, 1981) For example, case studies such as the one 
of UNLV basketball coach Tarkanian's battle with the NCAA, and 
the involvement of the board and president, provide examples of 
the use of power and authority by each of these constituents in 
intercollegiate athletic governance from which generalizations 
can be drawn. (Yaeger, 1991)
Elements of a variety of methodologies are used in this 
study to analyze constituent use of power and authority in the 
governance of intercollegiate athletics by applying established 
concepts and theories to information obtained from the source 
materials. Specifically, Wolf's (1990) modes of power are applied 
to the content of relevant source materials from both 1929 and 
the present. In Chapters Four and Five, this study interprets 
circumstances, structures, actions, practices, policies, and 
resources through examples and generalizations in order to 
determine constituent use of power and authority in the 
governance of intercollegiate athletics. Chapter Four identifies 
the constituents who use power and authority, analyzes how they
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use power and authority, and determines dysfunctions in athletic 
governance in 1929. Chapter Five examines constituent use of 
power and authority and the subsequent systemic dysfunction in 
intercollegiate athletic governance. The need for conducting this 
study over time is evident in the application of the findings to 
the development of reform alternatives. Chapter Six describes the 
systemic breakdown of intercollegiate athletic governance over 
time and uses the work of Maslow {1970) to analyze the needs 
prompting constituent use of power and authority over time, thus, 
determining viable alternatives for reform in athletic 
governance.
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CHAPTER IV
AUTHORITY AND POWER IN 1929 COLLEGE ATHLETICS 
Introduction
In 1929, Howard Savage prepared a report for the Carnegie 
Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching, which he entitled 
American College Athletics. The Savage Report has been judged as 
the most comprehensive examination of intercollegiate athletics 
to date. (Lawrence, 1987) The purpose of the 1929 Savage Report 
was to determine the "significant facts" about American college 
athletics, to analyze these facts in order to form 
generalizations about athletics within the American university, 
to summarize the "merits and defects" of American college 
athletics, and to offer suggestions for improvement of American 
college athletics. (Savage et al., 1929, p. 3) In addition,
Savage and his colleagues (1929, p. 3) noted that "some attention 
was paid to the bearings of college athletics upon the principles 
and practices of education."
In the preface of the Savage Report (1929), Henry Pritchett, 
President of the Carnegie Foundation at the time, highlighted the 
importance of this investigation into the arena of 
intercollegiate athletics:
In the United States the composite institution called a 
university is doubtless still an intellectual agency. But 
it is also a social, a commercial, and an athletic agency, 
and these activities have in recent years appreciably
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overshadowed the intellectual life for which the university 
is assumed to exist, (p. viii)
Furthermore, Pritchett noted the importance of examining 
athletics in the context of its time and place. At the time, no 
"system" of American higher education existed; rather, there was 
"a high degree of institutional autonomy and diversity." (Elliott 
et al., 1935, p. 1) The university was a relatively new and 
changing entity. Could it "serve every cause--scholarship, 
science, business, salesmanship, organized athletics?" (Savage et 
al., 1929, p. xxi) Questions involving the purpose of the 
university were constantly being asked, yet remained unanswered. 
Graduate research studies had emerged on the same campuses as 
undergraduate colleges. Business and professional curricula were 
added to the arts and sciences.
The weakness of the American university as it exists today 
lies in its lack of intellectual sincerity. It stands 
nominally for high intellectual ideals. Its effort at 
intellectual leadership is diluted with many other efforts 
in fields wholly foreign to this primary purpose. Inter­
college athletics form ... one of these. (Savage et al.,
1929, p. xviii)
"Mass production in higher education" created a "financial load" 
on public resources and inspired "social and intellectual 
objections;" however, no single formula for effectively 
controlling college athletics existed among the 130 institutions 
studied. (Savage et al., 1929, p. xviii) The term "control"
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itself connotes the need to contain a force that may get out of 
hand. The Savage Report (1929) defined athletic "control" as: 
the conduct of games and contests through the definite 
delegation of authority and responsibility touching a vast 
number of phases of college life, including a clear 
assessment of purposes both actual and theoretical, the 
framing and execution of a policy that takes account of the 
interests, whether practical or sentimental, of various 
groups, the provision and care of suitable accommodations, 
medical attention, finance, including auditing and 
bookkeeping, the preparation and the holding of contests, 
their schedules, and external relations in competition.
(p. 78)
This section of the study examines the issue of control--the 
governance of intercollegiate athletics in 1929--through 
analyzing constituent use of authority and power. The roles and 
responsibilities of constituents within the ideal athletic 
authority structure are presented, followed by an analysis of the 
discordant practices of those constituents that permitted gaps in 
the use of authority to occur. The study then examines the types 
of power utilized by constituents to fill in those authority 
gaps.
Authority
In the early decades of the Twentieth Century, institutions 
of higher education were governed within structures where 
constituent roles and responsibilities were specified.
Constituents were delegated degrees of authority within 
bureaucratic hierarchies and these roles enabled or restricted 
their participation in the governance of intercollegiate 
athletics. The constituent roles that exercised authority in the 
typical collegiate governance structure of 1929 included the 
governing board, the president, the faculty, the athletic 
administrator, the coach, the alumni, the conferences, and the 
NCAA. (Savage, 1929; Elliott, 1935) Constituents did not always 
fulfill nor limit themselves to the use of their prescribed 
authority roles, thus they established breaches in the authority 
structure. These breaches were quickly filled by constituents who 
were not ordained with the authority to fulfill the role, but who
began to use power, either legitimately or illegitimately.
In order to determine the dysfunctions of intercollegiate 
athletic governance in 1929, this study first explains the ideal
authority roles and responsibilities of constituents in
intercollegiate athletic governance. That explanation is followed 
by a description of authority gaps that emerged and the power 
used to fill those gaps, which are examined through the Savage 
Report's (1929) explanation of the practices, policies, and 
circumstances of the constituents in intercollegiate athletic 
governance.
Ideal Authority; Institutional Actors
State governments granted charters authorizing the operation 
of private institutions and served as the ultimate authority in 
public institutions as well. The institutional governing board
assumed, or was granted, the authority as the pinnacle of 
governance for the university and all of its programs. The 
governing board was primarily concerned with policy-making and 
procuring resources. (Elliott et al., 1935) At most institutions 
the authority to appoint athletic committees and personnel fell 
to the governing board. Some boards delegated this authority to 
the president or director of physical education. In rare 
instances, the board might contravene a president's 
recommendation, generally within financial or personnel matters. 
(Savage et al., 1929) However, the final authority over policy, 
whether university or athletic, usually rested with, and was 
delegated by, the university governing board. The "simple 
principle that boards should legislate and presidents should 
execute" applied to all areas of responsibility, with the rare 
exception of legal responsibilities and investments. (Elliott et 
al., 1935, p. 187)
The university president was generally appointed by the 
board as the chief executive officer and was delegated the 
authority to carry out university policy. In the ideal authority 
hierarchy, the president was responsible for athletics, although 
he delegated that authority to other university officials. The 
president often delegated the authority to control finances and 
maintain accounts to administrative officials such as the 
treasurer, or to athletic officials, such as the director or 
coach. Eligibility decisions were often delegated to the 
registrar or athletic committee.
Personnel selection decisions were not as consistent across 
institutions. Athletic personnel decisions, such as the choice of 
coaches, were often delegated to an athletic board, the athletic 
director, or even the alumni. (Savage et al., 1929) In some 
cases, the governing board retained its authority in athletic 
personnel matters, as well. For example, one-third of the 
institutions in the Savage Report required a cooperative effort 
in the selection of a coach. The final choice was usually made by 
the president, the athletic director, the alumni, or, far less 
frequently, the faculty. The choice was made in varying degrees 
of cooperation with the president, trustees, faculty, alumni, 
undergraduates, athletic director, or athletic committee. (Savage 
et al., 1929, p. 164) Boards, through presidents, delegated the 
authority of personnel selection to some form of athletic 
committee in 30% of the cases; to the alumni in 20%; to the 
athletic director in 20%; to the faculty in 17%; and to remain 
with the president in 17%. Appointments, equally as diverse among 
universities, were conferred by the trustees in 36% of the cases; 
the president in 28%; the athletic committee in 18%; the alumni 
in 11%; the athletic director in 3%; and the faculty in 2%. 
Approval of athletic personnel by the board trustees was required 
in 47% of all the institutions. (Savage et al., 1929, p. 164) The 
board and the president were most often responsible for the 
selection process, but rarely contravened the decisions of those 
to whom they had delegated authority.
Eliot (1908, p. 238) stated that the president should be "an
inventing and animating force, and often a leader; not a ruler or 
an autocrat." The president was charged with protecting the 
mission of the institution and inspiring the university 
constituents. Savage (1929, p. 265) suggested that he was "the 
man who is the most likely to succeed in uprooting the evils..." 
of college athletics. However the president did play the only 
part: "The defense of the intellectual integrity of the college 
and of the university lies with the president and faculty. With 
them also lies the authority. 1 (Savage et al., 1929, p. xx)
Savage (1929, p. 100, 101) identified three types of faculty 
involvement: l) pseudo-faculty control, wherein faculty authority 
was overshadowed by other interested parties such as coaches or 
athletic directors, or was restricted to certain issues such as 
eligibility, or was given to coaches and physical educators who 
were "elevated to faculty status"; 2) faculty guidance, wherein 
the faculty oversaw student-run athletic programs; and 3) true 
faculty control, wherein athletics were regulated, usually 
through committee, by academic faculty members. Princeton, Yale, 
Tulane, North Carolina, and Georgia were among only eight of the 
130 universities that were identified as having true faculty 
control. (Savage et al., 1929, p. 101) In many institutions, the 
faculty did have some authority, manifested in a variety of 
structures, but by 1929, direct guidance of undergraduate sports 
by academic faculty had given way to other forms of governance. 
(Savage et al., 1929, p. xx) Faculty were involved generally on 
a limited basis: in only four institutions was a faculty member
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responsible for athletic accounts, and in all four through 
athletic committees, councils, or boards. (Savage et al., 1929, 
p. 89)
Athletic personnel in academic enterprises were not endowed 
automatically with status within the system. Athletic coaches and 
directors had to gain legitimacy through "faculty" appointment by 
the board, and, with the institution's blessing. Subsequently 
they were delegated the responsibility and authority to oversee 
athletics. Athletic administrators and managers, who were often 
alumni, were delegated responsibility for athletic finances and 
daily operations in many institutions. (Savage et al., 1929) Like 
athletic administrators, physical education directors, coaches, 
and managers were usually very prominent in athletic policy 
making and generally were responsible for the execution of most 
athletic policies. (Savage et al., 1929, p. 88) Athletic managers 
and coaches were even authorized in some universities to control 
and maintain athletic accounts. However, they generally had 
little authority in personnel decisions, having the selection 
authority in 20% of the institutions and appointment authority in 
only 3% of the institutions. (Savage et al., 1929, p. 164) In 
many instances, however, athletic managers and coaches were 
delegated the responsibility of verifying an athlete's 
eligibility. To have the eligibility approved, which was almost 
always the case, they typically reported to a representative body 
or some form of athletic association or committee. (Savage et 
al., 1929)
The majority of the 130 universities had some form of 
athletic association, committee, council, or board. (Savage et 
al., 1929) Athletic associations, committees, councils, and 
boards varied from institution to institution in their 
composition of members. The most common form of athletic board 
was based upon balanced representation of a number of athletic 
interests. Constituents involved in athletic boards included 
college administrators and officials, athletic managers and 
coaches, academic faculty members, alumni, and undergraduates. 
Athletic associations, generally possessing athletic interests, 
were often responsible for athletic accounts, finance, and 
personnel. (Savage et al., 1929) In 62% of the institutions 
offering athletic subsidies, athletic associations were involved 
in the funding and dispersal of subsidies to athletes. (Savage et 
al., 1929, p. 241)
Athletic board members varied in their degree of authority, 
in part based on the responsibilities delegated to the board. 
Alumni gained legitimate authority through athletic boards and 
associations. In many institutions, such as Brown, Columbia, and 
Pennsylvania, they legitimately controlled financial policy 
through the athletic board. In 20% of the institutions, the 
alumni selected athletic personnel, and in 11%, they had the 
authority to appoint athletic personnel through the athletic 
board. (Savage et al., 1929, p. 164) The relation of the alumni 
to their Alma Mater was ideally based upon an affection that led 
to service. In reality, however, alumni served as a "source of
funds" solicited in support of university finances. (Savage et 
al., p. 191) An estimated 20% of all alumni were active in either 
the control of athletic policies, or the recruiting and financing 
of athletes, or both. (Savage et al., 1929, p. 192) While alumni 
gained authority through the athletic boards, undergraduate 
participation on athletic boards was often superficial, such as 
at the University of Pennsylvania, where they were not permitted 
to vote on such key issues as finances. (Savage et al., 1929, p. 
89)
The authority of athletic associations, committees, 
councils, and boards did vary from institution to institution. 
Those boards with alumni and athletic interests generally had 
final authority over critical issues such as finances and 
personnel, but faculty-controlled committees were typically 
advisory bodies. (Savage et al., 1929) The majority of boards 
that played a supervisory role did so because they had the 
ability to obtain the funds necessary for the operation of the 
athletic programs. (Savage et al., 1929) These athletic boards 
and committees were generally dominated by athletic interests 
such as physical education directors, managers, coaches, and even 
alumni. (Savage et al., 1929, pp. 100, 101) Presidents had 
authority over athletic committees at Iowa and Minnesota, but 
generally the committees were appointed by, and responsible to, 
the governing board. (Savage et al., 1929, p. 100) Meanwhile, the 
faculty rarely dominated the athletic boards. Athletic committees 
with true faculty interests, such as those at Lafayette College
and the University of Southern California, remained advisory in 
nature, dealing with eligibility approval and only such policy 
that immediately concerned academics. (Savage et al., 1929, p. 
100)
Ideal Authority; External Actors
Conferences were granted authority by their members, and 
exerted that authority in attempts to standardize practices 
across institutions in areas such as player eligibility and 
contest scheduling. These areas of standardization primarily 
addressed policy issues and practical concerns that enhanced 
competition but did little else. Conferences established minimum 
academic standards for athletic eligibility that, in some cases, 
were further strengthened by individual institutions. (Savage et 
al., 1929, p. 96) Some conferences, such as the Pacific Coast, 
the Southwest, and the Mid-Western, required "certification" of 
athletes' eligibility through a normal institutional channel, 
such as the registrar. (Savage et al., 1929, p. 201) The Mid- 
Western and the Rocky Mountain conferences were among a number 
who required "faculty control" as a condition of membership. The 
typical athletic conference of the day was:
"... a voluntary regional association of colleges and 
universities through elected or appointed representatives 
for discussion of problems concerning intercollegiate 
athletics, formulation of regulations to govern athletic 
contests between member institutions, and usually the 
conduct of competitions in various branches of inter-college
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... athletics. Thus its functions are deliberative, 
regulatory, and executive." (Savage et al., 1929, p. 199)
The authority of conferences varied, yet most possessed 
"police functions" in order to enforce rules. (Savage et al., 
1929, p. 199) Conferences also influenced athletic scheduling of 
member schools, often determining who and when contests would be 
played. Conferences had the authority to approve or restrict 
opponents and to determine the sites of contests.
The Savage Report (1929, p. 199) explained the NCAA, which 
was founded in 1906, as a "national representative body" with 
"many of the characteristics of an athletic conference." The 
difference between the NCAA and conferences was essentially in 
its "size, membership, and geographic extent." (Savage et al., 
1929, p. 199) Creating "countrywide affiliations, the NCAA was 
"open to all colleges, universities, and institutions of 
learning" in the U.S. and was "deliberative and legislative in 
its activities." (Savage et al., 1929, pp. 208-209) Its 
resolutions nominally supported the notion of college amateurism 
and sportsmanship. With the support of its membership, the NCAA 
was granted authority as a national organization functioning as a 
collective body to promote the ideals of educationally-beneficial 
athletics. Its functions included framing the rules of athletics, 
preserving records, and arbitrating member disputes. (Savage et 
al., 1929, p. 209, 210) The rules and purposes of the NCAA were 
viewed by the Savage Report (1929) as "so important and ...so 
wholesome," that they were "almost impeccable." (p. 210, 211)
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These rules called for "institutional control," "amateurism," 
"strict eligibility rules," and "the supervision of the 
regulation and conduct, by its constituent members, of 
intercollegiate sports." (Savage et al. 1929, p. 210)
Through its collective proclamations, the NCAA began to 
emerge as a national influence on athletics; however, the 
association held no enforcement authority for the rules or 
recommendations that it adopted. At the time, regional 
conferences actually exercised more authority in the governance 
of intercollegiate athletics. Individual institutional members 
authorized conferences to enforce the conference rules on their 
campuses.
Breaches in Authority
The ideal governance structure on paper often does not 
represent reality. College athletics in 1929 was no exception. 
"Slogans", such as "athletics for all" or "every student a 
player", commonly took the place of genuine educationally- 
inspired athletic policy. (Savage et al., 1929, p. 80) Authority 
breaches, which led to dysfunctions in the governance of 
intercollegiate athletics, occurred when constituents either did 
not fulfill or overextended their prescribed authority roles. For 
example, a "politically minded governing board" dominated by 
trustees with athletic interests could extend their authority, or 
override the authority they had delegated to the president to 
execute policy, if specific policies contradicted the board's 
athletic interests. (Savage et al., 1929, p. xx) While the
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governing board could exert its authority in such manner legally, 
such action contravened the nature of the authority roles in the 
governance of higher education and athletics.
Presidents were generally authorized by trustees in the 
operation of college athletics; however, they were often too busy 
with day-to-day duties and they neglected athletic policy.
(Savage et al., 1929) Recognizing the potential profits and 
prestige available to the institution, presidents "left the 
shaping of athletic policies" to constituents with athletic 
interests in order to capitalize on the external relations of 
athletics. (Savage et al., 1929, p. 80) Presidential involvement 
in athletic governance ranged from "deliberate unconcern" to 
"active participation", with most occupying the "mid-ground" in 
delegating authority. (Savage et al., 1929, p. 79) Presidents at 
Wisconsin and Dickinson attempted to justify the administrative 
independence of athletics, while at Oglethorpe and Allegheny they 
participated fully in the minute details of athletic operation. 
(Savage et al., p. 79)
However, most university presidents were pragmatic in their 
delegation of authority in athletics. Some presidents overlooked 
activities inconsistent with proper administration because they 
coveted the financial rewards of winning athletic teams. The 
Savage Report (1929) noted the reluctance of some university 
authorities, including presidents, to take an unpopular stand; 
therefore, presidents, through the delegation of authority, 
allowed athletic policy to be determined by a variety of special
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interest groups. Presidents were at times unconcerned with 
athletics or chose not to make decisions regarding athletics that 
would be unpopular with either the alumni or the undergraduates 
since student fees supplemented gate receipts, from alumni and 
students, and outside revenue in funding athletics. (Savage et 
al., 1929)
Undergraduates were generally supportive of commercialized 
athletics for its entertainment value and prompting of school 
spirit. Undergraduates retained some formal authority in 
athletics at a few institutions; however, their use of authority 
was rare and usually bound by the guidance of older, wiser 
constituents. (Savage et al., 1929) Students served on athletic 
committees, but in many cases could not vote on financial or 
eligibility matters. The Savage Report (1929) found the 
"meagerness" of undergraduate responsibility "regrettable," but 
noted that it would be unwise to entrust "all of the weight and 
the complexity of the financial burden" of intercollegiate 
athletics "upon undergraduate shoulders." (Savage et al., 1929, 
p. 102) There was also no undergraduate involvement in the NCAA, 
which was influenced instead by "men to whom athletics are a 
vocation." (Savage et al., 1929, p. 211) The exclusion of 
undergraduates from authority in athletic governance was "by no 
means an accident" having been accomplished by "deliberate 
calculation" of higher.authorities, including coaches and 
faculty. (Savage et al., 1929, p. 102)
While some faculty attempted to collectively assert
themselves in athletics through advisory committees, most faculty 
members were "aloof from athletics ... concerning themselves with 
the study and the lamp," and leaving athletic governance to 
others. (Savage et al., 1929, p. 23) "Faculty control" often 
existed in name only, such as in the Missouri Valley Conference 
universities. (Savage et al., 1929, p. 100) In these 
institutions, faculty had nominal authority, usually through a 
committee, but athletics were controlled by alumni or 
administrators with athletic interests. The majority of faculty 
members maintained a "laissez-faire" policy toward the 
administration of college athletics. (Savage et al., 1929, p. 23) 
Of the three types of faculty control--pseudo-faculty control, 
faculty guidance, and true faculty control-- the most prevalent 
was pseudo-faculty control. (Savage et al., 1929) The faculty 
nominally gained control at some institutions through coaches who 
received faculty appointments. Control of athletics by faculty 
members whose interest was in "physical education" was not held 
in high regard, as these faculty positions were not delineated 
clearly from athletics. (Savage et al., 1929, p. 10, 11) In 
addition, the faculty involved in athletic boards often had 
personal athletic interests; faculty athletic representatives 
were likely to receive an "honorarium" from the athletic 
department. (Savage et al., 1929, p. 101)
Intercollegiate athletics, intramurals, and physical 
education were housed together at most institutions of the day. 
Physical education directors, athletic managers, and coaches,
while a part of the legitimate governance structure, had personal 
interests because, in many cases, they received money from 
athletics. In athletic governance, athletic managers, coaches, 
and physical education directors all served "many masters," and 
were criticized for their special interests. (Savage et al.,
1929, p. 182) While many faculty members "began their careers as 
hired coaches of teams," the "faculty status" of professional 
coaches was not highly regarded by non-coaching faculty members, 
who were necessarily concerned only with the intellectual.
(Savage et al., 1929, p. 22-23) The academic faculty, with 
intense demands on their time, did not actively fight to control 
athletics, despite some rhetorical complaints. "There was 
scarcely a struggle for control," as academic faculty directed 
their interests elsewhere than athletics. (Savage et al., 1929, 
p. 23)
"Faculty status" coaches, because of their athletic 
interests, were most often in physical education. (Savage et al., 
1929) To the dismay of academic faculty, the "obvious" difference 
between physical and academic studies was often "neglected" with 
regard to coaches' salaries, particularly football, as football 
coaches' salaries averaged 18% higher than their academic 
counterparts' salaries at over 100 institutions. (Savage et al., 
1929, pp. 171, 172) However, the funds used to pay coaches were 
not always from the institution, coming from athletic revenues 
instead. Coaches who were paid through athletic associations 
generally received higher salaries, while coaches with "faculty
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status" received 27% less than their non-faculty counterparts. 
(Savage et al., 1929, p. 172) Coaches typically had low status 
among faculty on campus, but they received significant 
remuneration, and with it influence, from commercially-driven 
constituents. However, while coaches were typically well rewarded 
in financial terms, they had little security.
"Faculty status" did little to protect coaches from the 
pressures of producing victories. Losing teams were found to be a 
factor in the dismissal of coaches in many more instances than 
administrators were willing to admit. (Savage et al., 1929, p.
170) Coaches' status as faculty was viewed by academicians as 
insincere, although it was founded on the notion that a coach 
should be a man of high morals concerned with student learning. 
They also believed the practice of assigning faculty status to 
coaches was dishonest because coaches, whether broadly trained or 
specialized, were not considered equal to the faculty whose chief 
concerns were intellectual. (Savage et al., 1929, p. 167) The 
academic credentials of 104 football coaches showed that 17% had 
no college degree, 70% had at least a bachelors degree, 7% had a 
masters degree, and 6% had a doctoral degree. (Savage et al.,
1929, pp. 162-163) Coaches were typically regarded as "evil 
geniuses", operating against academic interests. (Savage et al., 
1929, p. 187). The quality of coaches' character was questioned 
because many had come from physical education, athletic, or 
business backgrounds, not serious academic backgrounds.
Coaches were expected to "produce" (victories) in order to
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retain their employment. (Savage et al., 1929, p. 182) They had 
to teach, tutor, and obtain players, and deal with extramural 
relations such as other colleges and coaches and with prospective 
players, local merchants, the alumni and townsmen who provided 
financial support, and the press who provided publicity. The 
"complexity of duties", legitimate or otherwise, associated with 
coaching was comparable "only with that of the president."
(Savage et al., 1929, p. 175) The authority to fulfill the vast 
responsibilities associated with coaching rarely matched the 
expectations of the position, but was legitimized to a degree by 
awarding faculty status to coaches.
Conferences often required "complete faculty control" and a 
representative body; however, it was not unusual for "faculty 
control" to exist "in name but scarcely in fact." (Savage et al., 
1929, pp. 100, 201) Pseudo-faculty control resulted in academic 
faculty being authorized to control specified issues such as 
eligibility, usually through athletic committees that served in 
an advisory capacity. Through the assignment of faculty status to 
coaches, the "actual control" as authorized by the university was 
often determined to "rest with the directors or the coaches." 
(Savage et al., 1929, p. 100) The NCAA, because of its lack of 
enforcement authority, unwittingly allowed the control of 
athletics to be in the hands of athletic interests. The NCAA, 
like conferences, relied primarily on individual universities to 
monitor and enforce the rules and standards of practice. Without 
external enforcement, many universities relinquished control of
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athletic governance to a variety of constituents with overriding 
commercial interests.
Power
The potential financial gains and the impact upon 
institutional reputation and "a thousand other forces" made 
college athletics in 1929 "joint cooperative enterprises 
involving presidents, trustees, faculties, alumni, townsmen, and 
the vast publics of the radio and the press." {Savage et al., 
1929, p. 79) Many institutions had "no settled athletic policy" 
as a result. {Savage et al., 1929, p. 79) With the control of 
athletic policy "grounded in human relationships," the desire for 
"power and influence" among a variety of constituents was the 
"source of most controversies over athletic administration and 
control." (Savage et al., 1929, p. 79) Noting the need to 
differentiate between "theoretical and actual control,"--or for 
the purposes of this study between authority and power--Savage et 
al., (1929) stated:
It is one thing to announce a program of athletic 
administration and another to effectuate it, it is a third 
and entirely different matter to maintain in its practical 
application the balance of powers which any such system is 
designed to guarantee." (p. 77)
While, ideally, athletic policy would be guided by 
educational motives, "in reality, athletics involve several 
groups," each of whom possessed "an interest which savors of the 
proprietary." (Savage et al., 1929, p. 81) Conflicts of interests
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resulted from the "necessity to control." {Savage et al., 1929, 
p. 81) Control of college athletics resulted from the application 
of power and/or authority by constituents with personal interests 
in athletics. Different constituents exercised varying degrees of 
power at individual institutions. Some constituents utilized both 
authority and power in the governance of college athletics; 
others had official authority in the athletic governance 
structure, but exercised little or no power in the process of 
governance. Still others used power to influence or control 
athletic policy and practices, but had no legitimate authority in 
the governance structure. Savage et al., (1929) cited the
constituents in this struggle for control:
Trustees, faculties, directors, alumni, townspeople, all, 
indeed, except for the undergraduates, who might profit most 
by athletics, have expected, and in some instances demanded, 
that the shaping of athletic policies be entrusted at least 
in part to them. (p. 81-82)
Noting the many masters to be served and the resultant 
"confusion of aims to which athletics at present are subject," 
the Report delineated myriad interests of the constituents 
involved in college athletics. (Savage et al., 1929, p. 81)
First, the board was interested in athletics as a source of 
wealth to bolster the university, and found it "comforting to 
find one source of funds that gushes without the use of a rod." 
(Savage et al., 1929, p. 81) Presidents were involved with 
athletic governance "by virtue of their responsibilities and
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functions as coordinators of general policy." (Savage et al., 
1929, p. 81) Faculties were charged with promoting educational 
interests. Directors and departments of physical education were 
concerned because of their "convictions concerning the values 
inherent in athletics as well as because of more personal 
ambitions and reasons." (Savage et al., 1929, p. 81)
Alumni were interested in athletics because of their loyalty 
to Alma Mater, and "less admittedly," because their financial 
support of the institution "is an established fact of university 
policy, they are held to have in justice a right to a voice in 
the conduct of those activities which afford the spectacular and 
concentrated diversion." (Savage et al., 1929, p. 81) Townsmen 
impacted athletics "because of the financial returns from the 
crowds of people who attend games, not to mention the active 
civic pride of trade and welfare organizations." (Savage et al., 
1929, p. 81) Finally, undergraduates were not included, although 
they were interested, "not because athletics necessarily fire 
them with a spontaneous loyal enthusiasm but because it is 
nowadays assumed that athletics benefit the institution;" and 
because athletics spurred interest in physical activity, which 
was "regarded as 'good for' undergraduates;" and, "finally, 
because teams that 'represent' a university are traditionally 
composed of student members of the university." (Savage et al., 
1929, p. 81)
Based on varied motives and interests regarding athletics, 
some constituents vied for and other relinquished control,
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whether through hierarchical lines of authority or informal 
channels of power. The Savage Report (1929) concluded that "the 
actual weight of authority and control rests upon quite other 
shoulders than those intended by the framers of the systems." The 
control exercised by these various constituents can be separated 
into three modes of power available to, or used by, constituents 
in college athletics, as identified by Wolf (1990). These modes 
of power are interpersonal, tactical, and structural. 
Interpersonal Power
Interpersonal power is the ability of an individual or group 
to impose its will upon another individual or group, irrespective 
of the field of play. It results from the "sequences of 
interactions and transactions among people." (Wolf, 1990, p. 586) 
The use of interpersonal power in the governance of 
intercollegiate athletics manifested itself through friendships, 
loyalties, and resource exchanges. Board members and presidents 
delegated and often relinquished control by authority, which 
permitted gaps to be formed and interpersonal power to be 
inserted by commercial influences. Personal friendships between 
coaches and board members, or coaches and presidents, overrode 
the normal lines of responsibility and control. This gap in 
authority resulted in the control of athletic finances by coaches 
who "assumed or maintained authority which was vested 
theoretically in the director of physical education" at 
institutions such as North Carolina and Ohio Wesleyan. (Savage et 
al., 1929, p. 167) Often this use of interpersonal power occurred
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among football coaches who circumvented athletic administrators 
at some universities. However, athletic administrators were also 
involved in controlling athletic resources at institutions such 
as Amherst, Georgia, and Tennessee, where they had personal 
friendships with the president or board members. (Savage et al., 
1929, p. 89)
In universities with predominantly commercial athletic 
endeavors, it was "not astonishing that the name of the modest 
gentleman who occupies the president's chair should be less 
widely known than that of the coach who he hires to develop a 
team." (Savage et al., 1929, p. 214) A coach's consistent 
popularity with undergraduates also strengthened his position. 
(Savage et al., 1929, p. 187) Coaches, and in some cases athletic 
directors, used the control of resources to obtain interpersonal 
power with other constituents. Coaches impacted the board members 
or presidents only when those constituents could profit from 
commercial athletics professionally or personally. If the board 
or president perceived a potential for gain, they were willing to 
ignore the operation of college athletics.
Coaches also used interpersonal power in obtaining resources 
for themselves and their program. For example, in the recruiting 
of prospective athletes, coaches commonly used interpersonal 
power to arrange jobs and other special conditions for athletes 
in order to persuade the recruit to attend their university. 
(Savage et al., 1929) Alumni and townsmen often provided the 
financial support for such endeavors, sometimes through their
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interpersonal power in athletic associations, and thereby exerted 
interpersonal power over the coach in many instances as well. The 
friendship of a coach with an individual or group of alumni or 
townsmen, which was prompted by the financial interests of both 
parties, often led to a controlling influence by the alumni or 
townsmen. (Savage et al., 1929, p. 184)
The alumni, through "the persistence or the strength of 
character," came to dominate many of the athletic boards. An 
enthusiastic group of "well-meaning, but unwise," alumni with 
strong athletic interests and available resources could 
frequently influence athletic policy. (Savage et al., 1929, p. 
xx) These alumni used personal power to influence or control 
policy-making through the athletic board at institutions like 
Dartmouth, Colgate, Purdue, and the University of Pennsylvania.
At Lehigh, Maryland, Purdue, Brown, and Amherst a single alumnus 
used interpersonal power to gain control of athletics. At 
Pennsylvania State, Allegheny, Dartmouth, and the University of 
Pennsylvania there was "absolute alumni control." (Savage et al., 
1929, p. 82) The alumni gained this "dominion almost by default," 
since the faculty was not intimately involved in the governance 
of intercollegiate athletics, concentrating instead on academic 
concerns. (Savage et al., 1929, p. 24)
The alumni gained their interpersonal power through resource 
allocation. Since athletics offered "special training tables, the 
costly sweaters and extensive journeys in special Pullman cars," 
and since the costs of equipment and facilities rose steadily,
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expenditures by commercial athletic departments rose accordingly; 
thus, increased funds were required for their support. (Savage et 
al., 1929, p. xxi, 23) Regular university sources could not 
support such commercial endeavors. Alumni who provided 
contributions received in return "a generous share" in the 
control of athletics. (Savage et al., 1929, p. 23) "Alumni who 
became active in that control gained or retained their power and 
prestige by their own contributions of money and by subscriptions 
they solicited from other alumni and friends of the college." 
(Savage et al., 1929, p. 23)
The alumni sought personal financial gain and control of the 
visible athletic component of their Alma Mater. Their involvement 
extended into personnel decisions at some institutions. An 
unnamed "prominent coach," quoted in the Savage Report, explained 
that, "In most colleges coaches owe their jobs to different 
groups of alumni who are interested primarily in winning athletic 
contests for their institution." (1929, p. 164) The selection of 
the coach was usually "affected by the decisions of persons not 
immediately connected with the administration of the 
institution." (Savage et al., 1929, p. 165) In most institutions, 
the alumni was a "group to be placated at almost any sacrifice." 
(Savage et al., 1929, p. 184) The motive of many alumni involved 
in college athletics was often the pursuit of status and 
prestige. And that pursuit was often unchecked because of their 
use of personal resources to secure their interpersonal power.
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Tactical Power
Tactical power refers to the instruments of power used to 
"circumscribe the actions of others within determinate settings." 
(Wolf, 1990, p. 586) It involves the methods and strategies 
employed by virtue of the specific arena of play. Tactical power 
was applied by constituents as an instrument of power to 
circumscribe authority because governing boards, presidents, or 
other university administrators delegated authority 
inappropriately. While boards and presidents were certainly too 
busy not to delegate authority, its over-delegation created gaps 
that were filled by constituents exercising tactical power. 
Conversely, university boards or presidents who under-delegated 
authority because of their desire to profit from athletics by 
increasing institutional prestige also generated authority gaps 
that were filled by the use of tactical power.
Boards and presidents at times permitted abuses, at times 
ignored abuses, and at times participated in abuses. Savage 
(1929) conjectured that in some cases there was a "powerlessness 
of educational leaders" to control commercialized intercollegiate 
athletics, in large part due to commercial influences filling 
authority gaps. (p. 23) Alumni, coaches, or athletic 
administrators set up unauthorized "slush funds" to cover 
expanding athletic operations. At the University of Wisconsin, 
for example, athletic revenues were used for illegitimate 
expenses such as illegal trips. (Savage et al., 1929, p. 90)
"Without exception," the Savage Report (1929) concluded, it
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was better to have university administrators in direct control of 
athletic finances, {p. 90) "The control of athletic moneys by 
university officers eliminates slush funds . . .," that could be 
used for inappropriate activities. (Savage et al., 1929, p. 90) 
However, "slush funds" existed at many institutions, whether 
disbursed through individuals, athletic associations, or 
university officers. Equipment, travel, and "special personnel" 
were generally paid for by athletic funds. (Savage et al., 1929, 
p. 88) At Dartmouth and Ohio State even the salaries of some non- 
athletic university officers and employees were "charged against 
athletics." (Savage et al., 1929, p. 88)
Often when high salaries were paid to coaches, the president 
or other university officers had little power over the source of 
the funds; therefore, they had little power over the dispersal of 
the funds as well. For example, football coaches in particular 
gained financially through the gate receipts and publicity they 
provided the university through winning teams. Average salaries 
of football coaches was $6107, with a range of $1800 to $14,000; 
athletic managers and physical education directors ranged from 
$1000 to $14,000, averaging $5,095, (Savage et al., 1929, p. 172) 
In comparison, professors averaged $5158, with a high of $12,000; 
and deans averaged $6409, with a high of $15,000. (Savage et al., 
1929, p. 171) Coaches' salaries were higher when athletic 
department funds were used, which occurred in the majority of 
cases.(Savage et al., 1929, p. 172) Coaches "elevated to faculty
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status" generally received less than their non-faculty 
counterparts. {Savage et al., 1929, p. 171)
Faculties were supposed to protect academic interests and be 
involved in athletic governance for educational reasons. However, 
few researchers had "taken the trouble to analyze precisely what 
those educational reasons are or may be." {Savage et al., 1929, 
p. 81) In addition, the profit from intercollegiate athletics, 
especially football, "may be put to academic uses in the form of 
new buildings and increased equipment;" therefore, athletics were 
seen by some faculty as having residual value. (Savage et al., 
1929, p. 81) However, most academic faculty voiced objection to 
commercial athletics. The "ideals to which so much lip service" 
was rendered by faculty were not actively pursued by those same
faculty, though. (Savage et al., 1929, p. 79)
Since the faculty was focused on other interests such as 
research, specialized coaches, physical education directors, and 
athletic managers emerged to run athletic operations. (Savage et
al., 1929, p. 21) Along with the faculty, administrative
officials such as registrars--even when involved with falsified 
eligibilities--were presented as the "victims" of the system they 
were supposed to prevent, while coaches were found to be the 
"evil geniuses" orchestrating the deception. (Savage et al.,
1929, pp. 99, 187). For example, coaches used students in 
fraternities to help recruit prominent athletes. (Savage et al., 
1929, p. 239) Once within the student body, an athlete then 
"stated" (self-reported) his own eligibility, which was usually
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verified by the coach and certified rather than scrutinized by 
the registrar, even when both knew his statement to be false.
(Savage et al., 1929, pp. 97-99)
Athletes were also recruited by paid professionals--athletic 
coaches and directors--and subsidized by the administration in 
the form of scholarships and other benefits. The "impecunious 
athlete," who would otherwise not go to college, often had his 
hand out. (Savage et al., 1929, p. 227) "Mercenary athlete(s)" 
used their athletic prowess as an instrument of tactical power by 
"shopping" for the best offer, being "coddled" along the way by 
coaches in need of their services. (Savage et al., 1929, pp. 228, 
229) However, prominent prospects whose services were obtained 
through subsidies--the majority of whom "valued dollars and 
cents"--were regarded as "hirelings." (Savage et al., 1929, pp. 
184, 232) In order to gain the services of these prized recruits, 
coaches used subsidies, which usually included room, board, 
tuition, books, supplies, and incidental fees, as an instrument 
of tactical power. (Savage et al., 1929, p. 259) The better 
athletes received jobs and spending money as well at some 
universities. (Savage et al., 1929, p. 258) The best performers 
even received "guarantees" or "pay checks." (Savage et al., 1929, 
pp. 259, 260) Academically, the athlete could obtain "gratuitous 
assistance in study by his fellow undergraduates" at nearly all 
universities. (Savage et al., 1929, p. 262) Most of these 
arrangements were made by coaches in order to attract and 
maintain the best athletes.
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While it was normal for coaches to be "elevated to faculty 
status," most often, the power of coaches and athletic directors 
was derived from the vast amounts of athletic wealth they 
oversaw. (Savage et al., 1929, p. 102) While some institutions 
provided funds to athletics through normal university channels, 
often athletic departments were responsible for and unchecked 
when obtaining the vast sums of money used in the operation of 
commercialized intercollegiate athletics. These monies could be 
used as instruments of tactical power. Athletic funds were 
sometimes used as an "honorarium" to the faculty athletic 
representative, thus ensuring athletic interests were realized. 
(Savage et al., 1929, p. 101) Athletic department personnel 
dispersed "slush funds" to pay for athletic interests, such as 
subsidies to athletes, who sometimes received 60 cents per hour 
from the athletic department for the same job for which a non­
athlete would receive half that wage. Athletic personnel provided 
game tickets to athletes for scalping; some tickets brought as 
much as $100.00. (Savage et al., 1929, p. 263)
Athletic coaches, directors, and managers attained a level 
of tactical power through their involvement in the daily conduct 
of athletic affairs. But, there were limits to their power.
Losses reduced available resources, and the loss of too many 
games resulted in termination of many a coach. (Savage et al., 
1929, p. 170) Coaches were expected to produce "results" as 
defined by a variety of constituent interests. (Savage et al.,
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1929, p. 182) Among those constituents exerting control over 
coaches' employment was the alumni.
As alumni recognized that they had the control of some vital 
resources, they moved toward a "proprietary" role on campus in 
"governance and trusteeship, whether of the university or of 
athletics." (Savage et al., 1929, p. 191) An estimated 20% of 
alumni were involved in athletics. Their interests were usually 
connected to tangible (financial) matters because that was the 
university's interest in them. Their relationship to athletics 
"manifested itself in two ways: the control of policies, and the 
recruiting and financing of athletes." (Savage et al., 1929, p. 
192) In some institutions, such as Dartmouth, alumni had few 
limits placed on their legitimized authority. (Savage et al.,
1929, p. 96) Within the hierarchical structure, they dominated 
some athletic associations that were responsible only to the 
governing board. And with the board often comprised of alumni, 
the associations enjoyed great latitude. As an avenue to service, 
the appointment of alumni advisory committees to governance 
positions in various branches of athletics was a practice that 
resulted in alumni domination of athletic governance.
Local merchants collaborated with alumni in recruiting and 
subsidizing by "offering rewards" to the best athletes, thereby 
gaining influence. (Savage et al., 1929, p. 184) Alumni and 
businessmen who provided resources obtained an "acquiescence of 
influence" from the institutions that led to a "domination of 
college athletics." (Savage et al., 1929, p. 23) Alumni influence
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in recruiting became commonplace. {Savage et al. , 1929, p. 228) 
They intervened with prospective athletes on behalf of the coach. 
They provided jobs to athletes, at times $150.00 per month when 
tuition averaged $270.00 per year. (Savage et al. 1929, p. 242)
In 12% of the institutions offering subsidies, the alumni alone 
provided the money; and they provided at least a portion of the 
money in over 50% of the universities offering subsidies. (Savage 
et al., 1929, p. 241)
Prized athletes received not only subsidies from coaches, 
but also "such valuable considerations as automobiles, clothes, 
typewriters, and haberdashery ... if not cash" for advertising 
"typewriters, clothing, sweaters, and other merchandise." (Savage 
et al., 1929, pp. 185, 277) Players also sold their names and 
photographs "for advertising cigarettes." At times, the athlete 
used tactical power within the press to gain profit and publicity 
against "good counsel from the athletic authorities of his 
college." (Savage et al., 1929, p. 276) Thereby, a small group of 
undergraduates, namely the athletes, while viewed by some as 
"exploited in news stories, columns of comment, and 
illustrations, and even in advertisements," individually used 
tactical power and reaped many personal rewards from the 
intercollegiate athletic system, which in turn empowered the 
media to influence the athletes directly. (Savage et al., 1929, 
p. 275)
As newspapers became "economic products," the press 
responded to public interest in college athletics by presenting a
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"distorted" view of universities that emphasized the importance 
of athletics. (Savage et al., 1929, p. 266) Savage et al. (1929) 
feared that "overstressing1 athletics would result in "seriously 
impaired" relations between colleges and the public, (p. 266) 
However, the Savage Report (1929) conceded that "college 
athletics are news and news that appeals to many readers as the 
most consistently interesting and important aspect of college 
life." (pp. 266-267) As a result of public interest, profits 
associated with college sports rose.
As profits for newspapers, advertisers, and college athletic 
programs increased, the press coverage of sports likewise 
increased. Newspaper circulation departments, "the thermometers 
of public interest and financial success," were concerned with 
the quantity of sporting news because of the increased public 
demands. (Savage et al., 1929, p. 289) The press responded to 
increased public interest in college athletics: 50% of all 
newspapers had over 15% of their pages dedicated to sports, while 
some dedicated as much as 25% for sports pages. (Savage et al., 
1929, p. 289) In the 15 years prior to the Savage Report (1929), 
the amount of college sports coverage increased 300-400% in 
several major city papers, such as the New York Times. (pp. 267- 
272) "Sensationalism" was commonplace in sports reporting because 
it stimulated public interest in college athletics and increased 
readership; however, it also obscured the differences in college 
athletics from professional competition. (Savage et al., 1929,
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pp. 275, 277) Some college athletes and prospects even obtained 
"press agents." (Savage et al., 1929, p. 283)
Most universities obtained "publicity officers," many of 
whom were paid with athletic funds, to deal with the press. 
(Savage et al., 1929, p. 283) While accusations persisted that 
professional sports writers were bribed by coaches to write 
favorably about him or his team, this type of "graft" in the form 
of cash and perquisites was "not substantiated in a single case." 
(Savage et al., 1929, p. 278) It was certain, however, that 
advertising and positive publicity for the coach and his team did 
reflect favorably on the institution. The coach had to please the 
alumni and the general public; therefore, favorable press was an 
invaluable instrument in his tactical efforts. As Savage et al., 
(1929) indicated, "the desire of the colleges and their partisans 
for the good-will of the public is due much of the publicity 
hunting that now obtains in athletics." (p. 284) By the time of 
the Savage Report (1929), in no other area was the "public 
interest so keen as in athletics." (p. 194)
Public interest in college athletics was "largely ascribable 
to the emphasis laid by our newspapers upon athletics in college 
life." (Savage et al., 1929, p. 208, 287) The Savage Report 
(1929) noted the aphorism that "a newspaper is no better than its 
sporting page." (p. 287) Newspaper publishers were "fully alert 
to the interest of their public in athletics," recognizing this, 
some charged the highest premium for advertising space in the 
sports pages. (Savage et al., 1929, p. 288) Thus, the interest of
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the press in college athletics was "wholly financial,--a question 
of profit or loss." (Savage et al., 1929, p. 289) Propelled by 
the potential for profit, public interest fostered 
professionalized commercial athletics. The commercial interests 
of intercollegiate athletics were the source of the structural 
power various constituents exerted on their behalf in the 
university.
Structural Power
Structural power shapes the social field of action. In its 
broadest sense, it encompasses the societal influences 
surrounding intercollegiate athletics. It "organizes and 
orchestrates" the playing field and specifies the form and
direction of power play. (Wolf, 1990, p. 586) College athletics
had been "transformed from a game played by boys to a profitable 
professional enterprise," which reflected the changes in the 
American university and in society in general. (Savage et al., 
1929, p. viii) The weaknesses resulting from the "educational 
growth" of universities during the five decades prior to the 
Report were "due to our national tendency to compete and 
imitate." (Savage et al., 1929, p. xiii) Universities wanted to 
be alike in order to serve the "masses." (Savage et al., 1929, 
pp. xvii, xviii) Mass education, a common outcome sought by many 
universities, was one component of structural power. Mass
entertainment was another. Both were results of the evolving mass
society; and all three supported the structural power of
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commercialized athletic competition. {Savage et al., 1929, pp. 
xvii, xviii)
In describing what the authors perceived as the central 
problem in college athletics in 1929, the Savage Report cited 
"commercialism and all the evils that follow in its train," which 
appeared to encompass most facets of college athletics and drive 
most non-academic interests surrounding college athletics.
(Savage et al., 1929, p. 88) The Savage Report (1929) defined 
"commercialism" in college athletics as:
... the placing of a higher value upon monetary and material 
returns, whether direct or indirect, from any athletic 
activity than is placed upon its returns in recreation, 
health, and physical and moral well-being, (p. 11)
Money stimulated the growth of and desire for "winning" athletic 
programs that, consequently, valued monetary and material returns 
more than any other potential benefits of athletics. (Savage et 
al., 1929, p. 11) The control of the abundant financial resources 
surrounding athletics, which included the control of accounting 
procedures, revenue sources, expenditures and dispersement, 
scheduling, and facilities and equipment, was central to the 
development of commercialized athletics. (Savage et al., 1929, p. 
102) In most cases, the execution of athletic policy, the day-to- 
day operation of athletic programs, and the daily supervision of 
athletic monies was left to and conducted by the professional 
athletic personnel paid with independent athletic, not 
university, funds. At times, these professionals were responsible
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to a representative advisory body, which itself was usually 
comprised of constituents with commercial interests.
The vast and "steadily mounting" funds that athletics, "and 
especially athletic success," brought, created within the 
university an "exaggeration of the importance of athletics and 
especially football in American college life." (Savage et al., 
1929, p. 88) Public interest, both reflected in and stimulated by 
the commercial press, empowered the athletic interests associated 
with the university. The power, prestige, and money of football 
in particular, derived from the vast public interest, 
subordinated academics and other sports. This domination was 
manifested in coaches' salaries, conference rules, and 
institutional administrative policies. Institutions were 
concerned, at least rhetorically, with the "administrative 
control" of college athletics, but athletics served "many 
masters," few of whom had the intellectual interests of the 
university at heart.
The administration of American college athletics is in 
reality a problem in the adjustment of human relationships, 
and its solution depends upon a compromise and cooperation 
which some of those concerned appear unable or unwilling to 
accord. Yet few college administrative officers appear to 
have attended sufficiently to the fact that the devising of 
a logically complete system for the control of athletics has 
little relation to the way in which that system may operate 
over a period of years. (Savage et al., 1929, p. 78)
University, conference, and NCAA rules were expanding, yet 
"no rule, however well intended, can be made binding without the 
consent and the active cooperation of those to whom it applies." 
{Savage et al., 1929, p. 208) NCAA, conference, and institution 
rules restricting recruiting, subsidizing, and compensation of 
athletes were "unmistakable." {Savage et al., 1929, p. 203) The 
stated intent was clearly to promote amateurism in college 
athletics. Yet, privately, 75% of all institutions offered 
subsidies to athletes, some through regular university funding, 
most through athletic revenue. (Savage et al., 1929, p. 241) In 
addition, the most "elastic" rules allowed professional summer 
baseball. (Savage et al., 1929, p. 204) The Savage Report (1929) 
noted the stretching of the rules "involving ethical values, 'the 
letter killeth, but the spirit giveth life.'" (Savage et al.
1929, p. 203) The evasion of rules reveals the interests of 
constituents in maintaining the status quo of the structural 
power in which college athletics were played.
Whatever reasons are urged for countenancing procedures 
which contravene and nullify the fine phrases in which 
conferences indulge concerning the amateur status, the real 
reason is this: universities and colleges have found that 
unless they relax their rules regarding professionalism and 
wink at flagrant abuses they cannot win enough games to 
satisfy their constituents and continue their large 
expenditures." (Savage et al., 1929, p. 207)
The Savage Report (1929) determined that, rather than curtailing
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commercial operations, "the university of the present day enters 
eagerly ..." into commercial athletics, and that the "weakness of 
the American university as it exists today lies in its lack of 
intellectual sincerity." (pp. xvi, xviii) "The availability of 
such resources stimulates" the desire for successful teams and 
the subsequent profits. (Savage et al., 1929, p. 88) The 
"compromises" that universities made to maintain commercialized 
athletic programs gave an air of hypocrisy to the whole of higher 
education. (Savage et al., 1929, p. xxi) While various types of 
power were being utilized by constituents to fill in gaps left by 
the use and misuse of legitimate authority, the structural power 
of commercialized athletics became the dominant force in the 
governance of intercollegiate athletics.
The governing board and the president welcomed the 
additional revenues afforded by commercialized college athletics: 
demonstrated by board formation of policy, and by presidential 
execution of policy. Administrations accepted the "notion that 
the first essential to the execution of any athletic policy is 
money, and plenty of it." (Savage et al., 1929, p. 79) Governing 
boards and presidents used the structural power of commercial 
resources in some institutions by extending their own authority 
in areas of finance. As a result, boards and presidents "have 
profitted by it; the task of finding money for new equipment or 
new buildings has been lightened." (Savage et al., 1929, p. 307)
Boards and presidents also succumbed to the structural power 
of commercialized athletics by delegating authority to commercial
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athletic interests. As noted above, they allowed athletic 
administrators or coaches to control athletic finances, or they 
placed prominent alumni in control of athletic boards, as was the 
case at universities such as Brown, Purdue, Colgate, Pennsylvania 
State, Lehigh, Amherst, Georgia, Dartmouth, Allegheny, Columbia, 
and the University of Pennsylvania. (Savage et al., 1929, pp. 81, 
82) The Savage Report (1929) presented athletics as a relatively 
unrestricted commercial system wherein administrations directed 
athletic policy toward profit, coaches bought and players sold 
their services, and faculty disconnected themselves from the 
entire endeavor.
While boards and presidents either quietly succumbed to or 
openly promoted commercial athletics, and the faculty grew 
powerless in their wake, athletic administrators and coaches 
profited by the publicity as well as the revenues of 
intercollegiate athletics. In order to obtain the best athletes, 
and thereby increase the potential for greater profits that 
strengthened structural power, coaches recruited and subsidized 
prospective players. Once the athlete matriculated, the coach or 
athletic administrator was responsible for verifying his 
eligibility, which was nearly always "certified" by higher 
authorities.
It would be idle to complain that conference rules are not 
enforced. Considering their complexity, the overwhelming 
desire for victory, and the reprehensible tendency to win 
games by means of 'jokers,' exceptions, and far-fetched
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interpretations of rules or resolutions, the regulations of 
conferences are generally well administered. But he who 
believes that clean and sportsmanlike games, chivalrous 
rivalry, and magnanimous competition are to be attained 
through mere administrative provisions and procedure is 
indeed naive. (Savage et al., 1929, p. 207)
Many rules in intercollegiate athletics were ideals that were yet 
to be successfully implemented by many institutions. "Rules do 
not enforce themselves," and their value lies in their 
"observance." (Savage et al., 1929, p. 9, 10) Coaches and 
athletic directors controlled the daily operations of college 
athletics largely because that was their charge. Coaches, 
athletic directors, athletes, and alumni each had commercial 
athletic interests which motivated them to circumvent the spirit 
of the rules whether by intent or by circumstance. Often with the 
consent of the university administration, coaches and alumni 
worked closely together in recruiting and subsidizing athletes. 
For example, a coach's letter to an alumnus suggested a 
"roundabout method of attack" in recruiting a standout athlete, 
while another alumnus offered to "take matters up" since "the 
coach cannot make direct contact with players." (Savage et al., 
1929, pp. 323-324) As a controlling influence in these practices, 
the alumni utilized interpersonal, tactical, and structural 
power, often outside the normal line of authority in the 
university. Where they were formally incorporated into the
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organizational hierarchy, alumni came to dominate as a result of 
their combined legitimate authority and structural power.
While the university administration had authority over the 
practices of recruiting and subsidizing, they either allowed 
these practices to go unchecked or, in some cases, encouraged the 
practices for the same reasons the athletic personnel gave: 
prestige and revenue resulting from the exposure by the press and 
increased public interest. The practices of recruiting and 
subsidizing athletes resulted from the structural power of 
constituents who were operating in an autonomous atmosphere that 
permitted the practices to go unchecked. These constituents were 
empowered by their access to abundant revenues and by the intense 
public interest in commercial athletics.
The administrations of individual universities, along with 
conferences and the NCAA, on the one hand generated idealistic 
rules that were not enforced, while on the other hand protected 
commercial interests through commercially-motivated scheduling. 
Scheduling athletic contests for increased profit, whether 
motivated by alumni rivalries or by "the possibility of securing 
legislative appropriations" in a state such as Pennsylvania, was 
more the rule than the exception. {Savage et al., 1929, p. 99) 
Many university constituents acquiesced to the structural power 
of commercialism. Motivated by commercial interests, conferences 
used structural power to dominate scheduling, often restricting 
less popular non-conference opponents and scheduling instead 
contests of great interest to the public. The end result was an
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increased threat to the "athletic autonomy" of the institution. 
(Savage et al., 1929, p. 99) However, university athletic 
governance was far from autonomous, as many external constituents 
exercised power in the governance of intercollegiate athletics.
Alumni and townspeople exercised structural power in college 
athletics through their control of financial resources. "Slush 
funds" were created through the resources of alumni and townsmen, 
and disbursed by athletic officials, the alumni themselves, or 
the university athletic association. Each of these constituents 
hoped to profit, either personally of professionally, in the 
pursuit of winning athletic teams. Athletic funds paid for 
advertising, athletic subsidies, athletic personnel, and 
facilities. These expenditures were prompted by "two forces, 
namely, ... alumni and townspeople, and the profits ... from vast 
crowds." (Savage et al., 1929, p. 92) Public interest in college 
athletics resulted in commercial profits for the constituents in 
control, while it also empowered those same constituents. Public 
interest in college athletics was not only reflected in but also 
generated by the press in order to produce increased advertising 
profits. The press became the connection between the general 
public and the university through college athletics. Thus, the 
capitalistic press was empowered through the public's interest in 
commercial endeavors such as athletics. The availability of 
advertising money and publicity, which translated into revenue as 
public interest increased, influenced coaches', players', and 
universities' relations with the press. As these constituents
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were guided by commercial interests, the press began to exert 
structural power in the operation of college athletics. The 
Savage Report (1929) described the media's structural power, 
noting that the role of the press "in leading public opinion to 
esteem the true value" of college athletics was crucial for 
reform: "It is certain that without the help of the American 
newspaper, little if any improvement is possible in college 
athletics." (Savage et al., 1929, p. 284) However, the 
commercially-driven media did not "meet the responsibilities that 
power brings" in terms of "public welfare," but it was giving the 
public what it wanted and deserved. (Savage et al., 1929, p. 289) 
Breakdown of Governance
The extent of commercialization in intercollegiate athletics 
reflected the changes that had occurred in universities, which 
resulted from the impact of the evolving mass society. Commercial 
college athletics became a system dominated by resources. 
Constituents utilized authority and power to obtain and control 
resources, monetary and otherwise. The Savage Report identified 
three critical areas for "control" of athletic resources: 1) 
finances, including revenues, expenditures, scheduling, and 
facilities; 2) personnel, including the selection of personnel 
and the determination of "faculty status" and "control"; and 3) 
student athletes, including the determination of athletic and 
academic eligibility of players, and the recruiting and 
subsidizing of athletes. (Savage et al., 1929, p. 77) The control
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of these resources in athletics was exercised by a variety of 
constituents.
In nearly every instance, the governing board of the 
university had, whether exercised or not, the authority to 
determine athletic procedure. The college president received by 
delegation from the board the authority to set athletic policies 
and control athletic practices. In turn, he generally delegated 
it into other hands. The academic faculty normally had authority 
in name only. The committees controlled by academic faculty were 
advisory in nature.
In many cases, boards, presidents, and faculty relinquished 
their authority to athletic managers and coaches. Authority over 
day-to-day operations was often delegated directly by the board 
to athletic personnel. Coaches and athletic directors often 
received "faculty status" in order to function within the 
hierarchy of authority. At times, alumni managers were also 
incorporated into the lines of legitimate authority through 
faculty appointment. More frequently, alumni managers obtained 
authority in college athletics through formal representation on 
athletic boards or associations.
Collectively, institutions invested authority in 
representative bodies. On the regional level, conferences were 
typically given collective authority over scheduling and 
eligibility issues. And on the national level, the NCAA 
represented its member institutions with limited authority over 
specific issues such as eligibility as well.
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Interpersonal, tactical, and structural modes of power were 
exercised in varying degrees by constituents both inside and 
outside the authority hierarchy. The governing board and 
president used power to support their authority over the 
operation of college athletics. Academic faculty members, 
disinterested in athletics, abdicated their advisory authority 
and refrained from seizing opportunities to solidify power. Aloof 
academicians joined the board and president to hand opportunities 
to utilize power over to commercial athletic interests.
It is not evident, however, had any of these legitimate 
authorities wanted to, that they could have controlled the 
structural power of the vast external forces that stimulated a 
commercial athletic system based upon profit and loss. Coaches 
and athletic directors, whose careers depended upon serving 
athletic interests and fielding successful (i.e., winning and 
profitable) teams, exerted tactical power in the execution of 
daily operations. When supported by structural power, they served 
other masters, namely commercial interests rather than academic 
interests.
The alumni garnered great influence in college athletics 
through exerting interpersonal, tactical, and structural power. 
Because they provided vast resources, alumni gained a proprietary 
interest in athletics. Local townsmen and merchants supported, 
financially and philosophically, the commercial growth of 
athletics as well since it translated into profit.
The structural power that drove the commercial athletics
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system stemmed from stimulating profit and public interest. The 
commercial press, which both reflected and stimulated public 
interest, had vast structural power, serving as the reciprocal 
link between the public and college athletics. In the end, the 
power utilized to control college athletics derived simply from 
resources.
The incongruity between university practices in controlling 
athletics, whether implemented through the use of legitimate 
authority or illegitimate power, and the ideal collective 
policies promoted by bodies representative of the university 
revealed a systemic dysfunction in the governance of 
intercollegiate athletics in 1929. In the majority of cases, 
collective lofty policy, particularly with regard to the control 
of resources, was subservient to pragmatic university efforts to 
profit from college athletics. In short, through their individual 
actions, university administrators utilized structural, tactical, 
and interpersonal power to promote the professionalized, 
commercial athletics that were demanded by the press and the 
public interest. On their own campus, they promoted these 
interests, at times willingly and at times without guile, at the 
expense of the collective public ideals that they promoted 
through the NCAA and conference associations. Whether university 
administrators engaged in willing hypocrisy or acquiescence to 
the manipulation of the structurally powered athletic 
constituents, the result was a dysfunction in the governance of 
intercollegiate athletics.
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The dysfunction in the governance of intercollegiate 
athletics in 1929 resulted from constituents' exercise of various 
modes of power to fill the gaps in authority. The delegation of 
authority is necessary for the efficient operation of any 
university. Yet, in the case of athletic governance, unchecked 
delegation resulted in commercially-motivated constituents 
exerting interpersonal, tactical, and structural power by which a 
modicum of control was gained.
Despite rhetoric and collective proclamations to the 
contrary, the administrations of individual universities sought 
the profits of commercial athletics. As legitimate authority 
yielded, the unchecked structural power that controlled college 
athletics emerged from outside the university; although 
constituents with commercial athletic interests were formally 
incorporated into the organizational hierarchy as well. Whether 
constituents were internally or externally situated, their 
structural power resulted from the availability of potential 
resources. Resource-driven, profit-oriented, publicity-seeking 
commercialized athletic interests reflected and fed the public 
interests of the emerging mass society. Commercialized athletics 
thus served the commercialized society that subsidized them and 
subsequently empowered them.
CHAPTER V
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POWER AND AUTHORITY IN CONTEMPORARY ATHLETICS 
Introduction
In modern college athletics, "the desire to win and the 
financial and more intangible rewards associated with success 
have, at times, led participants, administrators, supporters, and 
institutions to compromise fundamental principles of honesty and 
integrity." (NCAA, 1983) In 1989, the Knight Foundation 
Commission on Intercollegiate Athletics began what would be a 
three year and $3 million investigation of college sports. Its 
purpose was "to propose a reform agenda for college sports," 
which would ultimately restore "the public's trust in the 
integrity of college sports." (Knight Commission, 1993, pp. I, 
VII) Intercollegiate athletics "never has been devoid of 
scandals;" however "media attention has heightened awareness of 
abuses." (NCAA, 1983) Introducing the American Council on 
Education study of 1986, ACE President Robert Atwell commented on 
college sports' growing need for attention:
Intercollegiate athletics is one of the most volatile areas 
in higher education. The reputations of many institutions 
and their leaders have been sullied by scandals growing out 
of the extreme pressure that surrounds big time college 
athletics. Yet despite the importance of the subject, there 
has been very little scholarship in this area. (Gilley et 
al., 1986, p. v)
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Founded by the NCAA with the conviction that the "abuses needed 
to be dealt with forcefully," the Select Committee on Athletic 
Problems and Concerns in Higher Education noted: "Despite all of 
the problems that have been associated with college athletics 
programs, their contributions to the overall well-being of higher 
education have outweighed their negative aspects." (NCAA, 1983) 
But the Knight Commission (1993) emphasized that athletic 
problems highlighted in the Savage Report of 1929 had only gotten 
worse.
"Governance is a prime issue confronting all segments of 
intercollegiate athletics." (NCAA, 1983) Each of the afore­
mentioned national reports called for legitimate campus 
authorities to control college athletics, which "must be grounded 
in the academic traditions that created and nurtured" them.
(Knight Commission, 1993, p. VI) While college sports have "a 
legitimate and proper role to play in college and university 
life," the myriad abuses reflect systemic problems in governance. 
(Knight Commission, 1993, p. I)
Authority
Institutions of higher education, like other organizations, 
devise structures through which the enterprise is governed.
Within these structures, roles are specified and ascribed various 
degrees of authority. Constituents in prescribed roles in 
intercollegiate athletic governance are thereby enabled or 
restricted by their degree of authority in the decision-making 
and implementation process. The authority of a prescribed role is
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dependent upon the place that the role occupies in the chain of 
command or organizational framework. (Westmeyer, 1990)
The constituents in a normative collegiate governance system 
that exercise various degrees of authority based on their 
prescribed roles and responsibilities in the governance of 
intercollegiate athletics include the governing board, the 
president, the athletic director, the coach, the conferences, and 
the NCAA. These prescribed authority roles and responsibilities 
in the governance of intercollegiate athletics are generally more 
clearly delineated today than they were in 1929; therefore, there 
is more concern with roles currently. (Chait et al., 1993; 
Westmeyer, 1990)
However, constituents who undertake these roles in athletic 
governance do not always fulfill or limit themselves to the ideal 
authority roles and responsibilities. Relinquishing the 
prescribed responsibility or authority of a governance role 
stimulates the creation of a breach in authority. Constituent 
actions that create the gaps in authority allow other 
constituents to use power to fill in those gaps. Within the realm 
of big time intercollegiate athletics, when an authority breach 
occurs in any part of the governance structure, the gap is filled 
quickly and eagerly by persons, without legitimate authority but 
with something to gain, using power in the place of legitimate 
authority.
Ideal Authority; Institutional Actors
Ideal collegiate authority is entrusted, on behalf of the
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public, by state charter to institutional governing boards. The 
governing board operates as the "final institutional authority." 
(Peterson et al., 1991, p. 160) Governing boards are "expected to 
be the champions of the institutions they serve," charged with 
protecting the institutional mission. (Kauffman, 1980, p. 54) 
Boards are often comprised of prominent citizens, alumni, and 
business leaders with an "individual and collective competence of 
recognized weight." (Peterson et al., 1991, p. 160) The board has 
supreme responsibility for both long-term policy formation 
relative to the university mission and fiscal matters. (Kauffman, 
1980, p. 53)
The governing board is responsible to be "a fundamental 
defense of the vested interests of society in the educational 
institution." (Peterson et al., 1991, p. 161) Ultimately 
responsible for overseeing the long-term direction of the 
university, the governing board defines, refines, and protects 
the institutional mission. Typical governing board 
responsibilities also include the formation or approval of 
university policy relating future needs to "predictable 
resources," obtaining necessary resources and capital for 
operation, and broadly dealing with personnel. (Peterson et al., 
1991, p. 160)
The governing board's authority derives from the 
institutions charter or directly from the state. As the pinnacle 
of the university hierarchy, the board formulates policy, leaving 
the execution of policy to other constituents. (Chait et al.,
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1993) As the board oversees the implementation of "the policies 
and procedures of the institution under its jurisdiction," it 
"entrusts the conduct of administration to administrative 
officers." (Peterson et al., 1991, p. 160) The governing board 
should "genuinely respect the legitimate roles of others in the 
governance process." (Chait et al., 1993, p. 127) Because of its 
farsighted concerns, and the fact that most board members are 
"part-time, unpaid trustees" with outside interests in addition 
to university policy, the governing board delegates the authority 
to manage the daily affairs of the university to the president.
The president serves at the will of the governing board. 
(Kauffman, 1980) The president, or chancellor, is the chief 
executive officer of the university, having the formal authority 
to make and execute policies necessary to fulfill the mission of 
the institution. The president is supported by delegated 
authority from the board above and the faculty and staff below in 
the university governance hierarchy.
The president's work is to "plan, to organize, to direct, 
and to represent." (Peterson et al., 1991, p. 161) It is also the 
responsibility of the president to define and achieve goals, to 
take administrative action, to represent the institution 
publicly, and to engage in planning. (Peterson et al., 1991, p. 
161) In addition, the president is responsible for maintaining 
and expanding institutional resources and for defending the 
academic integrity of the institution. (Peterson et al., 1991, p. 
161; Knight Commission, 1993, p. VI) The president is accountable
139
to the board for the all the major elements of a university's 
life, including both academic and athletic endeavors.
While maintaining authority over and responsibility for 
athletics, the president generally delegates the daily 
responsibilities of athletic policy execution and operation to 
the athletic director. Noting the "complexities" of college 
athletics and "myriad problems" confronting college presidents, 
the ACE Policy Statement (1979, p. 347, 348) addressed the need 
for presidents to delegate authority:
Presidential delegation of authority for all types of 
programs, including athletics, is necessary to effective 
administration. Presidents who delegate authority to an 
athletics director for the conduct of collegiate athletics 
are, nevertheless, responsible for assuring ... integrity. 
Athletic directors are often delegated authority by 
university presidents to execute the policies associated with the 
operation of intercollegiate athletics. Athletic directors may 
formulate athletic policies necessary for the daily operation of 
athletics, but these policies must serve, not contradict, broader 
university policy. (Jensen, 1983) For example, unless university 
policy permits such deviation, the ideal athletic policy should 
not allow the admission or class-status promotion of athletes who 
have substandard academic records and do not meet general 
university requirements.
The authority of athletic directors typically extends to the 
execution of policy in areas of personnel, finances, and even
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academic concerns related to athletics. Athletic directors have 
the responsibility for the overall operation of the athletic 
program subject to the approval of the president. In turn, the 
responsibility for the day-to-day training of players and the 
operation of specific sport programs is delegated by the athletic 
director to the coach.
Through the athletic administration, coaches are generally 
delegated the specific authority needed to operate their athletic 
team. They determine such procedures as practice planning, player 
discipline, and player selection. (Sabock, 1985) The 
responsibility and operational authority of the coach is derived 
from the athletic director in a hierarchical chain of command. 
Thus, the ideal scope of coaches' authority is generally limited 
to sport-specific training and the execution of related athletic 
policy within the university that has a clear administrative 
hierarchy.
Ideal Authority; External Actors
As the authority role and responsibilities of the NCAA has 
expanded over time, extrainstitutional authority has changed. The 
NCAA, a voluntary national association of more than 850 
institutions, operates with a mission of ensuring a level playing 
field for intercollegiate athletics. The Association pursues this 
end through distributing collegiate teams into distinctive 
categories based upon their level of competition, and by 
developing and enforcing rules and regulations regarding athletic 
procedures for each of those categories. As a collective
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organization comprised of various institutions with diverse 
intercollegiate athletic programs, the NCAA's authority 
originates from its member institutions by virtue of their 
participation under its umbrella.
Presidents are expanding their collective authority in the 
NCAA and in conferences. (Knight Foundation, 1993) College 
presidents have policy formation authority within the NCAA, 
influencing the Association's legislative and executive process 
through their delegates and the Presidents' Commission.
University presidents have begun to assert their collective 
authority in proposing legislation in the NCAA through the 
Presidents' Commission. University presidents voluntarily 
participate in guiding NCAA policy primarily through the 
Presidents' Commission. The presidents selected to sit on the 
Commission propose legislation founded on the educational 
interests of the presidents they represent. At the NCAA's annual 
convention, presidents often delegate to their faculty athletic 
representatives the authority to vote in the legislative process. 
Presidents, however, can retain this authority if they choose to 
do so. (Knight Commission, 1993)
Thus legitimated by its membership, the NCAA's authority is 
manifested in legislation that addresses all areas of athletic 
operations. Presidents have asserted their collective authority 
through the Presidents' Commission, and through their faculty 
athletic representatives in the legislative process of the NCAA 
by proposing and supporting legislation such as Proposition 48,
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which sets minimum academic eligibility standards for incoming 
student-athletes. (NCAA, 1983) While Gilley et al. (1986, p. 5) 
found that the NCAA had its greatest authority relative to 
eligibility and financial assistance, its role in other athletic 
concerns has increased. For example, the NCAA has passed 
legislation restricting the involvement of "non-institutional 
personnel" in recruiting either on or off campus, and other 
legislation restricting the salary and tenure of coaches. (NCAA, 
1983, pp. 19, 22) The Knight Commission (1993) recognized the 
increased authority role of the NCAA in issues pertaining to 
academic integrity and finances.
NCAA authority now covers policy-making in the areas of 
recruiting, finances, eligibility, academics, and in other 
issues. For example, the NCAA has recently mandated several cost- 
cutting measures designed to limit institutional spending, such 
as further restricting the employment conditions of coaches and 
reducing the number of scholarships in some sports. As a result 
of the expansive legislation, the NCAA publishes a manual and 
several smaller guides, detailing its comprehensive rules and 
regulations. (NCAA, 1994) The NCAA's authority extends to the 
creation and enforcement of its rules, the investigation of 
infractions, and the imposition of sanctions, censure, 
probations, or the "death penalty"--the termination of 
competition for a specific athletic team--on offending members. 
For example, Southern Methodist University was forced to disband 
its football team and Tulane, its basketball team, as a result of
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NCAA penalties. In the 1980s, over 50% of all NCAA Division I-A 
institutions had violated rules, received sanctions, and abided 
by the penalties. (Knight Commission, 1993) Between May and 
November of 1994, ten universities were sanctioned by the NCAA, 
joining 23 other institutions already on probation. (33 
Institutions, 1994) The most common violations have occurred in 
the recruitment of prospective athletes. The NCAA has also 
extended its authority to ameliorate the problems it encounters. 
For example, to combat recruitment and eligibility problems, the 
NCAA has established a Clearing House to register all high school 
athletes interested in obtaining an athletic scholarship.
The authority of the NCAA is not unchecked with regard to 
its rules and its enforcement procedures. The Association has 
begun to face challenges in legislatures and in courts from some 
of its member schools, individual athletic interests, and even 
the federal and state governments. For example, the Florida 
legislature, like several other states, passed a due-process law 
which "prohibits the association from dealing with member 
institutions in Florida under its own rules." (Sidelines, 1994) 
Former Congressman Tom McMillen warned the NCAA Forum that 
Congress might "begin micro-managing the affairs of the NCAA." 
(NCAA, 1988, pp. 21, 22) While the NCAA's enforcement authority 
is limited by the federal and state governments through 
litigation, the inclusion of presidents in the NCAA's legislative 
process and the bolstering of its enforcement branch with more 
personnel has strengthened the NCAA's authority to enforce its
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rules on individual campuses. The NCAA's expanded authority to 
enforce, along with its control over elements of intercollegiate 
athletics that impact institutional revenue, have strengthened 
its position as a major player in the "big-picture" of college 
athletics.
Athletic conferences, which are comprised of similarly 
constituted universities, function as regional versions of the 
NCAA in that they enact rules and regulations that derive from 
the characteristics and circumstances of their membership.
(Knight Commission, 1993) Conference authority therefore arises 
from the needs of those institutions that comprise its 
membership. As a result of the relatively small number and 
homogeneous nature of conference members, conferences are closer 
to and therefore more accountable to their membership than the 
NCAA.
Conference authority manifests itself in rules that reflect 
members' needs in many areas of athletic operations, including 
academics, finances, and eligibility. For example, as in the Ivy 
League, conferences may choose to offer no athletic-based 
scholarships. Conferences might devise revenue sharing plans for 
member institutions. Conferences can establish and maintain 
eligibility standards, which can enhance but not conflict with 
NCAA minimum standards. Conference authority, although arising 
from its members, is limited externally by the NCAA, in that the 
rules and regulations of the NCAA supersede those of the 
conference.
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Although Gilley et al. (1986, p. 5) did not consider
conferences to be "major factors" in the control of athletics 
during the mid-1980s, larger "super conferences" have begun to 
emerge by result of conference realignments. The majority of the 
most prominent Division I-A universities are now affiliated with 
a conference in either football or basketball, or both. For 
example, Notre Dame and the University of Miami, traditionally 
prestigious and independent athletic programs, have joined the 
Big East Conference. The Big Ten Conference has added Penn State 
and may look to add another institution. The Big Eight has 
expanded by adding powerful new members such as Texas A & M. The 
renewed interest in conference membership, and the realignment 
into new conferences, suggests that the authority of conferences 
is reemerging.
As set forth in the Tenth Amendment of the federal 
Constitution, all powers, or authority given the definitions used 
in this study, not specifically given to the federal government 
pass to the state or the people. Since education is not 
specifically addressed, in the best interests of its citizens, it 
is within the authority of the state government to maintain a 
public higher education system. Government use of authority in 
the governance of higher education, and in particular 
intercollegiate athletics, arises in all three branches through 
executive, legislative, and judicial actions. For example, the 
governor appoints trustees to state institutions. The state 
legislatures appropriate funds to state institutions and grant
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charters for the operation of private institutions. Both state 
and federal courts often interpret the application of broader 
policies to higher education. For example, federal courts 
determined the profound impact of Title IX gender equity 
legislation upon intercollegiate athletic governance at both 
public and private institutions. (Johnson & Frey, 1985)
While government authority has been exercised more regularly 
than in 1929, there are many comparisons to be drawn between the 
two periods. Current governing boards and presidents have 
retained their paramount authority over the university and its 
athletics program. However, the athletic director has 
consistently increased his/her authority role over that of 1929. 
Today's coach has gained legitimacy through additional authority 
roles as well. The NCAA has an increased inter-institutional 
authority role as a result of its economic impact and enforcement 
capability. However, conference authority is currently more 
restricted than in 1929, not by the members below, but by the 
NCAA above. The alumni no longer hold the same legitimacy that 
they had through their control of athletic boards in 1929. And 
the limited authority roles of faculty and undergraduates in 1929 
have persisted.
Actors Without Authority
University constituents possessing limited or no authority 
in the governance of college athletics include the faculty, the 
undergraduates, the alumni, and the university community. 
University faculty, by virtue of their role, are concerned with
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the academic interests of the university. Faculty react to 
athletics in one of three ways. Often they are critical of 
commercial intercollegiate athletics for their negative impact on 
academic concerns, such as admissions exemptions for an 
outstanding athlete who does not meet institutional standards, or 
grade manipulation by university officials. (Gilley et al., 1986, 
p. 37) Some faculty, though, are staunch supporters of athletics 
for their entertainment value, institutional image enhancement, 
and revenue potential. These faculty believe that athletics can 
attract more students and, with them, an increase in revenue to 
be used for academic programs. Still other faculty members are 
indifferent to college athletics, having neither the time or 
inclination to take note of the role of athletics on campus.
Faculty play a limited role in "big-time" athletic programs. 
On some campuses, limited "authority for the athletics program 
[is] delegated to a faculty committee" by the university 
president. (ACE, 1979, p. 348) Through these advisory committees, 
the faculty has formal input into athletic policy. This input, 
though, is usually limited to academic concerns and is most often 
restricted to advice given to the athletic director. Participants 
on advisory committees are commonly supportive of athletics.
Undergraduates are also generally supportive of 
intercollegiate athletics. They are entertained and inspired by 
athletic success. Not always aware of the bigger picture of the 
university mission as a group, the students often place athletic 
interests ahead of academic interests. Universities, fearing
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intentional or inept misuse of authority with regard to athletics 
by undergraduates, have elected to withhold authority from them. 
Although students do at times have a representative on athletic 
advisory committees, they have no formal authority in policy 
formation or execution. Their contributions to the administration 
and supervision of athletic operations are limited by the 
university that houses these operations. Athletic operations 
count on student activity fees, in addition to student gate 
receipts, as a considerable source of revenue, averaging 8% of 
total athletic revenues at Division I-A schools. (Fulks, 1993, p. 
25) Despite their generation of resources, students are not 
entrusted with any significant authority in college athletics.
The alumni contribution to athletic revenues is a 
substantial 15%, excluding their portion of ticket sales. (Fulks, 
1993, p. 25) Yet, like the undergraduate, their role, as a body, 
in the campus governance is very limited. The alumni perceive 
athletics as the window through which the world sees their Alma 
Mater. Therefore, they generally want winning athletic teams. 
While the alumni are products of the university, the most 
supportive often do not hold the same value for the academic 
mission of the institution, therefore supporting athletic 
interests over academic interests. (Knight Commissions, 1993)
This manifests itself in formal alumni fundraising efforts.
(NCAA, 1982)
Alumni, through their official associations, are a 
significant source of revenue for the university as well as for
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its athletics program. While alumni do not have the legitimate 
authority to dictate policy, either academic or athletic, their 
spirited gifts through an official alumni association are 
essential for the very survival of the institution. {Gilley et 
al., 1986) It is through this formal alumni association, or an 
association specifically for athletic development, that alumni 
are incorporated into the authority hierarchy of university 
athletics programs. The authority of alumni associations is very 
limited by the university. The association, and its membership, 
are responsible for the acquisition of resources. They have the 
limited authority, in the name of the university, to raise funds, 
either for general accounts or earmarked for specified uses such 
as athletics.
Formal governance authority is withheld from the university 
community, which includes boosters, local citizens, business 
leaders, and the general public. The intrinsic and extrinsic 
support by these external constituents demonstrates a dual 
personality though. A 1989 Harris Poll indicated that 80% of the 
public felt that intercollegiate sports were out of control, 
corrupted by big money, and were undermining the traditional role 
of the university. (Knight Commission, 1993, p. II) Yet, 
attendance at intercollegiate athletic events has steadily 
increased and televised contests have generated large viewing 
audiences. (Knight Commission, 1993, p. II) Winning athletic 
programs, particularly football and basketball teams, generate 
vast revenue and notoriety through the media, and serve as a
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source of pride for the university communities. However, once 
again the academic mission of the university often takes a back 
seat to the desire for victory among the community of university 
boosters, business leaders, and "fans" in the local community, 
whose interests often lie beyond intellectual pursuits.
Like the alumni, the university boosters' resources are 
critical for maintenance of the present level of operation. Some 
officially sanctioned booster clubs generate over $5 million per 
year, while individual boosters have donated up to $1 million to 
an athletic department. {Gilley et al., 1986, pp. 38, 39) 
Possessing no legitimate authority to make policy, the community 
and boosters are limited in the formal governance structure to 
the booster organization whose purpose is to provide resources 
without controlling the "purse strings."
Breaches in Authority
As in Chapter IV, breaches in authority occur when a 
constituent in the authority hierarchy does not fulfill its 
responsibilities within the prescribed role, or when a 
subordinate constituent is allowed by a superior to overstep the 
limits of its formal authority. The end result is a breach in the 
athletic governance structure. Such gaps are likely to be filled, 
from within or outside of the institution, by another 
constituent. Since the constituent stepping in does not have 
legitimate authority, it must revert to using interpersonal, 
tactical, or structural power.
The governing board can generate breaches in authority at
151
the top of the organizational hierarchy. Individual board 
members, some of whom possess athletic interests, guide 
institutional policy. These board members can overstep their 
authority roles by becoming involved in micro-managing athletic 
affairs. For example, they may become involved directly in the 
hiring or firing of a coach or in the efforts to raise athletic 
resources. Such was the case at the University of Nevada, Las 
Vegas (UNLV) with regard to the hiring and firing of basketball 
coaches. (Lederman, 1991, p. A44) In this case, a breakdown of 
the institutional hierarchy from the top created gaps in the 
chain of command allowing for commercial athletic interests to 
permeate those gaps. When the governing board micro-manages the 
daily affairs of athletics it over-extends its responsibilities, 
because the role of daily management is appropriately delegated 
to other authorities, such as the athletic director.
While the board can generate a breach in authority simply by 
not delegating authority, it can also produce authority gaps by 
over-delegating authority, and by relinquishing its 
responsibility through the hierarchy, thereby abdicating its 
authority in athletic governance. If the board and its members 
are oblivious to university athletics, the authority that they 
delegate may be misused by those to whom it was delegated, or 
challenged through the use of power by constituents with 
commercial athletic interests. In this instance, an authority gap 
occurs in part due to a lack of oversight by the board within the
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hierarchy, thus allowing an ebb of power into the governance 
process.
Presidential "control" has been a central concern on all 
major reform agendas (Knight Commission, 1993; Gilley et al.,
1986) However, since direct institutional financial support of 
athletics amounts to only 6% of the average Division I-A athletic 
program's revenue, presidential authority has been challenged by 
commercially motivated constituents using power. (Fulks, 1993, p. 
25) While presidents must obtain and expand the resources 
necessary to preserve the university, they must, as a part of 
their role, simultaneously protect the integrity of the 
university mission. It is not uncommon that these purposes 
conflict, as the president faces a quandary of "disparate 
demands" on campus, where presidential authority is restricted by 
the complexity of university governance. (Kauffman, 1980, p. 79)
While the delegation of authority by the president is 
necessitated by this complexity, vagueness in the athletic 
hierarchy at some universities allows for fractured lines of 
authority in the athletic governance process. (Gilley et al.,
1986, p. 7) Delegated through regular university channels, 
authority roles and responsibilities have been placed in the 
hands of interested parties within the university, such as 
athletic directors. Seeking the resources needed to preserve 
their athletic interests, but not supplied through regular 
university channels, these athletics-oriented constituents have 
allowed external interests into the governance process. The
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exercise of authority by the individual president is limited 
through the use of power by external constituencies with vast 
resources that are necessary for the operation of big time 
college athletics. In response to the challenges they face on 
their own campuses, presidents have expanded their authority 
externally through the NCAA. (Knight Commission, 1993)
The NCAA has itself become a major authority holder in the 
governance of intercollegiate athletics. While the NCAA receives 
its authority from its member institutions, it also functions 
both as an external regulator and as an economic cartel. As a 
cartel, the NCAA restricts its members, who collude to restrict 
the product of intercollegiate athletics. (Lawrence, 1987) The 
NCAA's regulatory authority derives in part from its control over 
economic resources. The 512 pages of NCAA rules are considered 
arbitrary by constituents with athletic interests and their 
enforcement selective by offending institutions and even the 
general public. (Gilley et al., 1986, p. 36; Knight Commission, 
1993, p. 8) While the NCAA membership, and its presidents, make 
the rules, 57 out of 106 Division I member universities broke the 
rules during the 1980s alone. (Knight Commission, 1993, p. II) 
This situation reveals either the hypocrisy or the 
ineffectiveness of presidents on their own campus. It also 
suggests that NCAA enforcement authority is in part effective, 
but that its collective policy formation authority is not 
consistent with its members' practices. Thus, the NCAA has used 
its authority to emerge as a separate regulatory and economic
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interest, intent on self-preservation and not necessarily- 
reflecting the interests of a majority of its members. (Lawrence,
1987)
Within the hierarchy of athletic governance, the athletic 
administrator has emerged as a major player. Although athletic 
administrators are frequently products of athletic programs, 
having served as players or coaches at the high school, college, 
or professional level, the current trend is to hire 
administrators who are business-oriented individuals whose chief 
concerns are not academic. Charles Moore at Cornell University is 
one example of an ex-business executive recently hired as the 
director of athletics by a prominent university to manage their 
big budget athletic enterprise. (People in Athletics. 1995) At 
many of the NCAA sanctioned institutions, authority over 
admissions processes, remedial programs, academic advising, and 
record maintenance had been placed in the hands of the athletic 
department. (Gilley et al., 1986, p. 33) In this sampling of 
institutions with a record of NCAA violations, "administrative 
independence" for the athletic department, with no clear lines of 
authority, was the rule. (Gilley et al., 1986, pp. 36, 37) 
Athletic governance had either been orphaned by the university or 
had run away of its own accord. In either event, athletics were 
governed independently of the regular university channels of 
authority in these institutions with athletic problems. (Gilley 
et al., 1986)
While in many institutions the athletic director is "the
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central and most powerful figure on campus in regard to all 
aspects of the program," the authority of athletic administrators 
is delegated from the president, either by fully informed 
intention, lack of interest, or confused lines of responsibility. 
(Gilley et al., 1986, p. 5) Like presidents, athletic 
administrators face limits on their authority from external 
commercial constituents who exercise power as athletic 
administrators pursue external revenue sources. (Gilley et al., 
1986, p. 35) By not providing full funding for athletic programs 
through regular institutional channels, gaps in authority are 
generated.
The official authority of athletic administrators is often 
confined to matters of policy execution. However, the authority 
to execute policy can transform into the authority to form policy 
in a confused governance structure with fractured hierarchical 
lines. An athletic director given autonomy in controlling 
athletic operations can determine policy for that athletic 
department. For example, the lack of "supervision of any kind" 
over the athletic department in one institution allowed complete 
authority and self-determination by athletic interests. (Gilley 
et al., 1986, p. 36) On the other hand, in some universities, the 
authority of athletic directors over their own department, and 
the coaches within, is limited by an obscure hierarchy with 
tangled lines of responsibility. In one case, the athletic 
director's position was created after the university president 
had already hired a coach. The channels of authority were
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confused as both the coach and the athletic director reported 
directly to the president who "had little interest in the 
athletic program." (Gilley et al., 1986, p. 36)
Coaches are generally also products of the athletic system 
that they now guide. Like athletic administrators, their chief 
concerns are not commonly those of the academy. Most often, they 
are the most publicly recognizable representative of the 
university. This public recognition comes from extensive media 
coverage of the coaches of winning teams. Their salaries, which 
can exceed those of their university's president at some big time 
programs, are often supplemented by the resources of external 
athletic interests.
Higher authorities delegated more responsibilities within 
the athletic program to coaches, particularly if the coach 
consistently produced revenue for the athletic department. If the 
athletic program operates with administrative independence within 
a confused hierarchy, the lack of administrative supervision 
generates breaches in authority, allowing coaches to exert power 
either in the formation or execution of athletic policy. (Gilley 
et al., 1986, p. 36) At some institutions, the coach is not 
responsible to the athletic administrator but directly to the 
president or even the board, thus establishing a breach in 
authority. (Gilley et al., 1986, p. 36)
Authority Breaches and Institutional Mission
Indeed, various constituencies maintain assorted degrees of 
authority at individual institutions; however, generalizations
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can be made based upon consistent governance patterns identified 
in the reports. (Knight Commission, 1993; Gilley et al., 1986)
The reports describe the governance of intercollegiate athletics 
frequently as revolving around the loss of, and need for, 
"control" of athletics by academic interests. Thus, the reports 
imply disharmony between athletic and academic constituents who 
desire different ends, with each seeking to preserve and 
strengthen its own self-interests.
Due to the variety of roles fulfilled by the multiversity, 
the university mission is often not universally annunciated.
(Kerr, 1982) Individual constituents perceive different 
institutional missions; therefore, the execution of authority by 
each constituent may be directed toward varying ends. Without 
these various components of the mission linked together, a 
muddled sense of purpose has resulted in an obscure hierarchy, a 
confused chain of command, and fractured channels of 
responsibility and communication among the constituents involved. 
In the execution of athletic policy, constituents then fail to 
fulfill their responsibilities or over-extend their authority 
roles, generating authority gaps. These breaches in authority are 
filled with an influx of power into the governance process.
Power
Burbules (1986) noted not only that power is necessarily 
involved in every relationship, but also that power results from 
underlying conflicts of interest. The varied constituent 
interests associated with college athletics stimulate power
relationships due to conflicting goals and means that result in 
breaches in authority. In an attempt to control intercollegiate 
athletics, constituents with conflicting academic and athletic 
interests determine and execute university athletic policy 
through the combined exercise of authority and power. The 
constituents who possess some degree of power in the process of 
athletic governance include the governing board, the president, 
the faculty, the athletic administrator, the coach, the 
undergraduate, the alumni, the university community, the business 
community, the boosters, the general public, the media, the NCAA, 
the conferences, and the government.' The modes of power used by 
these constituents to fill gaps in authority were identified by 
Wolf (1990): interpersonal, tactical, and structural. 
Interpersonal Power
Interpersonal power is the ability of an individual or group 
to impose its will on another individual or group. It manifests 
itself through the "sequences of interactions and transactions 
among people." (Wolf, 1990, p. 586) In the governance of 
intercollegiate athletics, relationships between specific 
individuals, whether on or between campuses, result in 
interpersonal power. Individuals serving as board members, 
presidents, athletic directors, coaches, players, boosters, and 
even government officials all may use interpersonal power in the 
governance of intercollegiate athletics. Their utilization of 
interpersonal power often resembles that of their 1929 
counterparts.
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Board members with athletic interests continue to use 
interpersonal power to promote athletics on their campus.
Athletic resources, tangible and intangible, are at times pursued 
irrespective of their compatibility with university mission. More 
than one university president has lost or resigned from his/her 
job over an athletic conflict with the board wherein the 
president's defense of mission contradicted a board member's 
commitment to athletic interests. After a prolonged "war over 
basketball," in which several university board members supported 
commercial athletic interests by getting directly involved in 
personnel decisions, a frustrated UNLV President, Robert Maxson, 
left for California State University at Long Beach. (Lederman, 
1994, p. A44)
The athletic-minded president, athletic director, or coach 
may also direct interpersonal power toward obtaining resources or 
favors for athletic interests. Presidents and athletic 
administrators use personal power to procure money and other 
resources for personal, athletic, and university interests. For 
example, Winston-Salem State University was sanctioned for the 
financial violations of its chancellor. (33. Institutions. 1994) 
Their interests range from augmenting the institutional image, to 
winning contests, to blatant self-promotion. Coaches entice 
recruits--critical resources in college athletics--in order to 
enhance winning and job security. An attempt to gain the services 
of a valuable player through the use of illegitimate power by a 
coach, athletic administrator, or even a university president, in
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the process of recruitment reflects the perception that self- 
preservation in intercollegiate athletics is tied directly to and 
often dependent upon resource acquisition.
Boosters have offered, and players have accepted or even 
expected, inducements to attend certain universities or to 
perform at a specified level. These boosters use interpersonal 
power to persuade these athletes. Former University of Georgia 
football players Jimmy Womack and Norris Brown recalled "padded 
handshakes" of $100.00 bills from boosters. (Sanoff & Schrof,
1990, pp. 46, 47) Boosters have provided a shoebox full of money 
for a top athlete, fishing trips for recruits, hotels, private 
jets, champagne, jobs for family members, summer employment for 
athletes, and even cash payments to prospects. (Gilley et al., 
1986, p. 38) In return, boosters gain influence over and, at 
times, profit from a winning athletic program. Texas A & M 
boosters, in one specific case, made $18,000.00 in improper 
payments to football players. Players at the University of Miami 
were promised incentives by athletic boosters for each big play 
they made, such as $500.00 for a touchdown. (Sidelines, 1994g, 
1994h)
Athletic boosters apply interpersonal power frequently 
through giving money directly to the university's athletic 
department. Amounts vary, but Gilley et al. (1986, p. 38) noted a 
single one million dollar donation by one booster. Such donors 
are coddled by athletic officials in need of resources. Boosters 
also often have strong ties with board members or other
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"individuals who are powerful in the university," even to the 
point of having been teammates at the university. (Gilley et al., 
1986, p. 39) Thus, while boosters utilize a variety of resources 
from cash to athletes in their exercise of interpersonal power, 
they also employ loyalty and friendship as instruments of power.
The booster, coach, or athletic director with a specific 
athletic agenda may gain the ear of a powerful board member and 
supersede the authority of the president. Gilley et al. (1986, p.
37) described one university case in which a successful athletic 
director had "important friends on the Board of Directors, and 
among boosters." After several NCAA violations in the athletic 
program, the university president resigned because of athletic 
differences with the board, which maintained support of the 
athletic director despite his repeated violations of regulations. 
The athletic director's use of interpersonal power to gain job 
security was successful because the board valued winning and 
commercial success in their athletic program.
Business leaders promote their interests, personal and 
financial, through their use of interpersonal power with athletic 
department officials or individual players. For example, sports 
agents supplied money and gifts worth $10,000.00 to Florida State 
University football players. (Sidelines. 1994e) Since many 
professional athlete's contracts are in the seven- and eight- 
figure range, if the agents obtained the right to represent these 
potential professional players, they could have received a large 
return on their $10,000.00 investment. However, this payoff was a
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violation of NCAA rules on behalf of the players and resulted in 
an NCAA probe. In another instance, a ticket broker's request for 
the right to purchase 4,000 Rose Bowl tickets was approved by 
Chancellor Charles Young after the broker donated $100,000.00 to 
UCLA. (Sidelines, I994f) The broker would certainly profit beyond 
the $100,000.00 he donated from the sale of 4,000 Rose Bowl 
tickets. The Chancellor, however, compromised the integrity of 
the institution in order to obtain additional resources, in this 
case $100,000.00, for the University because funding needs 
outweigh their availability.
Interpersonal power is dependent upon the individual 
involved. Most of the current actors are the same as their 1929 
counterparts. The methods of exercising interpersonal power have 
changed little as well. However, the magnitude of resources has 
multiplied. As in 1929, the perceived need for resources can be a 
driving force in university governance and often, the use of 
interpersonal power involves both monetary and personal pressure. 
However, it is the power of the person, not the position, that is 
applied in individual relationships in order to achieve the 
intended results. The constituents using power benefit their own 
interests and obtain outcomes from which they profit. In each of 
these cases, constituent use of power in athletic governance 
derives from situations wherein a breach in authority has been 
generated.
Tactical Power
Tactical power refers to the instruments of power used to
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"circumscribe the actions of others within determinate settings." 
(Wolf, 1990, p. 586) It involves the methods and strategies 
employed by virtue of the specific arena of play. Tactical power 
emanates from the organization of intercollegiate athletics, its 
governance structure and processes, and its constituent 
interests. The application of tactical power in college athletics 
by actors with athletic interests is highly systematic. The 
current use of tactical power by circumventing rules and 
adjudicating conflicts is more sophisticated than that of 1929.
The NCAA regularly exerts tactical power to promote its own 
interests over those of its membership through the enforcement of 
rules. One might assume that the application of sanctions is 
within the authority of the NCAA. However, the rules presented in 
the 512 page NCAA Manual are perceived by athletic interest 
groups and the general public as arbitrarily applied and 
selectively enforced by the NCAA. The NCAA applies tactical power 
by selectively pursuing violations in certain athletic programs. 
(Knight Commission, 1993, p. 8; Gilley et al., 1986, p. 36) For 
example, a University of Florida football player violated NCAA 
rules by writing a satirical restaurant review column for the 
student newspaper. The player received no payments from the paper 
and paid for his own meals; however the NCAA selected to pursue 
and sanction his reviews as endorsements, which they consider an 
illegal activity. (Sidelines. 1994m) There are many other cases 
of more serious rule violations the NCAA has chosen to pursue, 
including "substantial inducements to recruits" at UNLV, cash
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payments to players at Auburn University, improper loans to 
athletes at the University of Virginia, and the use of ineligible 
athletes at San Francisco State and University of New Mexico, to 
name but a few. (33 Institutions. 1994, p. A43)
The fact that 57 out of 106 Division I-A member universities 
were caught breaking NCAA rules during the 1980s alone suggests 
that the NCAA's enforcement ability in imposing these rules over 
member institutions is effective. (Knight Commission, 1993, p.
II) Yet, the extensive number of violations suggest that the 
NCAA's policy formation does not curb all of its members' 
practices that contradict those policies. In a counter-tactic to 
serve their own interests, most conferences and most major 
universities operate a compliance department. (Yaeger, 1991) When 
conferences or individual institutions conduct their own 
investigation or impose their own penalties prior to NCAA 
sanctions, they are treated favorably by the national 
association. For example, NCAA officials said that penalties 
would have been different for the University of Washington if the 
Pacific-10 Conference had not imposed sanctions on the university 
before the NCAA became involved. (Athletic Notes. 1994) 
Nonetheless, when over 50% of NCAA Division I-A members have been 
caught operating outside the rules made by their representative 
organization, the NCAA functions as a self-preserving body less 
responsive to its member universities than to its own ends.
(Knight Commission, 1993, p. II) The NCAA uses tactical power to 
function as a cartel that controls the trade of intercollegiate
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athletics and restricts its members from profiting independent of 
the cartel. (Lawrence, 1987)
Currently, the NCAA is using tactical power in considering a 
format for a Division I-A football playoff to determine a 
national champion. The four highest-bidding football bowl games 
would form an alliance as a part of a playoff system under NCAA 
control. (Sidelines, 1994i) While the NCAA has the authority to 
determine a national champion, this tactic would assure the NCAA 
a portion of the massive television revenues from such an 
endeavor. Thereby, the NCAA would maintain control over its most 
visible members, the top Division I-A football programs, who rely 
on the bowl revenues that can exceed $7 million. In this case the 
instrument of tactical power would be the playoff and the 
objective of the NCAA is increased profits. University membership 
in the NCAA would become less voluntary because of the NCAA's 
economic power. Most universities' athletic programs receive 
money from the NCAA's revenue-sharing plan. Major university 
athletic programs perceive a need for the vast revenues they 
receive through NCAA television contracts, such as its $1.75 
billion deal with C.B.S. to televise NCAA basketball 
championships. (Blum, 1995)
As Burbules (1986) points out, power is interactive. While 
membership of elite athletic programs in the NCAA seems compelled 
by economic circumstances, those very institutions recognize that 
they may tactically gain power through the NCAA's dependence upon 
their market appeal. For example, some of the top football
universities, most of whom are also members of the College 
Football Association (CFA), have proposed creating a new level of 
competition within the NCAA for big time programs. This new 
category would offer them more autonomy in developing legislation 
and disbursing revenues; therefore, they could reduce financial 
and other limits imposed by the NCAA by creating new rules. 
(Sidelines, 1994k) In addition, these institutions tactically use 
the courts to pursue their goals. For example, in 1981, the 
College Football Association (CFA) defied the NCAA control of 
television contracts. That same year, the University of Oklahoma 
and the University of Georgia each filed suit against the NCAA 
for "price fixing ... and monopolizing." In 1984, the Supreme 
Court decided in favor of the CFA, finding the NCAA in violation 
of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act. Thus, the reciprocal nature of 
inter-active power play is clearly demonstrated by these 
constituents' use of tactical power against one another.
(Burbules, 1986)
Likewise, the NCAA and other constituents tactically attempt 
to establish, maintain, or extend their power through the courts 
when the normal authority roles do not achieve their intended 
outcomes. Individual athletes, institutional employees, state 
boards, and individual institutions have challenged the NCAA, or 
member institutions following its rules, in court. In one of the 
most celebrated, and longest, legal battles, the NCAA was aligned 
with UNLV President Robert Maxson against UNLV basketball coach 
Jerry Tarkanian over the lack of due-process rights in NCAA
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investigations. The U.S. Supreme Court decided that the NCAA, 
because of the voluntary nature of its membership, did not have 
to follow due-process procedure in its investigations. (Yaeger, 
1991, p. 237) In other cases, a University of Montana student is 
contesting NCAA drug testing requirements, and gender equity 
issues are currently in litigation at NCAA institutions such as 
Baylor University and Saint Bonaventure. (Sidelines, 1992a;
1994b) In August 1994, the NCAA filed suit against the Florida 
Board of Regents in an attempt to overturn a Florida due process 
statute hindering its investigative processes. (Sidelines, 19941) 
In each case, the authority of the courts was used by the 
constituents as a tactic to realign the power when the 
constituents' interests were conflicting.
As the NCAA has joined individual institutions, university 
employees, and student-athletes in using tactical power in 
pursuit of their self-interests externally through the courts, 
the NCAA has taken on a life of its own. The organization has 
become more than the sum of its members. Tactically, it actively 
attempts to protect its own legal and commercial interests 
through organizational innovations. Its Governmental Affairs and 
Joint Legislative Committee promotes cooperation with various 
branches of government, its enforcement and compliance branches 
used to police its members, and its recent hiring of a 
"congressional liaison" to lobby for NCAA interests in Congress. 
(Sidelines. 1995a)
The NCAA obtains much of its power from external
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economically-motivated sources, such as the multi-billion-dollar 
media interests. It derives authority from its members, but its 
power and resources are used to keep individual institutions at 
bay. Through its revenue-sharing plan, the NCAA uses tactical 
power over member institutions by enticing members to comply 
through NCAA control of the distribution of vast revenues 
generated from the public interest in college athletics. The 
NCAA's tactical power is also held over its individual members 
through the process of selective enforcement by the NCAA's 
enforcement branch.
Presidents initiate much of the NCAA legislation through the 
Presidents' Commission, tactically promoting their own academic 
interests collectively through the NCAA. However, while 
presidents support NCAA legislation publicly, in using tactical 
power, they do not always actively pursue the same goals on their 
own respective campuses. For example, Winston-Salem State 
University was recently cited for NCAA violations that included 
the "inappropriate use of university funds by the chancellor.1 
(33 Institutions. 1994)
Presidents' delegates, faculty who represent their 
institutions, vote on the NCAA the rules. Yet, over half of NCAA 
Division I-A members were rule violators in the 1980s. While 92% 
of the presidents surveyed believed that there were major 
problems in college athletics, only 22% believed that problems 
existed at their own institution. (Gilley et al. ,1986) Thus,
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presidents appear to be either hypocritical or ineffective on 
their own campus.
Although seemingly inactive in policing their own campuses, 
presidents use their collective voice in the NCAA as a self­
preserving tactic to maintain the balance between the need for 
athletic resources and the integrity of the institutional 
mission. They attempt to "legislate integrity" at the public NCAA 
level while their leadership at their own university does not 
"commit itself to complete integrity." (Slaughter & Lapchick,
1989, p. 161) Presidents' public postures bolster the image of 
academic integrity, while their private commissions and omissions 
give in to the pursuit of resources. For example, the President 
of the University of San Francisco, which had previously received 
the NCAA's "death penalty" for violations in basketball, Rev. 
LoSchiavo stated:
How can we contribute to the building of a decent, law- 
abiding society in this country if educational institutions 
are willing to suffer their principles to be prostituted and 
involve young people in that prostitution for any purpose, 
and much less for the purposes of winning some games and 
developing an ill-gotten recognition and income. (Chu, 1989, 
p. 155)
The private on-campus actions of individual presidents speak as 
loudly toward their interests as the collective public voice 
tactically presented in the NCAA and in other public forums. 
Chancellor Charles Young, who accepted a $100,000.00 donation to
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UCLA from a ticket broker seeking 4,000 Rose Bowl tickets, was 
also a prominent member of the Knight Commission when it 
condemned commercialism in college athletics. (Sidelines, 1994f; 
Knight Commission, 1993)
At "four institutions identified as exemplary, 1 (Gilley et 
al., 1986, p. 5)--Michigan, Notre Dame, Penn State, and Virginia- 
-the president "emerged as the most powerful figure" in the 
governance of athletics. However, the president was "clearly 
second in power" to the athletic director at most institutions. 
(Gilley et al., 1986, p. 5) Athletic departments, administrators 
and coaches, assumed control of policy development and execution 
because of their administrative independence, which has resulted 
in increased commercialization of college athletics.
The autonomy of the athletic department originates with the 
application of tactical power by athletic administrators and 
coaches. Gilley et al. (1986) described the coalition of power
sources that often converge with the athletic director: external 
revenue sources provide most of the funds for the operation of 
intercollegiate athletics, while internal university officials 
give the control of those funds to the athletic director. (Fulks, 
1993, p. 25) Thus, the athletic director uses tactical power as 
the connection between the external resources and the university. 
The ability of athletic departments, through their administrators 
and coaches, to attract resources empowers these departments and 
individuals. Therefore, the tactical power of the athletic 
director and coach is derived from the autonomy of the athletic
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department. For example, in hopes of an improved winning 
percentage, an assistant basketball coach at UNLV became legal 
guardian of a touted recruit and supplied him with a car, a 
motorcycle, and cash in order to secure his services. (Dealy,
1990) In other areas, several coaches and athletic department 
officers have violated NCAA rules by modifying eligibility 
reports or circumventing reporting procedures in order to retain 
athletes' services or other resources they deemed necessary. (33 
Institutions. 1994)
Coaches also apply tactical power on the national level 
collectively through associations such as the National 
Association of Basketball Coaches (NABC). The NABC convened a 
National Summit to tactically promote specific NCAA rules changes 
that its members perceived to be in their interest, such as 
rescinding Proposition 48 eligibility standards. (Richardson,
1994, p. 9) Recently, the Black Coaches Association (BCA) 
proposed resolutions addressing eligibility requirements for NCAA 
athletes and the payment of athletes. The BCA has worked with 
Department of Justice mediators to negotiate with the NCAA, whose 
rules are not in line with the proposals of the BCA. (Blum, 1994) 
While these associations have no authority, they are applying 
tactical power in an attempt to collectively influence the NCAA 
and other legitimate authorities in the governance of 
intercollegiate athletics to modify their rules in favor of the 
NABC and BCA proposals.
From an external perspective, government officials use
tactical threats of direct involvement in intercollegiate 
athletics in attempts to stimulate self-regulation. Recognizing 
the government's lack of legitimate authority in governance 
issues, Maryland Congressman Tom McMillen (1988) stated, "The 
government might not have a role in these issues, you might say, 
but it will have a role." He was referring, of course, to the use 
of tactical power through which the government might have its 
"role". Legislative tactics, he said, were designed to "prod the 
system along." (NCAA, 1988, p. 22) McMillen (1988) pointed out,
"I have to remind you only of Title IX and the Civil Rights 
Restoration Act to show you that the Federal government does get 
involved in these issues." Federal power, whose source is in the 
funds it provides to universities, outweighs the authority of 
internal university governance structures.
Additional Federal legislation presented by Paul Henry (MI), 
Bill Bradley (NJ), Ed Jenkins (GA), and Winston Winter (KS) 
addresses Internal Revenue Service tax-free status for athletics 
and due process procedures for the NCAA. Their measures serve as 
a tactic to support the legitimate authority of universities and 
the NCAA. Maryland's Tom McMillen introduced an NCAA Reform Bill 
that empowered the NCAA to negotiate television contracts for its 
members, required it to equitably share revenues, mandated 
presidential control of the NCAA, and determined due process 
standards, thus supporting the legitimate authorities in the 
governance of intercollegiate athletics. Finally, Illinois 
Senator Carol Mosely-Braun and Representative Cardiss Collins
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sponsored the Equity in Athletics Disclosure Act, attached to the 
Elementary and Secondary Education Act, which required public 
disclosure of athletic departments' revenues and expenditures. 
(Sidelines. 1994n) This was a tactic designed to bolster 
legitimate institutional control of athletic finances.
Federal legislation has often dealt with intercollegiate 
athletics as interstate commerce. The "big business" of college 
athletics has been the subject of the Ways and Means Committee as 
well as other federal agencies, such as the Education 
Department's Office of Civil Rights, the Justice Department, and 
the Department of Labor, which have directly addressed policy and 
compliance issues, such as gender equity in intercollegiate 
athletics. (33 Institutions, 1994; Sidelines. 1994j ; NCAA, 1988, 
p. 21) In most cases, the federal government has employed tactic 
power to support the legitimate authority roles in the governance 
of intercollegiate athletics, thus circumscribing the 
illegitimate use of power by those not in authority.
State governments directly impact campus athletic policy and 
practice through legislation. At the state level, at least six 
states--California, Iowa, Michigan, Tennessee, Texas, and 
Alabama--have proposed or enacted laws that provide criminal 
penalties to athletes, their families, or boosters who are 
convicted of involvement with illegal recruiting inducements.
v.
These laws are tactics designed to bolster the power of the NCAA 
and university governance structures over external constituents. 
Twelve states have previously introduced or enacted legislation
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designed to curb NCAA investigative procedures on campuses in 
their state: Nebraska, Nevada, Florida, Kansas, Illinois, 
California, South Carolina, Iowa, Missouri, Minnesota, New York, 
and Connecticut. (Associated Press, 1994) These laws are tactics 
intended to increase the autonomy of individual institutions, or 
their athletic departments, in the governance of their athletic 
programs at the expense of the authority of the NCAA. Most 
recently, Mississippi, on the heels of an NCAA investigation at 
the University of Mississippi and on the verge of one at 
Mississippi State, has proposed legislation that would require 
due-process procedures such as cross-examination of witnesses and 
state court appeals of NCAA rulings. (Sidelines. 1995c)
Some state legislatures have proposed or passed laws that 
limit illegitimate or self-promoting behavior among interested 
parties. These range from Oklahoma's 1951 attempt at requiring 
the University of Oklahoma to ignore NCAA rules regarding 
televised appearances, to laws that restrict the direct use of 
public funds for college athletics, to others that provide for 
legal action against boosters involved in actions that result in 
NCAA violations. Respectively, each of these laws is used as a 
tactic aimed toward achieving an intended outcome: from limiting 
or supporting the legitimate authority of the NCAA, to limiting 
or supporting legitimate university authority. The Nebraska state 
legislature has recently introduced a bill that would require the 
University of Nebraska to pay its football players, contrary to 
NCAA rules. (Sidelines. 1995b) This new proposal is a tactic
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intended to empower Nebraska's football program at the expense of 
the legitimate authority of both the University and the NCAA. The 
New York legislature, supported by the governor, approved $3.6 
million for a new football stadium at the State University of New 
York at Stony Brook over faculty complaints tactically supporting 
the athletic department's intent to move into NCAA Division I-A 
competition. While direct government support outside the 
university authority hierarchy amounts to 2% of college athletic 
revenues, the ability to impact finances, through tax exemptions 
as well as direct appropriations, is the true source of tactical 
power for the government. (Fulks, 1993)
The potential for large financial returns motivates business 
interests to use tactical power as a source of revenue for 
college athletics. Business leaders are empowered because they 
can make equipment available to athletic departments and hefty 
contracts available to coaches and universities. Coaches' shoe 
contracts, which can exceed seven-figures for a public 
endorsement, such as that given to Duke's basketball coach, Mike 
Krzyzewski, enable manufacturers to have their product 
prominently displayed by college athletes. (Sidelines, 1994d) The 
NCAA itself has bargained for an "undisclosed sum" with athletic- 
apparel manufacturer Starter, to give the company exclusive 
rights to provide shirts and caps to be worn after NCAA 
championships. (Sidelines. 1994d)
Companies employ these tactics because they receive 
profitable returns on their investments. The NCAA and coaches
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each enter into these agreements in order to obtain the resources 
they presume they need. Thus, these arrangements between 
constituents with business interests and constituents in athletic 
governance are an example of the bilateral, reciprocal use of 
tactical power by both constituents in the governance of 
intercollegiate athletics.
Booster groups also supply revenues needed for the operation 
of athletic departments that are often under-funded through 
regular institutional channels, which permits tactical power to 
be employed. For example, Annapolis' Naval Academy Athletic 
Association, a private organization, bought the athletic director 
a condominium and paid for 100 officials and boosters to go to 
the Army-Navy game in Philadelphia. (Sidelines, 1994j) At some 
institutions, these private booster groups provided as much as $5 
million per year. (Gilley et al., 1986, p. 38) Along with alumni 
contributions, they account for more than 15% of athletic 
revenues at Division I-A institutions. (Fulks, 1993, p. 25) These 
instruments of tactical power are employed to bolster the 
autonomy of the athletic interests in the university, while at 
the same time, the alumni and booster groups are pursuing their 
goal of having a winning athletic program.
The media can offer notoriety to coaches and players and can 
impact, and even define, the image of the institution itself.
Fame translates into money, giving the media the tactical power 
of resources. Resources available from the media are offered 
directly in the form of television dollars for athletic programs.
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For example, the CFA's five-year television contract is worth 
$300 million to its 67 members. (Sidelines. 1994b) The most 
recent contract for the rights to televise the NCAA basketball 
championship between CBS and the NCAA is worth $1.75 billion. 
(Blum, 1995) As super conferences, such as the Southeastern, Big 
Ten, Pacific-10, Big East, and Atlantic Coast Conferences, emerge 
from conference realignments, each is seeking its own television 
deal, worth up to $100 million over five years. (Sidelines,
1994b) The University of Notre Dame has an individual agreement 
with NBC television. (Sidelines. 1994a) On the average, 
television revenues directly account for 8% of the athletic 
operating budget. (Fulks, 1993, p. 25) So major athletic 
conferences are using their audience draw as an instrument of 
tactical power to gain monetary resources while the television 
networks profit through additional advertisements.
With professional athletic contracts worth in excess of $100 
million, athletes are indebted to the media for a potential 
professional sports career resulting from their collegiate fame. 
Yet most players, the best of whom generate as much as $1 million 
in revenue for their school, remain generally powerless. (Blum, 
1994) They have yet to organize or recognize their potential in 
this high stakes game.
The resource-driven nature of power in intercollegiate 
athletics is evident in the use of tactical power by various 
constituents. Those individuals and groups who control the vast 
revenues associated with college athletics exercise power in the
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governance of intercollegiate athletics. This commercial system 
derives, however, from the structural power surrounding 
intercollegiate athletics.
Structural Power
Structural power shapes the social field of action. In its 
broadest sense, it encompasses the societal influences 
surrounding intercollegiate athletics. It "organizes and 
orchestrates" the playing field and specifies the form and 
direction of power play. (Wolf, 1990, p. 586) It creates and 
maintains the reality of the environment in which college 
athletics exist. We necessarily address academic interests in the 
university environment; however, we must be aware that 
universities reside in a commercial society that values systemic 
capitalistic exploits. Thus, intercollegiate athletics have 
become commercial ventures, reflecting society's interests and 
bolstered by the inherent structural power of competition and 
commercialism. Broadly interpreted, structural power in 
intercollegiate athletics emanates from its connection to 
commercial societal values.
College sports' wide-spread popularity with the general 
public has resulted in mega-dollar television and business 
interests. In 1989, a Harris pole found that 78% of the general 
public felt that "big time" college athletics were "out of 
control", but by 1993, only 52% agreed with the same conclusion. 
(Knight Commission, 1993, p. 3) While a majority of the 
population still perceived a problem, the reduced dissatisfaction
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among the general public reflects the expanded power of 
commercial values. Public interest in college sports remains 
high. Sold out 100,000 seat stadiums, with ticket sales 
accounting for 33% of athletic revenues, and $1.75 billion 
television deals reflect the high entertainment value of college 
athletics. (Blum, 1995) As commercial motives dominate college 
athletics, universities are seeking to maintain a share in the 
control of their athletic enterprises.
The composition of the Knight Commission, and those with 
whom they counselled, reveals the variety of interests connected 
to college athletics, thereby reflecting the structural power 
surrounding college athletics. The Commission was composed of 
eight university presidents, the chief executive officers of the 
NCAA and the U.S. Olympic Committee, three corporate CEOs, one 
alumni association representative, one trustee, a former member 
of Congress, and a former television network chair. In response 
to the varied interests in college athletics, the Commission also 
met with 12 conference commissioners, 13 faculty athletic 
representatives, 16 athletic directors, 11 basketball coaches, 
seven football coaches, six student-athletes, several authors who 
write about college athletics, several legal experts, print and 
television media personnel, NCAA personnel, a professional sports 
league representative, education association representatives, a 
high school representative, and a business association 
representative. While academic interests rest primarily with the 
presidents, the structural power of commercial interests resides
180
in the NCAA, government, alumni, media, and business interests 
now included in the Commission, as well as in resource-driven 
university athletic officials.
The co-chair of the Knight Commission, William C. Friday, 
President Emeritus of the University of North Carolina, noted the 
continued "capitulation to the pressures of money" by college 
athletics and the presidents, whom the Commission recommended 
take control of those pressures. (Blum, 1994) However, the 
pressure of money and resources is so great because their power 
is structural in nature. Tulane 's Faculty Athletics 
Representative Gary Roberts summed it up: "The implications of 
the money, the compromises that might have to be made, are 
considered simply the cost of doing business." (Blum, 1995)
Money, and the image it helps create, is a driving force in 
society. Resources are not easily controlled by those who do not 
possess them, or those who rashly pursue them.
Breakdown of Governance
While loss of institutional control over athletics may be a 
function of the structural power of resources, it is also, in 
part, a result of administrative laxity. (Gilley et al., 1986, p. 
37) Academic and athletic interests can conflict. The mission of 
the university is often referenced by academic interests, but 
rarely clearly defined. Various constituents perceive different 
institutional missions; therefore, the possession and application 
of power by constituents is often directed toward varying ends. 
This muddled sense of purpose has resulted in an obscure
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hierarchy, a confused chain of command, and fractured channels of 
responsibility and communication among the constituents involved.
The Knight Commission (1993) found that college athletic 
policies often are not explicit; thus, leading to inconsistent 
application of authority and power in the execution of policies. 
The ambiguous governance structure opens the door for athletic 
interests to exert power in the execution of policy. (Gilley et 
al., 1986) At times, the power of athletic interests, located 
both within and outside of the governance structure, extends in 
actual practice beyond policy execution to the point of policy 
determination. Interested parties, from athletic directors to 
boosters, maintain control of athletics on individual campuses 
because they have either the resources or a mutually beneficial 
relationship with the sources of revenue. Athletic department 
members have been empowered by the university to control the 
product that makes the profits, college athletics, and thereby 
have obtained the power of resource control. Regular 
institutional authorities have at times abdicated their local 
control, and at other times have relinquished it to constituents 
exercising illegitimate power.
Educational aims are prominent in rhetorical, and sometimes 
substantive, reforms at the national level led by presidents 
through the NCAA's Presidents' Commission. However, the NCAA, now 
a self-serving entity, is driven by its own need to gain 
structural power within commercialized athletics. The structural 
power of resource-driven commerce combines with the interpersonal
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and tactical power of constituents possessing resources to 
dictate the nature of intercollegiate athletics.
Actors with academic interests residing in legitimate 
authority roles and fulfilling prescribed responsibilities 
acquiesce to illegitimate power groups outside of the legitimate 
authority hierarchy because the former do not have the power or 
will to override the latter. Therefore, the presidents espouse 
their interests collectively through the NCAA, while knowing, or 
ignoring, the fact that they have increasingly abdicated or have 
never had the power to control the athletic machines on their own 
campuses. {Knight Commission, 1993; Savage et al., 1929) 
Collective statements of policy through the NCAA reveal the 
public face of universities that, when compared to the individual 
implementation of policy, often contradicts the private actions 
of the university. The predisposition of colleges to collectively 
empower commercially-motivated constituents by saying one thing 
regarding public national athletic policy formation and doing 
another in individual policy execution is common.
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CHAPTER VI
A MODEL OF BALANCE IN ATHLETIC GOVERNANCE
Introduction
Intercollegiate athletics are a component of America's 
system of higher education that demand the same attention from 
researchers that they have attained from the general public. 
Analyzing the application of power and authority at two points in 
the development of intercollegiate athletics, 1929 and the 
present, reveals continued systemic dysfunctions in their 
governance. Conflicting interests among constituents in athletics 
require decisions to be made by those constituents that have in 
some circumstances resulted in breaches in authority. The gaps 
have, in turn, often been filled by power exercised 
illegitimately by other constituents in the governance process.
Who are the constituents involved in the governance of 
intercollegiate athletics? The legitimately empowered 
constituents who have specified roles and responsibilities as 
well as internal limits on their power within the governance 
structure include the board, the president, the athletic 
director, the coach, the conferences, and the NCAA. Other 
constituents obtain their power through illegitimate channels, 
often commercial sources or resources; these constituents 
function within the process, but outside the legitimate authority 
structure, of athletic governance. These constituents include 
boosters, community business leaders, and the media.
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This analysis of the use of power and authority in the 
governance process, exercised by constituents both within and 
outside of the governance structure, has revealed a systemic 
dysfunction in the governance of intercollegiate athletics that 
is often commercially driven and has remained consistent over 
time.
When the governance system is functioning properly, 
constituents use legitimate power through hierarchical authority. 
The board, for example, supervises the president, the president 
guides the athletic director, and the athletic director directs 
the activities of the coach. However, breaches in authority can 
occur, wherein constituents either abdicate or are robbed of 
their legitimate power through regular channels of authority, 
thereby creating gaps that are filled by the use of illegitimate 
power. For example, institutional administrators can empower 
constituents outside the governance structure if the resources 
needed to operate their programs are not provided through regular 
university channels and not controlled through that structure. If 
individual constituents can obtain needed resources through 
outside sources, such as contributions from boosters or 
businesses, these constituents are in a position to wield 
illegitimately-obtained power in the governance process that 
operates outside the organizational hierarchy of intercollegiate 
athletics.
The three types of power that Wolf (1990) has identified 
have been utilized within the legitimate hierarchical lines in
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the governance structure by authorized constituents. They have 
also been used by unauthorized constituents through illegitimate 
channels to fill authority gaps in the governance structure left 
when legitimately authorized constituents do not fulfill or 
exceed their prescribed roles and responsibilities.
The continued use of legitimate and illegitimate power, 
through or in spite of lines of authority, reveals an historical 
systemic dysfunction in intercollegiate athletic governance. Why 
has this dysfunction occurred? Constituents, whether applying 
legitimate power through prescribed lines of authority or 
illegitimate power to fill in breaches in authority, are 
utilizing power for their own self-interests. For example, 
university presidents might legitimately use power to support 
their authority in executing policies that are presumably driven 
by academic interests, such as protecting the university mission. 
On the other hand, coaches might illegitimately use power to 
contravene the hierarchical lines of authority by promoting 
athletic interests that are commercially-driven and profit- 
oriented. Since academic and athletic interests often appear to 
conflict, each of the constituents seek to preserve his/her own 
self-interests. In describing the component parts of the Model of 
Balance in Athletic Governance, self-interest--ultimately self- 
preservation- -becomes the foundation upon which governance 
decisions are made.
Self-Preservation
Self-preservation is the drive by individuals or groups in
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athletic governance to preserve their current status. It is the 
objective of organisms and organizations alike, the need of 
individuals and institutions. Maslow (1970) has theorized that 
humans build to a peek of autonomous self-actualization, but his 
Hierarchy of Needs is founded on the basic needs of security and 
safety. These basic needs are deficiency needs, meaning that, if 
they are not met, the person will seek to make up for the 
deficiency, and this takes precedence over all other needs. 
(Maslow, 1970)
Owens (1981) applied Maslow's theories to educational 
organizations and the individuals in those organizations. Owens 
(1981, p. 114) noted that "a need that has been satisfied is not 
a motivator" and only "unmet needs motivate people." Herzberg 
(1966) described factors similar to Maslow's general deficiency 
needs in organizational settings as "hygiene" or "maintenance" 
factors, upon which "motivation" factors could be built. If 
maintenance factors are sufficiently present, they can facilitate 
motivation. Like deficiency needs, these maintenance factors have 
a preventive function, however, and if they are not adequately 
met, they can block motivation. For example, job security as a 
deficiency need might be obtained in athletics by winning games. 
If a coach needs job security as a part of his/her self- 
preservation, he/she might feel pressure to win games in order to 
ensure his/her survival, whether the pressure is real or self- 
induced perception. The coach might pursue that end as a 
deficiency need, first and foremost above others. Any resources
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available to the coach would be directed toward self- 
preservation, any perceived need for resources that were deemed 
necessary to win--in order to maintain job security--would be 
sought above all else.
Maslow, in his Hierarchy of Needs, suggests that the basic 
needs of safety and security are deficiency needs that serve as 
the preeminent motivation for human behavior. Referring to 
athletics, University of Virginia Athletic Director James 
Copeland suggested that "...programs go through stages and growth 
just like human beings do." (Teel, 1995) Various constituents in 
college athletics perceive diverse needs to secure their own 
self-preservation. These needs include, but are not limited to 
job security, academic integrity, positive image, and resources, 
such as money or athletes.
As breaches in legitimate authority result from the pursuit 
of these needs, some constituents illegitimately use power to 
meet needs that have not been met through the authority 
hierarchy. Thus, constituents in the college athletic governance 
process are driven by self-preserving interests. Toward that end, 
certain constituents in athletic governance need and attempt to 
obtain the resources that will ensure their self-preservation 
when the mission they perceive is to win-at-all-costs.
Perceived Resource Needs
Resources are the various objects, actions, or concepts that 
are assigned value by the constituents involved in 
intercollegiate athletic governance. Resources sought by
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universities include space, time, books, equipment, reputation, 
and money (Westmeyer, 1990, p. 107) Constituents perceive these 
valued resources as necessary for success in achieving their 
primary objective, self-preservation, within the system of 
intercollegiate athletics. More resources and better quality 
resources are continually sought by constituents as a source of 
self-preservation. (Westmeyer, 1990) Constituents' perception of 
resource needs is influenced by the mission of the institution, 
the type of resource sought, the accessibility of the resource, 
and the perceived impact of the resource on the constituent's own 
self-preservation within the organization.
Resources relative to intercollegiate athletic governance 
come in many forms, both tangible and intangible. Intangible 
resources may include a positive reputation, 
visibility/publicity/fame, influence, and athletic contest 
victories; whereas tangible resources might include prospective 
athletes, and, very often, money or other capital gains.
Different constituents typically value, and therefore seek, the 
type of resources that they perceive necessary for self- 
preservation .
Promising athletes are a valuable resource to coaches 
because they represent the potential to field a winning team. A 
winning team can ensure the coaches' self-preservation. Some 
presidents value the visibility associated with winning programs, 
which yields increased revenues for the institution and perhaps 
larger and therefore more selective enrollment. Yet, presidents
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must also protect the mission of the institution, and therefore, 
they value a positive academic reputation in order to preserve 
themselves as the educational leader of their institution. In 
pursuit of a positive academic reputation, presidents present 
public faces in leading the NCAA reform agenda. Simultaneously, 
they privately tolerate NCAA infractions on their own campus, 
demonstrating their pursuit of diverse self-preserving resources. 
(Gilley et al., 1986)
Boosters and business leaders typically seek to profit from 
their association with college athletics and pursue money, 
publicity, and influence. Their actions ensure the continued 
commercialization of intercollegiate athletics and reflect the 
perception by these boosters and business leaders that such 
commercial endeavors are central to their self-preservation as 
athletic constituents. The NCAA has been seeking financial 
resources in order to expand its influence in college athletics. 
The NCAA's $1.75 billion contract with CBS Television is an 
example of the magnitude of the monetary gains currently 
available in college athletics, wherein both parties perceive the 
need to attract billions of dollars in order to survive.
While perceived needs of the various groups tend to foster 
the pursuit of top athletic prospects, new stadiums, and cold 
cash, each constituent pursues those resources--first and 
foremost--that will best enhance his/her own self-preservation. 
The greater the perceived potential a resource has to impact upon 
a constituent's self-preservation and the higher the level of
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need for that resource, the greater the pursuit for that resource 
will be. For example, a "blue chip" athlete, one who can turn a 
program into a winner, will be a highly valued and pursued 
resource for a coach who perceives a great need to win.
In the actual pursuit and acquisition of resources, 
constituents must determine if the desired resources can be 
feasibly obtained. Access to resources can significantly impact a 
constituents' perceived level of need. In general, easily 
accessible resources will result in a lower perception of need.
In contrast, inaccessible resources stimulate a heightened 
perception of need. For example, if an athletic department 
obtains $4 million per year, and that money covers the 
department's expenses, the perception of monetary resource needs 
would not be as great as that in a department not covering 
similar operating expenses by obtaining only $1 million per year. 
Both departments have similar actual resource needs in the form 
of operating expenses. However, their perception of need varies 
based upon the accessibility of resources, which impacts the 
degree of need. Subsequently, the departments vary in their 
perception of resource need.
The perception of need can reflect real need, like that 
resulting from concrete numbers as in the previous example. 
However, perceived need can also result from intangible elements 
or forces, such as self-created or situational pressure to win. 
(NCAA, 1983) If a coach, or president, perceives a need to obtain 
or maintain a winning season, whether or not it is real, he/she
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will pursue a strategy to win which includes securing the 
resources necessary to win in order to enhance his/her self- 
preservation.
Ultimately, the perception of resource needs, whether real 
or imagined, is impacted by the constituents' access to and the 
availability of those resources, which are pursued to enhance 
self-preservation. In pursuit of the perceived need to win, if 
wins are realistically unobtainable, the coach or president must 
find the means to enhance his/her access to the needed resource.
The perception of resource needs is directed by the pursuit 
of self-preservation. A variety of resources, including athletes, 
money, and visibility, are pursued by athletic constituents. The 
perceived need of resources, and the degree to which the resource 
is pursued, is related to the perception of its relative impact 
upon self-preservation: the more the potential impact, the 
greater the perceived need. The accessibility of resources 
impacts the perception of resource needs as well, with less 
accessible resources heightening perceived needs. Influenced by 
the type and accessibility of the resource, the degree of need, 
the perception of resource needs and the subsequent pursuit of 
those resources impacts the integrity of constituents in the 
governance of intercollegiate athletics.
Integrity
Integrity in higher education, and in particular, in the 
governance of intercollegiate athletics, involves both 
individuals and institutions. The integrity of institutions or
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individual constituents in intercollegiate athletics reflects a 
"wholeness" based upon salubrious values. (Bailey & Littleton,
1991) Integrity requires an incorruptible adherence to specific 
values and a dedication to mission. Institutional integrity 
begins with a commitment to mission and requires the members of a 
university to embrace "transcendent goals and ideals while having 
to exist and be of service in a practical, imperfect world."
(Bok, 1982, p. 11) However, the mission must be clearly defined.
Kerr (1982) defined modern "multiversities" as institutions 
with many components, each having a distinct yet related purpose. 
Kerr's conception of the American university allows disparate 
objectives to be defined by each of the many university 
constituents. Mission in this diffuse institution is sometimes 
neither clearly defined nor universally agreed upon.
Institutional integrity becomes ill-defined as well, when diverse 
components housed under the university umbrella are directing 
their interests toward distinctly different, yet still related, 
goals. Academic, athletic, and external commercial constituents 
alike have distinct interests that can impact the university 
mission. Institutional integrity can be enhanced by clarifying 
the missions of these varied university components, and 
emphasizing their related goals.
Integrity, whether institutional or individual, is reflected 
in actions. Specifically, constituent integrity, defined here as 
commitment to the university mission, is revealed through the 
constituent's use of power and authority. In the athletic
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governance process, constituents face many pressures, real or 
perceived, from a variety of interests, each of which may 
conflict with university interests and mission. The degree of 
integrity and therefore the adherence to authority and use of 
legitimate and illegitimate power by constituents reflects the 
pressures they perceive and the primary interest of each 
constituent, self-preservation. Constituent perceptions of the 
importance of integrity in self-preservation vary. Each 
individual constituent perceives his/her commitment to mission on 
a scale from essential to non-essential for his/her self- 
preservation. Therefore, constituent actions in power and 
authority relationships, directed toward self-preservation, 
reveal the role of integrity in decision-making.
Independence of purpose entails purposeful action in 
congruence with mission. The independence of purpose in 
constituent actions reflects the level of integrity with which 
they are acting. A high level of independence in constituent 
actions, without regard for consequences aside from the impact on 
mission, reveals a high level of integrity. In a university with 
a governing board influenced by commercial athletic interests, if 
the university president exercises the authority to remove a 
coach who is operating without regard for the mission of the 
institution, that president's independence of purpose reflects a 
high level of integrity since his/her actions are dictated by 
his/her commitment to the mission.
Constituents with a high level of independence perceive the
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commitment to mission as a requisite for their self-preservation. 
In contrast, constituents perceiving the commitment to mission as 
irrelevant to self-preservation, whose decisions reveal little 
independence in purpose and are dictated by other interests, 
reflect a low level of integrity. In college athletics, these 
constituents commit or allow actions contrary to the mission of 
the institution. Regardless of the level of integrity or the 
perception of resource need revealed by their actions, 
constituents remain directed by self-preservation as they 
encounter conflicting interests.
When faced with conflicting interests, constituents-- 
attempting to preserve themselves--reveal through their actions 
the balance struck between their integrity, or commitment to 
mission, and their need for resources. For example, the 
presidents' role in protecting the university mission must be 
balanced with their role in obtaining new resources for the 
university.
Balance of Perceived Resource Weeds and Integrity
The objective of the constituent is to protect his/her self- 
interests: self-preservation is the ultimate goal and foundation 
of decision-making. The tendency for presidents to present a 
visible public face--for example, leading the call for reform 
legislation in the NCAA--while conducting, or allowing, private 
actions on their own campuses contrary to their rhetoric-- 
emphasized by more than 50% of Division I-A universities caught 
breaking their own NCAA rules in the 1980s--is dictated by their
pursuit of self-preservation. (Knight Commission, 1993, p. II) As 
conflicting interests require a decision to be made, each 
constituent bases his/her decisions upon the foundation of self- 
preservation. For example, the resignation of a university 
president brought about by an overzealous board who wants to win- 
at-all-costs suggests that integrity is more critical to that 
president's own self-preservation than either winning or job 
security. In contrast, a president caught breaking NCAA rules by 
offering illegal inducements to athletes has his/her self- 
preservation closely tied to the acquisition of resource needs.
In each case, constituent actions are directed by their perceived 
needs. Dictated by the need for self-preservation, the balance 
between integrity--independence of purpose in commitment to 
university mission--and perceived resource needs in these cases 
was asymmetrical.
An imbalance between perceived resource needs and integrity 
of purpose results in the creation of breaches in authority into 
which a subsequent influx of illegitimate power fills the gaps. A 
dysfunction in the athletic governance process results. These 
imbalances have been systemic in nature, resulting in the 
application of illegitimate power in intercollegiate athletics 
for some time. For example, the unethical recruiting of 
prospective athletes has been a major concern from 1929 to today. 
(Savage et al., 1929; Knight Commission, 1993) Constituents with 
commercial athletic interests have consistently been quick to
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fill breaches in authority as they have occurred, thus, 
perpetuating the systemic imbalances in athletic governance.
Balance between perceived resource needs and integrity can 
be achieved in intercollegiate athletics. Systemic balance can 
only be achieved, however, through the many constituencies in the 
intercollegiate athletic governance process in reform efforts. A 
balance between perceived resource needs and integrity of purpose 
is more likely to produce use of legitimate power within the 
authorized governance structure. Where integrity and perceived 
resource needs are balanced, athletic governance should function 
properly if the actors are fulfilling their roles. Some athletic 
programs do it right. For example, Gilley et al. (1986)
identified four university athletic programs--Michigan, Notre 
Dame, Penn State, Virginia--in which athletic governance 
structures function through designated channels of authority. 
Systemic Dysfunction Over Time
Constituents involved in the governance of intercollegiate 
athletics have remained similar over time. In both 1929 and 
currently, the constituents with legitimate authority in 
athletics include the governing board, the president, the 
faculty, the athletic director, the coach, the conferences, and 
the NCAA. Undergraduates have consistently had a limited role or 
none at all. The media, alumni, boosters, and business leaders 
have consistently had an interest in intercollegiate athletics as 
well.
While constituents have remained similar, some of their
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defined roles have evolved over time. For example, the alumni 
have seen their legitimate role in the governance of athletics 
dissipate. In 1929, alumni gained legitimate authority at some 
institutions through athletic boards, while current alumni are 
excluded from legitimate roles in athletic governance.
Conferences played a larger role in the governance of 
intercollegiate athletics in 1929 than they do today, but the 
emergence of new conferences may signal a renewal of conference 
power. As conference roles have decreased, the legitimate role of 
the NCAA has expanded. The burgeoning influence of the NCAA make 
it the supreme inter-institutional authority in athletic policy.
The media influencing intercollegiate athletics in 1929 was 
the newspaper. The power of the media at the time was clearly 
presented in the Savage Report (1929), which concluded that 
reforms could not succeed without media support. The significance 
of the media today has not waned. In addition to continued 
newspaper coverage, the current method of coverage has expanded 
to include countless sports magazines and the powerful media of 
television. The increased magnitude of media influence is 
reflected in a $1.75 billion television deal for NCAA basketball. 
(Blum, 1995) The intensifying scrutiny of college athletics has 
resulted in several sports broadcasting networks.
While the magnitude and intensity of constituent roles may 
have changed over time, the incongruence between the structure 
and process of governance in intercollegiate athletics has 
remained constant. During both time periods, authority gaps were
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generated when prescribed roles were either neglected or 
exceeded. Consistent breaches in authority were filled by 
constituents exercising power. For example, the faculty continues 
to focus on intellectual responsibilities, leaving athletics 
governance to other constituents. Presidents while tending to 
academic matters, have consistently permitted athletics to be 
influenced or controlled by commercially-motivated constituents.
In each time period, the needs that motivated constituents 
to employ power and authority are consistent. An analysis of 
constituent practices, policies, and circumstances in 1929 and 
the present reveals that self-preservation has consistently been 
the pre-eminent need. For example, in order to preserve their 
jobs, coaches in 1929 and currently have cheated to obtain 
players who could enhance the prospect of winning. (Savage et 
al., 1929; Gilley et al., 1986) The consistent imbalance between 
resource needs and integrity over time has generated breaches in 
authority that are filled by illegitimate power. Thus, athletic 
governance has endured a systemic dysfunction for some time.
Model of Balance in Athletic Governance
Constituents in intercollegiate athletic governance make 
decisions based upon their need for self-preservation. The 
pursuit of perceived resource needs or integrity of purpose 
results in the application of power, either legitimately through 
the authority hierarchy or illegitimately filling in authority 
breaches. An analysis of the application of authority and power 
in intercollegiate athletic governance reveals a systemic
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dysfunction that is caused by self-preserving interests impacting 
the balance between perceived resource needs and integrity of 
purpose. As decisions in athletic governance are consistently 
based upon a foundation of self-preservation, and impacted by the 
balance between perceived resource needs and integrity of 
purpose, a Model of Balance in Athletic Governance emerges to 
explain the process.
low access high independence
( t ) ( T )
perceived resource needs integrity
1 A —
self-preservation
( 4 ) < * )
high, access low independence
Figure 2: Model of Balance in Athletic Governance
Coaches cheating to obtain players, boosters buying 
influence with huge cash payments, presidents abdicating their 
authority to get winning teams, and board members ignoring 
legitimate channels of authority in athletic hiring or financing 
issues are all examples of an imbalance in which perceived 
resource needs are high and integrity is low. When, to ensure 
self-preservation, the perceived need for resources is higher
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than integrity of purpose, authority breaches occur and these 
gaps are filled by the application of illegitimate power in the 
governance process. Indeed, constituents in authority roles who 
place perceived resource needs above integrity give up their 
legitimate power, or have it taken from them by constituents 
applying illegitimate power in a variety of forms. Constituents 
who exceed or neglect their role in the athletic governance 
structure in pursuit of self-preservation allow the development 
of authority breaches and the application of power in the 
governance process.
A constituent who places more emphasis on integrity than on 
resource needs to ensure self-preservation, can generate 
authority breaches as well, if other constituents' resource needs 
are high (see figure 2). The resulting gaps are filled by the use 
of illegitimate power in the governance process. These imbalances 
appear to be less common, but do occur. For example, reports 
suggest that the University of Virginia Athletic Director left 
his post to assume the corresponding position at Southern 
Methodist University because athletic interests on Virginia's 
Board of Visitors superseded his authority over the football 
coach. (Teel, 1995) The board reportedly wielded power contrary 
to the accepted line of authority in pursuit of maintaining a 
valued resource--in this case, the services of the football 
coach--thus revealing an imbalance that results in a dysfunction 
in the athletic governance process. In recent years, a number of 
university presidents have resigned, or been released, over
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conflicts with the university governing board, centering on 
athletic control. In each case, integrity appears to be an 
essential part of self-preservation, ranking higher than the 
perceived need for resources. This was the case for the UNLV 
President Robert Maxson, whose resources needs did not include 
job security. (Lederman, 1994)
Athletic governance functions properly when, to ensure self- 
preservation, a balance between the perceived need for resources 
and integrity of purpose exists (see figure 2). In this scenario, 
legitimate power is applied through channels of authority in the 
governance structure. Authority roles are fulfilled, subject to 
neither excess or neglect. Constituents make decisions through 
regular university channels and do not operate independent of the 
university authority hierarchy; this balance of resource needs 
and integrity leads to proper functioning of university athletic 
governance. (Knight Commission, 1993) Universities such as Penn 
State and Notre Dame are cited as examples of athletic programs 
that operate within the proper administrative authority of the 
university, in which a balance between perceived resource needs 
and integrity of purpose exist. (Gilley, et al., 1986)
In institutions where constituents can balance perceived 
resource needs and integrity of purpose, self-preservation is not 
fully dependent upon either and enhances the balance. Power is 
applied through regular channels of authority. A coach might not 
perceive pressure to recruit unethically because his/her self- 
preservation is not dependent upon resource needs, in this case
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athletes, which are either readily accessible and easily 
obtained, or are not expected to be obtained. The coach meets the 
perceived resource needs through authorized activities within the 
regular administrative hierarchy, neither exceeding nor 
neglecting authority roles and without having to resort to 
illegitimate sources of power.
In pursuit of self-preservation, the balance of perceived 
resource needs and integrity of purpose results in proper 
operation of the governance process through the use of legitimate 
power in the authority hierarchy of the athletic governance 
structure. An imbalance between perceived resource needs and 
integrity of purpose results in a dysfunction in the governance 
process through the actions of constituents, some of whom fail to 
fulfill their legitimate roles in the governance structure and 
some of whom use illegitimate power to fill the breaches in 
authority. Constituents, motivated by self-preservation, reveal 
through their power and authority relationships, the relative 
importance of balanced resource needs and integrity.
The Model of Balance in Athletic Governance shows the 
relationship between perceived resource needs and integrity of 
purpose, and the impact that their relative balance has on the 
creation of authority breaches and the subsequent application of 
illegitimate power. This conclusion provides insights into the 
governance of intercollegiate athletics that suggest alternatives 
for change. If systemic change is to occur, individual 
institutions, and the constituents within those institutions,
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must balance perceived resource needs and integrity as they make 
decisions in the athletic governance process.
Recommenrlations for Reform
Recommendations for reform in the governance of 
intercollegiate athletics are based upon the systemic 
dysfunctions revealed by the analysis of the use of power and 
authority and the resulting Model of Balance in Athletic 
Governance. Based on the underlying causes of systemic 
dysfunctions in the governance of intercollegiate athletics, 
potential avenues for affecting change should determine the 
participants and methods for reform (see figure 3).
1929
self -pres erva tion 
needs prompt 
authority breaches 
filled by power; 
reveal governance + 
dysfunctions
Present 
self-preservation 
needs prompt 
authority breaches 
filled by power; 
reveal governance 
dysfunctions
Reform
systemic
dysfunctions
in
governance 
reveal avenues 
for reform
reform
need for self-preservation motivates ►constituent use of power and authority, reveals _______ systemic dysfunctions in governance_____
Figure 3: Cause-Based Reform
The use of legitimate power in support of clearly 
established lines of authority will limit authority breaches and 
the resulting influx of illegitimate power. There are two levels 
at which the following reforms must ensue: at individual 
institutions, and inter-institutionally. Specifically, the 
ensuing recommendations for reform are:
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1. Each institution must clearly define its athletic 
mission.
2. Presidents must take responsibility for the policies and 
practices related to the athletic mission.
3. The authority within the NCAA must be decentralized to 
the conference and institutional level so that individual 
institutions can connect their practices to their self-proclaimed 
athletic mission.
4. Conference membership must be required of big time 
athletic programs within the NCAA, thereby placing more authority 
with the conferences.
5. Full public disclosure of the athletic mission and all 
practices related to athletics must be required by the NCAA and 
provided by each institution.
Each institution must individually commit to establish clear 
lines of authority in the governance of athletics on its own 
campus. Toward this end, institutions must first clearly define 
their own mission, and their companion goals for athletics. The 
roles of each constituent and the channels of authority must be 
specified within the institution. Institutions and constituents, 
from the board down, must use whatever legitimate power necessary 
to support the authority structure in maintaining the congruence 
between the goals and behaviors of each constituent and the 
university. If commercial athletics are valuable to an 
institution, that value should be acknowledged, not ignored. For
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example, universities should openly disclose their athletic 
intentions and practices, even if they are commercially driven.
Aligning perceived resource needs with a clearly defined 
mission and goals will support the integrity of purpose of 
constituents and balance in athletic governance. Substantive 
reforms are essential for the intercollegiate athletic governance 
system to foster balance between resource needs and integrity. In 
order to promote balance, institutions could increase resource 
accessibility. Specifically, if monetary resources are 
predominant needs for athletic constituents, universities could 
meet those needs by fully funding athletic programs through duly 
authorized channels. In that way, institutions should lock out 
the illegitimate use of power by preventing breaches of 
authority. If an intangible resource need for coaches is 
security, institutions could increase coaches' resource 
accessibility by de-emphasizing winning and increasing job 
security for coaches, if these are objectives congruent with the 
mission of the institution and its constituents.
Individual institutions through their governing boards and 
presidents must accept responsibility for the operation of their 
own athletic program. Each constituent and individual should be 
supported by higher authorities in his/her use of legitimate 
authority and power in the athletic governance process. Boards 
and presidents must support athletic directors and coaches who 
fulfill their roles and responsibilities prescribed by the 
university in accordance with the university mission. In turn,
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board members, presidents, athletic directors, and coaches alike 
should neither exceed nor neglect their prescribed roles in the 
hierarchy. University constituents must require adherence to the 
authority hierarchy in athletic governance. As constituents 
accept the responsibility of their roles in athletic governance 
through regular university channels, universities will check the 
influx of illegitimate power, backed by commercial interests.
Contrary to many reform alternatives, these recommendations 
are in no way an unqualified indictment of commercial athletics. 
Given the magnitude of the illegitimate power constituents are 
willing to use to fill any emerging gaps in authority, attempts 
to eliminate commercial interests in athletics are not only 
unfeasible but also unwise, unnecessary, and unwanted at the 
highest levels of competition. The elimination of commercial 
interests would create an imbalance that would ultimately result 
in an authority breach that would be filled by illegitimate 
power. If power is used legitimately through the authority 
hierarchy, then universities will control their commercial 
athletic activities. Big time commercial athletics can be 
compatible with the mission of a major university, if that 
university chooses to fully incorporate its athletic program as a 
legitimate component of the university, and if the university's 
mission includes articulated commercial athletic goals. Full 
public disclosure of the athletic mission, policies, and 
practices must become standard procedure. Requiring full 
disclosure of individual university athletic purposes, policies,
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and practices would enhance the clarity of the role of athletics 
within the mission of the university. Institutions are more 
likely to match their practices with their respective missions if 
both elements are made public and addressed through regular self- 
study and reporting. Universities can profit from athletics-- 
regardless of the level of commercialization--if each university 
controls athletic governance through regular authority channels 
by clearly defining athletic purposes, appropriately funding 
athletic operations, and specifically defining the authority 
parameters of each constituent.
University leaders can no longer be a spectator, viewing 
athletics with pride when teams are winning or attracting 
positive attention, or with shame when teams are losing or left 
to run out of control. Only when individuals in universities 
equalize their pursuit of resources with a commitment to 
integrity at each level of the governance process will a balance 
be created that will ease the systemic dysfunctioning of college 
athletics on their own campus. Inter-institutional athletics will 
be impacted by reform at the campus level, but intercollegiate 
athletic reform must also occur through the NCAA and at the 
conference level.
The NCAA is central to athletic reform. However, the 
Association and its member institutions must recognize the NCAA's 
self-preserving interests as the same motivation driving other 
constituents. As with its individual members, the NCAA should 
clearly define its mission and openly pursue that mission through
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a legitimate hierarchy of authority. If the NCAA, as a result of 
increased resource needs, has become increasingly commercialized, 
as reflected in its $1.75 billion television contract, it must 
come to grips with its own commercial interests, recognize those 
of its member institutions, and incorporate those interests into 
its mission. If the NCAA is to be anything more than a self- 
serving commercial organization, its member institutions must 
control its commercial endeavors through restructuring its 
authority hierarchy to more accurately reflect the interests of 
its membership.
After specifically defining its commercial interests, the 
NCAA should decentralize its authority by returning more 
authority roles and responsibilities to individual institutions 
in order to increase its effectiveness. While requiring public 
disclosure of athletic mission and practices through the NCAA, 
more authority reserved for individual universities would result 
in more effective compliance and enforcement of NCAA rules and 
regulations because each university would truly be responsible 
for its own athletic program. The nature of NCAA rules and 
regulations must necessarily change to better serve the interests 
of the membership. Since universities are diverse institutions, 
the NCAA's attempt to standardize them by delineating 512 pages 
of detailed rules has been ineffective. NCAA rules should reflect 
the least common denominator among its members institutions. 
Detailed NCAA rules should be replaced by broader, more easily 
enforced rules. For example, an NCAA rule requiring each member
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institution to disclose all athletic purposes, policies, and 
practices would place the responsibility for clarifying each 
athletic program's relation to overall mission upon the 
university itself. This type of broad-based rule would increase 
the role and accountability of local campus authority. An 
increase in local campus authority, and collective authority 
through conferences, must parallel the decentralization in order 
to build upon the basic NCAA rules.
Conferences can play a significant role in intercollegiate 
athletics, as they have in the past, by balancing conference 
membership to promote competitive parity. Like their similarly- 
constituted individual members, conferences must clarify their 
mission. Conferences, like other constituents, must pursue their 
objectives--regardless of the level of commercialization--within 
their established channels of authority. A conference, reflecting 
its member institutions and operating through a legitimate 
authority hierarchy, might legitimately pursue an agreed upon, 
commercially-oriented course of action in the governance of 
conference athletics. Conference realignments appear to be a step 
toward increasing parity among similar institutions and toward 
reestablishing conference authority in athletics. If the emerging 
super-conferences continue to function as legitimately authorized 
constituents in the governance of intercollegiate athletics, they 
will become critical in intercollegiate athletic control and 
reform.
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Recommendations for Further Study
This study deals specifically with the uses of power and 
authority in the governance of intercollegiate athletics. The 
Model of Balance in Athletic Governance, developed to explain the 
actions of constituents in the governance of athletics, lends 
itself to application in other areas, both inside and outside of 
higher education. For example, the model might be employed to 
examine other institutional components or other constituents in 
universities. The model could also be applied in political 
arenas, businesses, or other organizational studies. It might 
also be adapted to a study of personal decision-making 
strategies.
The analysis of the application of power and authority in 
college athletics ultimately led to the Model of Balance in 
Athletic Governance. A similar analysis of power and authority 
relationships in other arenas, either inside or outside of higher 
education, would seem to be a natural next step. For example, an 
analysis of the application of power and authority in athletics 
in high schools, or Division II and Division III institutions 
might follow. Additional studies might analyze other areas of 
concern within higher education. The analysis of power and 
authority could be adapted to non-educational organizations, such 
as business or political organizations. Since this study is based 
on national data, a follow up could utilize similar techniques to 
look at individual institutions. Thus, individual universities
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could begin to make necessary changes based on their specific 
circumstances.
An analysis of the application of power and authority, 
leading to use of the Model of Balance in Athletic Governance, 
could readily be applied to individual case studies of athletic 
directors, presidents, board members, coaches, or other 
constituents. In order to determine cause-based solutions to 
specific problems, a similar analysis of the use of power and 
authority, leading to the application of the Model in an 
institutional case study of an athletic department or other 
university program might be useful. The Model might also be 
adapted to a case study of an organization outside of academe.
In conclusion, this study determined how some constituents 
legitimately use authority within the organizational structure, 
and how others illegitimately use power to fill gaps in 
authority. These breaches are generated by the pursuit of self- 
preservation by constituents who are balancing resource needs and 
integrity. The result of the use of illegitimate power by 
constituents to fill in breaches in authority is a systemic 
dysfunction in the governance of intercollegiate athletics that 
has existed over time. This dysfunction has been allowed to go on 
for over sixty years and the gaps have widened consistently in 
that time. Individual universities must align athletic purposes, 
policies, and practices with their mission. Thus, in looking to 
the future, duly authorized administrators of individual 
institutions must assume more responsibility in the governance of
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athletics on their own campus as well as through their conference 
and the NCAA.
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ABSTRACT
The intent of this study was to explore constituent 
utilization of power and authority over time that led to systemic 
dysfunctions in the governance of intercollegiate athletics, and 
to examine the needs motivating the interested constituents, thus 
suggesting alternatives for reform, a comparison of the policies, 
practices, and circumstances of constituents in 1929 and the 
present was based upon an analysis of the Carnegie Foundation for 
the Advancement of Teaching Report (1929) ; the American Council 
on Education Report (1986); and the Knight Commission Report 
(1993), and other books, articles, and reports.
The constituents involved in the governance of 
intercollegiate athletics were consistent over time and included 
the governing board, the president, the faculty, the athletic 
director, the coach, conferences, the NCAA, boosters, business 
leaders, and the media. These constituents' use of power and 
authority was examined based upon Burbules' (1986) description of 
the legitimacy of authority and the reciprocal nature of power 
and upon Wolf's (1990) modes of power: interpersonal, tactical, 
and structural.
In both time periods, systemic dysfunction in the governance 
of intercollegiate athletics resulted from constituents who 
either neglected or exceeded their prescribed authority roles, 
thus generating breaches in authority. Other constituents 
subsequently exercised illegitimate power to fill these gaps in 
authority. Since constituent exercise of power and authority is 
based upon the inherent conflict of interest in power relations, 
an examination of the needs motivating constituents to use power 
and authority was essential. The examination of needs was based 
upon Maslow's (1970) deficiency needs that were the foundation of 
his Hierarchy of Needs. The basic constituent need that motivated 
constituents to exercise power and authority in both 1929 and the 
present was founded on self-preservation.
The Model of Balance in Athletic Governance explained the 
relationship between constituent resource needs and their 
integrity and was based on self-preservation, when an imbalance 
occurred, the Model explained why constituents exceeded or 
neglected their prescribed authority roles and why other 
constituents used power to fill the gaps in authority.
Reformers must ultimately understand the needs and roles of 
constituents and their use of power and authority over time in 
the governance of intercollegiate athletics in order to devise 
feasible reform alternatives. Only through understanding the 
participants and process of athletic governance can reformers 
have a genuine and lasting impact upon changes in the operation 
of intercollegiate athletics. Recommendations for reform were 
based upon the needs of constituents that motivate their exercise 
of power and authority. Reform recommendations at both the 
individual university and inter-institutional level included: 1. 
clarify the athletic mission; 2. presidential control; 3. 
decentralize the NCAA and increase conference influence; and 4. 
require full public disclosure of policies and practices.
